Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

208. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (McCain) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)¹

Honolulu, November 16, 1968, 0538Z.

160538Z. The Korean Situation.

1. From all appearances, Kim Il-Song is accelerating considerably his drive to unify Korea on Communist terms. Coming at a time when the Vietnam situation is in a state of flux, Kim’s strategy of subversion and terror could have serious implications for the PACOM. Realizing that trying to predict the whys and wherefores of Kim Il-Song’s behavior is a risky business, I am, nevertheless, taking this opportunity to pass on my views on the Korean situation.

2. On the dangerous side, I see Kim implementing a Korean-style “Vietnam strategy” to foment revolution in the ROK. For the first time we are experiencing in the winter months a surge of rear-area, guerrilla-agent actions combined with intensified DMZ activities. This may well be Kim’s opening, and what he may consider to be decisive, drive to establish a viable infrastructure of revolution in the South. I am confident that the South Koreans, with our help, are capable of dealing effectively with Kim’s threat, but I am also concerned that his failure to subvert the ROK may lead him to further rash actions. The chance that the ROKs could be provoked or would be more inclined to take unilateral action is now increased greatly.

3. Although we have not been able to establish a direct relationship between the actions occurring in Vietnam and those in Korea, I am concerned that events in each place may be correlated and coordinated in future Communist strategy and military actions. Kim probably has fairly accurately assessed the general scheme of things in Southeast Asia. He will use every opportunity originating in SEA to increase tension in Northeast Asia. For instance, there is considerable uncertainty regarding North Korean actions if the Vietnamese Communists were now to embark on a renewed country-wide offensive activity. The termination of hostilities and the resultant draw-down of friendly forces in Vietnam also could be viewed by Kim as an opportune time to cause trouble. The vision of a revitalized ROK power base could lead Kim to hasty action in a “now or never” drive to subvert the ROK or even to attempt a reunification of the Koreas by force. This situation could hold a number of possibilities for miscalculation by the Communists.

4. Trying to predict North Korea’s behavior, however, can lead us down some dark passages. There are constraining factors which are bound to inhibit Kim’s efforts to unify Korea. He appears strong militarily but is not in a position to take over South Korea by his own forces alone. Kim speaks stridently and is inclined to take risks and there is a chance that he can miscalculate, but I do not believe he is wholly irrational. We can expect him to be deterred at least in some degree by the risks to his country and to himself of initiating open conflict.

5. On balance, we expect that Kim will do everything in his power to subvert South Korea short of open hostilities. He could become particularly dangerous if he feels his timetable for subversion is running out. My people are constantly and closely watching the Korean situation.

6. Very respectfully and warm regards.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Memos, Vol. IV. Secret; Noforn; Eyes Only. Repeated to COMUSKOREA and DIA and forwarded by Wheeler’s office to Rostow, Rusk, and Helms.