Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

202. Information Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson¹

Washington, June 19, 1968, 10:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Sec. Clifford argues that we should not proceed with the dispatch of the 5,000 Korean civilians to Vietnam because of the high budgetary cost in allocating the equipment held on Okinawa to expedite the reequipment of the GVN forces. He also argues that to accept the civilians would make it more difficult to get the additional 6,000 combat troops which were to have been part of the 11,000 light division from Korea.

This item is on the lunch agenda today.

Walt

Attachment

Washington, June 18, 1968.

Department of Defense Paper

Additional ROK Deployments to Vietnam

Last fall, the South Korean Government agreed to deploy an additional light division to South Vietnam. They proposed to send 5,000 ROK civilians to replace an equal number of present support troops. In addition, 6,000 combat troops were to be sent to make up the light division total of 11,000.

During the conversations in Honolulu, President Park reaffirmed the commitment to supply additional combat forces but contended that it was not feasible for him to proceed to secure the National Assembly’s support for this deployment at this time. He urged, however, that we go ahead with the deployment of 5,000 ROK civilians and the conversion of that number of ROK support forces to the combat role.

Intelligence reports indicate that Park’s assessment of the political situation eliminates any chance that he will dispatch additional combat forces to Vietnam now or within the foreseeable future. However, the ROK Government continues to press us to agree that they should send the 5,000 civilians to Vietnam. It seems clear that they view this arrangement as a way to obtain high paying jobs and to earn additional foreign exchange.

Korean Defense Minister Choi raised this matter with Secretary Clifford and Secretary Nitze during his visit here last month.² In response to his argument that the question of the 6,000 additional combat troops could be dealt with separately and later, he was told that this decision could only be made by the President.

It is recommended that we not now agree to the dispatch of these additional ROK civilians and that this be delayed until such time as the ROK Government is prepared to send additional combat troops. This recommendation is supported by the following reasons:

1. These 5,000 civilians have always been part of the package for an additional ROK light division of 11,000 men. If the package is now divided and the civilians separately approved, the chances, already slim, of later obtaining the additional 6,000 combat troops, are probably much diminished.

2. Because the ROKs view this as a monetary transaction, they have asked for comparatively high pay scales for these civilians. At their “asking” price, the total wages for 5,000 additional ROK civilians would cost the U.S. about $22 million annually. Ambassador Porter thinks it would take at least $15 to $18 million annually to satisfy ROK political and economic requirements. However, Ambassador Bunker and Admiral Sharp recommend we pay no more than $4 to $5 million annually. Wages for a comparable number of ROK military personnel in Vietnam, including overseas allowances paid by the U.S. and base pay and allowances paid by the ROK Government, would be about $5 million annually. Wages paid in Korea for a comparable number of ROK civilians in equivalent jobs would be about $4 million annually. The Korean asking price for the lowest grade civilian would be about $4,000 per year, compared with about $800 per year earned by a ROK soldier in Vietnam for an equivalent job and about $600 per year earned by a ROK civilian in Korea in a comparable position.

We continue to receive congressional and public criticism of U.S. payments to Korean troops and civilians currently in Vietnam. We are criticized for hiring “mercenaries” and for giving Korean civilians preferential consideration over U.S. and other TCN personnel. If we now accede to either the Korean asking price or Ambassador Porter’s recommendation, the resultant bonus paid to these additional Korean civilians in Vietnam could generate more public and congressional criticism at home.

3. Combat equipment for 5,000 additional ROK forces would be required. This is equipment identical with that which we are attempting to provide to the GVN forces on a priority basis and any provision to the ROK would result in a one-for-one slippage in the timing of our efforts to make the GVN capable of assuming a larger role in the war. This problem of priorities would also exist in the follow-on support for these forces.

The major equipment for a full ROK light division (11,000 men) is still being held on Okinawa. If we do not now agree to the dispatch of the 5,000 civilians, all of this equipment should now be released to expedite the reequipment of the GVN forces. If the ROK Government should later decide to go ahead with the deployment of the light division, at least 90 days would be required to ready these forces. The necessary equipment could be reconstituted in from 90 to 120 days. Accordingly, the release of the equipment at the present time would not result in any appreciable delay if a deployment decision is reached later.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Cambodia 5E(3), November 1968 to January 1969. Secret.
2. Choi visited the United States May 27 and 28. Documentation covering that visit is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/OASD/ISA Files: FRC 73 A 1250, Korea 337.