Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

19. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara¹

JCSM-683–64

Washington, August 11, 1964.

SUBJECT

• Guidance to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (U)

1. Recent communications from the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC), indicate the need for guidance for his use in discussions initiated by Republic of Korea (ROK) Government officials concerning military force levels in Korea and the Korean Military Assistance Program. Inasmuch as these matters have political and economic as well as military implications, your approval of guidance to CINCUNC is desired.

2. On 17 and 18 June 1964, General Howze (CINCUNC) was visited by ROK Minister of Defense Kim Sung-eun, who indicated he had five proposals he would like to present to the US Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense and to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, should he have the opportunity to visit Washington. These proposals were as follows:

a. That ROK armed forces not be reduced.

b. That US forces in Korea not be reduced.

c. That military aid to Korea be increased.

d. That the MAP Transfer Program—Korea be suspended for at least two years.

e. That the United States support financially the needed pay increase for the Korean armed forces.

3. The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the above subjects are summarized in the Appendix hereto.²

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have concluded that CINCUNC should be furnished the following guidance for use in discussions initiated by ROK Government officials:

a. ROK Force Levels

(1) In view of the current situation in Southeast Asia, the United States does not favor any reduction in military capability in the Far East. Therefore, the United States considers that ROK forces should remain at the current levels.

(2) Any announcement of reduction in ROK forces prior to an announcement to withdraw a portion of the US forces stationed in Korea could be expected to have an adverse effect on congressional support of the Korean MAP.

b. US Forces

(1) The United States does not intend to lessen its over-all military capability in the Far East.

(2) No indication should be given ROK Government officials that the United States is considering withdrawing one division from Korea.

c. Korean MAP

(1) There are no immediate prospects for relief from the pressures of reduced funding.

(2) There are many competing requirements for funds under MAP. The Department of Defense is obliged to seek a strategic balance world-wide within the dollar ceiling appropriated by the US Congress.

(3) The Department of Defense recognizes the contributions to Free World security being made by the Republic of Korea, and the ROK need for support under MAP.

d. MAP Transfer Program

(1) The basic principle of the MAP Transfer Program, to encourage a country to shoulder more of the operations and maintenance cost of its defense burden, is valid. Through it a greater portion of the MAP can be devoted to investment purposes.

(2) The MAP Transfer Program must be applied with flexibility, submitting it to frequent review, extending its time phasing, or reducing it as necessary when continued implementation will result in further reduction in ROK forces below Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) force objectives; but cancellation of the program should be avoided.

(3) As stipulated in the Military Assistance Manual, AID will support approximately two-thirds of the ROK defense budget, and the ROK defense budget should be permitted to increase to allow for the MAP Transfer.

(4) As stated in the message AIDTO Circular 573,³ execution of the MAP Transfer Program does not imply a concomitant decrease in the Korean MAP.

e. Korean Pay Raise

Provision of a pay raise is primarily an internal matter to be acted upon by the ROK Government. However, the Military Assistance Manual provides that AID will underwrite approximately two-thirds of the cost of a cost-of-living pay adjustment.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the guidelines listed above be approved. Upon approval, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will issue appropriate guidance to CINCUNC.⁴

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27–14 KOR/UN. Secret. Attached to an October 1 letter from Green to Henry S. Rowen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, and to an August 21 letter from Rowen to William Bundy.
2. Not printed.
3. AIDTO Circular 573, dated 16 December 1963. [Footnote in the source text; telegram in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19 US–S KOR.]
4. Rowen sent a copy of this memorandum to the Department of State for review and comment. Green replied on October 1 by suggesting that, although the JCS position differed from that of other agencies, the paper be sent to General Howze for his consideration. (Ibid., POL 27–14 KOR/UN)