251. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea1

108338. 1. If NK MAC proposes you sign receipt comparable to that given by UNCMAC for helicopter pilots Stutts and Voltz in May 1964, suggest you counter with following arguments:

a.
Facts on helicopter pilots were quite different, and that case is no precedent for proper handling of this one.
b.
Our side recognized that pilots had entered airspace over territory under control of your side and landed in North Korea; there was no dispute about these facts.
c.
Case of Pueblo is quite different. Your side has asserted vessel was in territorial waters of North Korea at time of seizure. Our information, based on reporting of positions not only by Pueblo but also by NK vessels participating in seizure, shows Pueblo was more than fifteen nautical miles seaward from nearest NK territory—Ung Do Island. In our view there is no possibility Pueblo was in territorial waters at time of seizure even if such waters were measured as extending twelve nautical miles from coast, as claimed by some countries.
d.
Our side will, of course, conduct further inquiry into facts of incident once crew have been released and we have access to information they can provide.

2. You should not agree to or sign any receipt or other statement except unconditional release. You should refer any NK proposals to Washington for instructions and propose another meeting.

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3. At this stage it is impossible to foresee development of exchanges in Panmunjom. We will need to review developments as they occur. Our tentative thinking on some possibilities, FYI, is as follows:

a.
One possible course might be form of receipt in which positions of both sides are accurately reflected as to Pueblo facts. We might agree to formulation of NK position proposed by them, so long as it is clearly stated to be theirs. Our position might then be set forth along following lines: “According to our data, USS Pueblo, a commissioned war vessel of the United States Navy, was in international waters at the time of its seizure by North Korean naval units, at a distance of more than fifteen nautical miles from the nearest point in North Korean territory.” This for your information and not to be put forward without further instructions.
b.
Also for your info and not to be put forward: It is altogether unlikely NK MAC would be interested in having receipt embody any statement as to what either side would do on basis of further inquiry into Pueblo incident following release of crew. However, if they should propose statement to effect that US will make some kind of amends if it is later determined, after crew and vessel released, that Pueblo was in the territorial waters, we could agree to balanced statement along following lines: “If further investigation should disclose that the Pueblo was in the territorial sea of North Korea, US Govt would express its regret and give assurance against recurrence of incident. If further investigation should disclose that the Pueblo was in international waters, North Korea would express its regret and make appropriate reparation.”

NK side will not, of course, accept anything like this, but balanced statement would be appropriate counter to any NK proposal on subsequent steps.2

  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cactus. Repeated to USUN. Drafted by Meeker; cleared by Berger, Walsh, Sisco, and Rostow; and approved by Katzenbach. According to a copy of the telegram in the Johnson Library it was also cleared by President Johnson. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea—Pueblo Incident—Cactus I, Cactus State Cables, January 28, 1968 to February 10, 1968)
  2. Printed from an unsigned copy.