Office of the Historian

234. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea1

Washington, January 28, 1968, 0208Z.

106066. Ref: State 106065.2 Further instructions follow:

1.
In meetings with North Korean side of MAC you should make business-like, dispassionate presentation of US positions. In answer to any North Korean harangue or propagandistic argumentation, you should give calm and factual response, setting forth US views plainly and firmly.
2.
North Korean side may press argument that Pueblo was in territorial waters. You should respond with following points:
a.
Pueblo under US Naval orders to stay at least 13 nautical miles from coast and thus would not enter any waters that North Korea claimed as territorial sea;
b.
At time when Pueblo was hailed by North Korean submarine chaser, Pueblo radioed her position as 39–25.2 North Latitude 127–55 East Longitude—a position more than 15 nautical miles from nearest North Korean territory, Ung Do Island;
c.
At exactly the same time, North Korean submarine chaser Number 35 radioed to shore its position as 39 degrees 25 minutes North Latitude 127 degrees 56 minutes East Longitude—a position approximately one mile further East and seaward from that reported by Pueblo;
d.
At time of boarding, North Korean vessels reported the position as further East, at 39–26 North Latitude 128–02 East Longitude.
3.
North Korean official message said, “It is quite possible to solve this problem if USA will acknowledge that the people of the ship are prisoners of war.” We are not sure what they mean. This may be intended as an admission that the Pueblo crew was engaged in warlike activity. Or it may be intended as a ploy to bargain for the return of North Koreans. Accordingly our language avoids specific reference to prisoners of war, and you should avoid phrase or acknowledgment, and try to minimize issue, simply repeating that they were taken by force and are at least entitled to the protection of Geneva Conventions of 1949. If this point proves troublesome, you should say these are highly technical and legal matters, and you would like clarification of what they mean, so as to study matter further.
4.
North Korean official message refers initially to “question of ship and crew” but later to “willingness to negotiate or discuss in a normal way when one side would like to have prisoners back.” US position, of course, is that both vessel and crew are to be returned and you should seek to deal with both together. However, there is obviously a priority in physical return of crew from North Korean custody and, realistically considered, arrangements for return of crew could be more rapidly carried out than necessarily more complicated arrangements for return of vessel.
5.
If North Korean side should refer to prospect of criminal trial or penalties for crew members, you should point out that no basis exists for prosecution and that any such action would be contrary to Geneva Conventions of 1949 and threats this nature not helpful in search for peaceful solution.

Rusk
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US. Secret; Flash; Nodis; Cactus. Repeated to USUN. Drafted by Meeker; cleared by Berger, Rostow, and Walsh; and approved by Katzenbach.↩
  2. Document 233.↩