204. Report Prepared by the Department of State1

SITUATION IN NORTH KOREA

The posture of the North Korean regime remains extremely hostile, but there are no discernible indications that they are considering an all-out attack on South Korea or even a large-scale provocation of some sort.2 The frequency of incidents along the DMZ, which had been considerably lower this year than last, has risen in recent weeks. The character of these incidents has, however, not altered.

Despite the continued propaganda attacks on US and our South Korean “puppets”,3 we have not observed any changes in North Korean military dispositions which would indicate that an attack is likely. Their posture is such that we might have little or no warning of an attack over the DMZ but its prospects for success would be dim. President Pak and his colleagues, who were extremely nervous some months ago, now seem confident that the US and ROK forces can handle any contingency. Talk of an “Israeli-type” lightning blow from the North is less frequently heard. Nor are the ROKs talking about the need to retaliate against provocations.

Provocative infiltrations through the DMZ and attacks on our patrols have continued, but the incident and casualty rates since February are well below 1967. Small groups sent to reconnoiter military targets are most common. Infiltrations by sea, a real worry last year, have been close to zero this summer, though a few may have taken place undetected. Since late July DMZ incidents have increased in frequency but it is too soon to say if this is a brief flurry or a disquieting trend.

In sum, we do not believe the North Koreans are planning any large-scale operation which would risk provoking a war. Tension remains high, however, and the Intelligence Community is keeping the closest watch on the situation.

  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–7 KOR S. Secret. Attached to an August 14 memorandum from Read to Rostow that states the report was prepared in response to a request from the President. Rostow forwarded the report to the President by telegram. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Memos, Vol. VI)
  2. The Embassy prepared frequent reports on North Korean infiltration and subversive activities. Those assessments are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–7 KOR S.
  3. An analysis of North Korean propaganda efforts revealed increased activity “designed largely to provoke anti-American sentiment and to enhance the image of the DPRK.” (Intelligence Note 424, June 3; ibid.)