Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

211. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to President Johnson¹

Washington, December 23, 1968.

SUBJECT

• Review of United States Policy Toward Korea: Status Report

Last February, upon his return from Seoul, Mr. Vance recommended to you that we reassess our policy toward Korea. You asked me to take responsibility for this task. This assessment has been going forward under the direction and supervision of the Senior Interdepartmental Group.²

As a result of the work, the issues are now well understood.³ A considerable amount of highly technical analysis—economic, military and political—remains to be completed but these studies, too, are now well under way.⁴ Thus, we should be able to present your successor with incisive, well-grounded policy options and with detailed program recommendations to carry out these options.

This memorandum is in the nature of an interim report—to tell you what we have accomplished to date and what remains to be done.

Importance of Korea

I need not dwell on the extent of our Korean involvement and its dangers. Our intelligence both as to intent and capability needs improvement,⁵ but it does seem clear that North Korea remains aggressively bent on swallowing the South. Over the past year Pyongyang has significantly stepped up its provocative actions. South Korean patience is running thin. We are tied to South Korea’s defense by treaty commitments and perhaps even more by history. Our military presence in Korea still numbers over 50,000. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Last year we provided some $350 million in military and economic assistance (plus the special $100 million military assistance appropriation you sought of the Congress).

We should be proud of our efforts in Korea. The Koreans have used our assistance well. Their economy is growing at near fantastic rates and the prospects for ultimate viability are excellent. Korean military forces are among the best in the world, as their 50,000 troops in Viet-Nam more than attest.

Our Objectives in Korea

Our objectives in Korea are:

• —To keep South Korea out of hostile hands;
• —To reduce the probability of large-scale North-South hostilities;
• —To maintain a stable compromise among the great powers with interests in Korea;
• —To increase ROK ability to defend itself;
• —To promote South Korean economic and political development;
• —To encourage a greater Japanese contribution to ROK security and prosperity.

Some Tentative Conclusions

The conclusion which I and the other members of the SIG draw from this record is this:

There must be no question about the strength and importance of our commitment to the security of South Korea in the face of an aggressive adversary. But, as time goes by, it is appropriate to reconsider the question of whether our present posture decided many years ago is still an optimal one for meeting our commitment.

The answer could well turn out to be that it is. But the SIG believes that there is here a real and pressing question of national policy and strategy which will bear further examination by the next Administration.

• —The Republic of Korea (ROK) has made great progress in all areas. Increasingly, she has the strength—and should be encouraged—to stand on her own two feet.
• —Our knowledge about North Korean military capabilities is limited and may not be altogether reliable. This raises questions about what the military balance—with and without United States forces—actually is and how, if necessary, it should be improved.
• —Our present policy effectively ties down in Korea two United States divisions, which are not available for use elsewhere. They require substantial expenditures for support both in Korea and the United States.
• —Our present posture leaves us little choice as to whether and how to become involved on the ground in the event large-scale hostilities reoccur on the Peninsula.

Whether or not we consciously change our strategy, the United States will face important decisions in Korea over the next few years. Sooner or later, the ROK divisions in Viet-Nam will return home. We will have to make choices on the kinds of force structures—both ROK and U.S.—we should maintain. The prospects for the Korean MAP—so essential to our defense policy toward Korea—are uncertain and we need to consider whether to try to transfer this program completely to the Defense Department budget. Some of our policy options require considerable lead time (e.g. MAP), and the new Administration will have to act soon if the United States wants to maintain these options.

Uncertainties

There are a number of uncertainties which hinder reaching definitive conclusions on any changes in policy:

• —First, as already indicated, our limited intelligence makes it difficult to estimate the precise nature of the threat to South Korea.
• —Second, there is the even greater difficulty of determining the likely effect on North Korean, USSR, and Communist Chinese attitudes, intentions, and policies, of any change in our military posture.
• —Third, the outcome in Viet-Nam may affect the general climate in East Asia including Korea.
• —Fourth, the 1971 Korean Presidential election raises serious questions about the continuation of political stability in Korea.
• —Fifth, our position in Japan or Okinawa—now essential to Korea’s defense—could well be eroded in coming years.

Some Key Issues

The critical problem to resolve is whether it is possible to substitute improved Korean combat forces in whole or in part for our forces now in Korea and still maintain a combined ROK-U.S. strength adequate to provide deterrence and, if necessary, deal with the likely military threats. This question in turn raises a host of subsidiary questions.

• —Is the United States combat presence, 15 years after the Korean War, an irreplaceable element of deterrence against North Korean attack?
• —If our forces are reduced or withdrawn, will we be politically able in the United States to reintroduce them should hostilities again break out?
• —How much of a South Korean defense is needed to replace United States forces and what will it cost? What kind of United States force capabilities would we want to keep in readiness against certain major military contingencies such as a combined Chicom-North Korean attack? [1 line of source text not declassified]
• —Is it feasible to reduce the margin of uncertainty about North Korean military capabilities by a stepped-up intelligence effort?
• —What would be the effect of a United States troop withdrawal from Korea on our position in Asia?

In addition, there are several subsidiary questions:

• —To what extent is a “trade-off” between US and ROK forces compatible with our objectives for Korean political stability and development?
• —Similarly, what share of the cost of its own military needs can we ask the ROK to assume without impairing her now very favorable economic prospects?
• —And, finally, how can we obtain the necessary funds to assist the ROK in a multi-year program for the improvement of her forces?

Remaining Efforts

I have listed only some of the more fundamental problems involved in any policy change. They are not easy to resolve. To deal with them in an orderly manner we need a more detailed look at these and similar problems. The SIG has commissioned an interagency group to assess them and to determine, as precisely as the subject allows, the technical, and political feasibility, requirements, costs, advantages and disadvantages, of various policy options in Korea.

The end-product of our whole review effort will be alternative five-year programs for ROK and United States forces and for United States economic and military assistance programs which can serve as the basis for decision-making by the new Administration.

Parenthetically, I am hopeful that the interagency study effort will also shed light on how to improve our whole approach to integrated country planning and programming in areas where security, economic, and political considerations so greatly overlap.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence concur in this memorandum.

Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 1 KOR S–US. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis.
2. Reference is to the study, “U.S. Policy Toward Korea,” June 15; Document 201.
3. The SIG members met to discuss the paper on policy toward Korea on September 19. A September 9 Issues Paper and an undated Briefing Paper were prepared in advance of the SIG meeting. Copies of those documents as well as minutes of the SIG meeting are in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, Senior Interdepartmental Group, Vol. 7, 43rd Meeting, September 19, 1968 and National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Senior Interdepartmental Group Files: Lot 70 D 263.
4. Katzenbach sent a memorandum to SIG members on September 26 directing the initiation of an interagency study based on the issues raised and points of agreement derived from the September 19 SIG meeting. (Ibid.)
5. A letter from Katzenbach to Helms, November 30, discussing options for an effective intelligence program in Korea as well as similar documentation focusing on the intelligence issue are ibid., Central Files 1967–69, POL 1 KOR S–US.