178. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State1
4207. VANTO 8. Cyrus Vance, accompanied by Ambassador Porter, General Bonesteel, John Walsh and Colonel Greenleaf met for 2 and 1/2 hours this morning with the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Defense Minister, Information Minister,CIA Director, and Chief JCS. Session was intense, frank, spirited, and we believe helpful to both sides. Under existing circumstances each side felt constrained to get certain issues out on the table. This was done without excessive rancor.
The discussion, which was identified by the Ministers as consultations under our joint mutual security treaty, ranged widely over varied aspects of US commitments and performance in the postwar world, the origins of the Korean War, US-Korean relations, US assistance to Korea, Korean participation in the Vietnam struggle, problems of Korean public opinion, Panmunjom Communist objectives, overt and covert Communist threats to Korea, and the tactics of dealing with indirect North Korean aggression. After several hours of give-and-take, the [Page 374] ROKs expressed full confidence that the US would respond in the event of overt aggression and that further discussions would be limited to the problem of indirect aggression and the method of dealing with it.
Vance at this point said the next question to be addressed was whether it was possible to define in advance what degree of indirect aggression required counter reaction which of course carries with it the risk of war. Vance said he had long reflected on this problem and had concluded that it was impossible to do so. He had therefore concluded that the best course to pursue in the event of further incidents of indirect aggression is to consult and then jointly determine what action should be taken in light of all existing circumstances. Furthermore, he said, in our democracy we must operate under the Mutual Defense Treaty ratified by Congress. President can only take action under this treaty. For the moment, at least, the Koreans seemed to agree.
At the end of the meeting the Foreign Minister presented two documents to Vance, an “agreed minutes” and a “joint defense declaration.” These documents which are transmitted in septel raise most serious legal and funding issues.2 After pointing out the serious legal problems embodied in these documents, Vance agreed to study them and discuss them in a meeting scheduled for tomorrow. We intend reject these documents for the reasons cited and endeavor reach agreement on the draft communique contained State’s 114006—VANTO 7.3 We would like your views by 0900 local tomorrow whether, if necessary for reaching agreement on our communique, we could agree to an annual defense meeting at the ministerial level with first meeting beginning 1969.4
A detailed report on this meeting will be submitted separately.5
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 US/VANCE. Secret; Flash; Nodis; Cactus.↩
- The texts of the documents were transmitted in telegram 4208 from Seoul, February 13. (Ibid.)↩
- See footnote 3, Document 176.↩
- The Department of State rejected the proposed Joint Defense Declaration and approved the inclusion in the joint communique of references to consultations between the Secretary of Defense and the Minister of National Defense. The response also noted that the communique “might usefully include” a bilateral reaffirmation of both countries’ commitment to Vietnam. (Telegram 114713, February 13; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US)↩
- Telegrams 116984, 117381, and 117382 to Seoul, all February 17, transmitted a detailed, three-part report of Vance’s meeting with the Korean Cabinet. (Ibid., POL 7 US/VANCE) On February 13 Vance also met briefly with majority and minority leaders of the National Assembly. (Telegram 4209 from Seoul, February 13; ibid.)↩