Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

187. Information Memorandum From the Chairman of the Korean Task Force (Brown) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, March 12, 1968.

SUBJECT

• Possibility of Obtaining Two Additional ROK Divisions for Viet-Nam

REFERENCE

• Seoul’s 4784²

The Situation

1. ROK Prime Minister Chong Il-kwon has suggested to Ambassador Porter the possibility that the ROKG might be persuaded to send to Viet-Nam two combat divisions in addition to the light division which President Pak has already agreed, in principle, to deploy. The Prime Minister’s proposal is set forth in detail in Seoul’s 4784, a copy of which is attached. Although Chong stated that this proposal is entirely his own idea, it is possible that he has discussed it with President Pak and other ROKG officials.

2. The pros and cons of this proposal are discussed below. Because a decision on this subject will have an impact upon our budget and upon equipment modernization for GVN and US forces, I do not believe any decision can be made regarding it until equipment availabilities are sorted out and decisions made regarding US reserve call up and possible additional deployments to Viet-Nam.

Discussion

3. The Prime Minister has proposed that the ROKG deploy to Viet-Nam two regular ROK Army divisions, one light division (two regiments), and 5,000 civilian reservists (the latter to free 5,000 ROK logistic troops in Viet-Nam for combat duty). The result would be a total ROK force in Viet-Nam of about 97,000 men, including five ROK Army combat divisions, and 17 divisions in Korea. In conjunction with these deployments, according to Chong, the US Government, in addition to equipping, supporting, and paying the overseas allowances of deployed forces, would be expected to:

a. Finance the mobilization to active duty in Korea of the three Ready Reserve divisions (estimated cost $23 million);

b. Provide equipment to bring the seven ROK rear area security reserve divisions up to the level of regular Ready Reserve divisions (estimated cost $63 million);

c. Construct a large air base on Cheju Island (as a possible eventual replacement for Okinawa when that island reverts to Japanese control).

4. ROK-US negotiations for the deployment of the light division and 5,000 civilians have already virtually been completed, with the exception of the issue of pay scales for the civilians. Equipment which could be used for this light division (or for US or GVN forces) is available in Okinawa. However, the ROKG has not yet sought National Assembly approval of this deployment.

5. Deployment of two additional divisions would also require approval by the Assembly and its approval is by no means to be taken for granted.

6. In conjunction with the despatch of the light division, we have agreed to provide to the ROKG: two destroyers, 12 helicopters, one battalion of 8-inch howitzers, operating and maintenance costs of 8 additional battalions constituting a counter-infiltration strike force, a $32 million counter-infiltration program, and financial support for the light division and 5,000 civilians. Delivery on these commitments is proceeding on schedule. Total one-time cost of this package is estimated at $54.7 million, with an annual recurring cost of $77 million.

7. Implementation of the Prime Minister’s proposal would have the following advantages:

a. It would provide two additional combat divisions for Viet-Nam over and above the light division the ROKs have already agreed to supply;

b. It would be a strong demonstration to the North Koreans that their efforts to deter the ROKG from further participation in Viet-Nam had not only failed but had resulted in increased ROKG participation;

c. It would strengthen the ROK armed forces in Korea.

8. Possible disadvantages include the following:

a. Availability of major items of equipment, such as the M–16 rifle and helicopters, is so limited that a choice would have to be made between arming US reserves activated, ARVN troops, or the two ROK divisions;

b. It would require major augmentation of US logistical personnel in Viet-Nam (roughly one American for every three Koreans);

c. The style of ROK operations in Viet-Nam is such (i.e., virtually to take over the government of the areas in which they operate) that doubling the size of the ROK forces might have a significant adverse effect on Vietnamese attitudes;

d. Such a large increase in the level of ROK forces in Viet-Nam (from 49,000 to about 97,000) would greatly strengthen the ROKG’s demand and expectation for active participation in strategic planning regarding the Viet-Nam conflict, in planning for peace negotiations and in the negotiations themselves. In this regard, we should bear in mind that the ROKs even now take a hard line in expecting a military victory in Viet-Nam and they would not double their forces unless they were determined to pursue this outcome. Thus US–ROK relations might be complicated and frictions might result which could have an inhibiting effect on ROKG participation in post-Viet-Nam activities elsewhere in the area.

e. Cost—$141 million one-time cost (without including any estimate of the cost of building an airbase on Cheju-do) and a recurring cost of $387 million. (Both figures include the cost of the light division and 5,000 civilians.) 9. We have had preliminary discussions of the Prime Minister’s proposal with DOD/ISA. Our tentative conclusion is that, unless the equipment shortage is so acute that the equipment now in Okinawa and presently earmarked for the light division will have to be limited to US or ARVN use, Ambassador Porter should be instructed to seek the early deployment of the light division and 5,000 civilians, without prejudice to the proposal to deploy two additional divisions. Decision regarding the latter will, we assume, have to await decisions regarding further US deployment.

10. This course of action, involving two Assembly approvals, might make the second approval of the two additional divisions more difficult if this proposal should turn out to be desirable and feasible. However, the light division could be deployed soon while the two divisions proposal is highly tentative and at best will take weeks to negotiate and months to implement. We conclude that it is the wise course to proceed with what has already been agreed and not entangle it with this more complicated new proposal.³

11. We are requesting Ambassador Porter’s considered views on the two division proposal, including his reactions to the specific pros and cons listed above.⁴

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Fleck and cleared by Steadman (DOD). Copies were sent to Katzenbach, William Bundy, and Habib.
2. Document 186. The memorandum indicates that Rusk saw this telegram, a copy of which was attached.
3. Paragraphs 1–10 were repeated in an undated action memorandum from Bundy to Rusk, a copy of which was sent to the Department of Defense, where Warnke forwarded it to Clifford with a covering memorandum indicating that he concurred with the recommendations contained therein. (Memorandum from Warnke to Clifford, March 12; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/OASD/ISA Files: FRC 73 A 1250, Korea 370)
4. Transmitted to Porter in telegram 128972 to Seoul, March 13. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27–3 VIET S)