Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

152. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State¹

Seoul, February 4, 1968, 1344Z.

3935. Ref: State 109821.²

1. President Park was clearly moved by message contained reftel. I have not seen him affected in this way before now and he made no effort to hide his feelings as he heard President Johnson’s solicitude for him and his family, lengthy discussion of mutual problems and finally the warm reference to him as trusted friend and ally. One may occasionally make him smile and even laugh, but it is a very rare thing to see his emotions stirred as they were by the President’s message.

2. He kept me for almost two hours, during which I took occasion to brief him on the US/NK meeting this morning.³ He was greatly interested in fact that NK rep put questions to US concerning augmentation of our air and naval forces, and troop alert. He said this another indication of their preoccupation with strength and their need to ascertain whether it might be used against them. He feels they will probe to determine our intentions and if and when they believe we have additional measures in mind, they will meet our demands for return of Pueblo and crew. They will not alter their policy of deliberate humiliation of US, he said, if they do not sense determination on our side.

3. He asked me what I thought. I said it looked to me as though the NKs may be approaching something like the North Vietnamese “you-stop-the-bombing-and-we’ll-talk” ploy. In their case the NKs may tell us “you-withdraw-your-naval-and-air-strength-from-ROK- and-we’ll-talk-about-your-ship-and-crew.” In neither case, of course, was there much prospect of anything substantial. I said this was my off-the-cuff reaction and was not an official estimate, as I had not yet heard from you on the subject.

4. Park said we must be careful, that they had proved time and again that they cannot be trusted. Humiliation of the US is their goal, he said, and “your prestige is ROK prestige.”

5. He then took up matter of public opinion, and the National Assembly view of the situation, all of this along lines known to you, but with certain ideas added. He remarked that the NK/US private meetings are stirring up adverse comment here and expressed a preference (I would not say it was stronger than that) for future meetings in public, or, if closed meetings continue to be necessary, a ROK representative should be present. Public meetings, or closed meetings with a ROK officer present, would do much to reassure the public. Fact of matter, he said, is that ROK side of problem, i.e. DMZ violations and raids by NK, not being discussed in any forum at present.

6. I said that he knew we deeply appreciated his patience in all these matters, and his concurrence in meetings we found it desirable to have. He can see key position occupied by men of Pueblo in this problem and his understanding of that enabled us to sound out the adversary when other channels had failed. It is sometimes necessary, I went on, for Presidents to withhold information temporarily in the public interest, to face press and public criticism while they are doing so, and this seemed to be one such case. I would of course transmit his comments and, as he knew, they would command attention at our highest levels.

7. I said I would comment now, however, on the matter of a public MAC meeting. These usually turn into propaganda displays and as such cause important matters to be drawn out for weeks and months longer than might be necessary were they dealt with in closed session. True, as he said, the correspondents could be present and could at least publicize our statements. Trouble is, they usually give as much time and space to the propaganda of the adversary and we end up no better off. I would sound out my people on this general subject and would come back to him. (See comment below on advisability of trying to set up open MAC meeting to discuss DMZ violations only.)

8. I did not comment on suggestion that ROK might be present at closed meetings. We are likely to make more progress with NKs if there is no ROK presence at these meetings.

9. Comment: Please give me your views on desirability of another open MAC meeting on DMZ violations only. It is possible that such a meeting would evoke NK riposte with Pueblo statement, but also possible, if we made no mention of Pueblo, that they would take that as indication we wish continue private talks with them on that subject. What I am trying to do is find device which will meet Park’s public opinion (Assembly, party, intellectuals, military) problem here without interfering with our NK contact on Pueblo.

10. It would also help us greatly if you could arrange early delivery to Kimpo Airport by largest airplanes available of substantial amount of counterinsurgency items already promised ROK, if they are presently available. We would take care to have adequate presence of elements mentioned above, as well as all elements of local and foreign press. This kind of thing, if properly handled, might also aid us in our palaver with the NKs. Please comment soonest on this possibility.

11. The excellent support you have given me has made all the difference at this end.

Porter

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea—Pueblo Incident—Cactus II, Cactus Seoul Cables, January 29 to February 9, 1968. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cactus. Attached to a February 4 memorandum from Rostow to President Johnson, that indicates the President saw it.
2. Document 151.
3. Admiral Smith, representing the UN Command, and General Pak, head of the North Korean delegation, met in closed meetings at the Military Armistice Commission to discuss issues relative to the Pueblo and the release of its crew.