245. Editorial Note

On January 29, 1968, Director of Intelligence and Research Thomas L. Hughes sent to Secretary Rusk intelligence reports analyzing the Soviet, Communist Chinese, and world reaction to the seizure of the Pueblo. “The Emerging Soviet Line on the Pueblo Incident,” Intelligence Note No. 75, concluded that Moscow adopted a public posture of noninvolvement, but also sought to diffuse the issue and prevent tensions from escalating. (Attached to a memorandum from Rostow to the President, January 30; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea—Pueblo Incident, Vol. I, Part B [through January]) The analysis of Communist China’s response, “Peking on Pueblo: Relatively Cool,” concluded that, since relations between China and North Korea were strained, the Chinese had remained detached from and had adopted a low profile toward the crisis. “Initial World Reaction to the Pueblo Incident,” presented the Communist and non-Communist reactions and briefly summarized the country-by-country response of the nations within each ideological orbit. (Intelligence Notes No. 78 and No. 76 respectively, both January 29; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US)