Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

176. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State¹

Seoul, February 12, 1968, 1147Z.

4176. VANTO 5. Cyrus Vance, accompanied by Ambassador Porter, General Bonesteel, and John Walsh, conferred with President Park for 5–1/2 hours today. Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Defense Minister and CIA Director also participated.²

Lengthy session provided useful relief value for ROK emotions. Tensions gradually eased as dialogue was established. Park reiterated at length themes made familiar by reports of Ambassador Porter and General Bonesteel in fatalistic and simplistic terms. While the President’s sincerity was not in doubt it was evident that his specific proposals were the product of emotion rather than finished staff work.

Park charged with deep conviction that Kim Il-Sung is on path of war. The rate of violation of the Armistice Agreement has increased markedly. The attack on the Blue House designed to kill him and his family and the seizure of the Pueblo were acts of war. The North Koreans have thousands of trained infiltrators and further serious penetrations are inevitable in the spring. They intend to harass the South Korean people, disrupt the economy and, when the country is sufficiently weakened, resort to all out war. They will only respect counterforce. They should be warned of the consequences of further violations, asked to apologize for past actions, and requested to promise not to violate the armistice agreement in the future. In addition we should publicly state that any future violations will be met by immediate retaliation. All courses of action in the present situation are dangerous but Park did not believe that retaliation would provoke the DRNK to war. Firmness and resolution are imperative in the present situation. The US world position depends upon firmness in face of Communist pressure. If we are weak here we will pay for it in the form of Communist aggression elsewhere.

On the Panmunjom issue, Park feared Kim Il-Sung would delay and stall the negotiations in order to humiliate the US and therefore ROK. He wished to know what the US would do under those circumstances in order to calm his people. He was worried and displeased by the indications by high officials that the Pueblo could have been in North Korean territorial waters and by Senator Mansfield’s recommendations that the issue be submitted to the ICJ. These statements and the absence of ROK participation at Panmunjom aroused ROK suspicions about the negotiations. Nevertheless, he would not oppose the continuation of secret talks providing he had an assurance that infiltration would stop.

Throughout the lengthy discussion Vance calmly and sympathetically strove for a dialogue with the President, probed for specificity, pointed out the weakness and dangers of Park’s options, explained US policy, reiterated the commonality of US–ROK interests, warned of the dangers of precipitate and unilateral action, and sought for a common, satisfactory course of action.

While the jury remained out at the end of the session, the atmosphere was friendly and the ROKs appeared to recognize that we would not agree to a policy of retaliation. Despite press reports to the contrary, the ROKs did not raise issue of revision of Mutual Defense Treaty or of seeking to disengage from the operational control of CINCUNC. Clearly, however, we have much serious talk ahead of us before we will know the outcome of this mission. We will submit a draft communique tonight.³ Tomorrow morning we will meet with the Foreign and other Ministers and probably in the late afternoon with the President.

Porter

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea—Pueblo Incident—Cactus IIa, Cactus Seoul Cables, February 10 to February 28, 1968. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cactus. Attached to a February 12 memorandum from Rostow to President Johnson, that indicates the President saw the telegram. Telegram 4178 from Seoul, February 12, also attached to Rostow’s memorandum is discussed below.
2. Telegram 117405 to Seoul, February 18, and telegrams 117522, 117523, and 117531 to Seoul, all February 19, contain a detailed, five-part report of this meeting. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 US/VANCE)
3. Telegram 4178 (VANTO 7) from Seoul, February 12, stated that the draft communique “will fall far short of ROK ambitions and a substantial wrangle is in the offing.” In telegram 114006 to Seoul (TOVAN 20), February 12, the Department of State forwarded cleared language for use in the communique. (Ibid., POL 33–6 KOR N–US) The Embassy later reported that “ten hours of exhausting exchanges were required” to agree on the wording of the communique, with which neither side was fully satisfied. (Telegram 4242 from Seoul, February 15, also telegram 4229 from Seoul, February 14; both ibid., POL 7 US/VANCE) The joint communique issued on February 15 is in Department of State Bulletin, March 11, 1968, pp. 344–345.