Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

149. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis (Enthoven) to Secretary of Defense McNamara ¹

Washington, January 31, 1968.

SUBJECT

• Service Proposals to Increase U.S. Army Strength in Korea (U)

There are three Service requests now pending which deal with increasing U.S. Army strength in Korea:

1. General Bonesteel has asked CINCUSARPAC for an increase of 5161 in the U.S. Army Korea ceiling. His message of January 21² cites two reasons:

a. “To improve our capability to cope with the expected increase this spring in enemy infiltration and sabotage tactics”;

b. “To improve and maintain a credible deterrent posture to cope with the enemy’s increasing improvement in conventional war capability.”

2. On January 25 the JCS ³ recommended that you increase Army strength in Korea by 8,500 to raise operating strength from 79 percent to 90 percent of TO/TD. (The 11,000 KATUSA are not counted.)

Note: Their calculations are wrong, as will be made clear below.

3. On January 29 the Secretary of the Army⁴ presented four alternatives to you for increasing strength in Korea, ranging from 5,200 to 18,500. The first coincides with General Bonesteel’s request. The others are based on the JCS “manning level increase” concept. The Secretary of the Army recommended that any increase approved for Korea be matched by an increase in Army end-strength.

Comments

1. “Manning Level” Increases. (Please see the attached chart.)⁵ Keying a Korean augmentation to an increase in manning level of the aggregated TO/TD structure spaces is not sound. Last year we thought we had about 65,000 TO/TD in Korea. As the result of the Army’s efforts to account for all of its TO/TD structure, about 6,000 more TO/TD structure spaces have been found in Korea. (This did not result in an increase in the total structure for which we are buying equipment. Compensating reductions were made elsewhere to assure consistency with our division force planning factor and the DPM control figures.) The Army commander in Korea is probably not even aware of the total TO/TD strength which he has. He simply uses the people he has and makes adjustments in his force structure to maintain his principal combat units at a reasonable manning level. Some low priority structure is undoubtedly “deactivated” or kept at very low manning, perhaps even cadre status.

The sensible questions to ask here are: (1) What are the jobs that the Army in Korea must do that it’s not doing now? and (2) How many more people (if any) does it take to do them? To answer these questions requires a careful audit of the status of each unit and a description of its job. Manning level increases might be justified on an individual unit basis, but certainly not across the board.

2. Army End-Strength Increases. There are several points to be noted.

a. We don’t know how much the transient population can be reduced from current Army projections through control of leave taken during PCS moves. There are different levels possible, depending on the degree of national emergency and the inconvenience to which we are willing to subject personnel.

b. We believe that the training establishment is larger than necessary, but we don’t know how much.

c. An increase in end strength would not help to provide an immediate augmentation in Korea, owing to the lead time in generating trained strength. However, steps that could be taken are: (1) an arbitrary contraction of the transient population; (2) extension of tours in Korea (4,000 men leave there each month); and (3) diversion of planned SEA deployments temporarily to Korea.

3. Whether to Increase Korea. General Bonesteel says that the enemy is getting stronger and is planning to step-up infiltration and sabotage. He says nothing about how much the ROK Army has improved. It seems inconceivable that the ROKs can’t take care of themselves, at least against the North Koreans. It also seems inconceivable that 52,000 U.S. troops can’t protect themselves and their equipment.

Recommendations

There are two courses of action: (1) deny the JCS request on the assumption that the U.S. and ROK forces now in Korea should be able to handle the situation; (2) defer the JCS request pending their analysis of the force structure and presentation of a unit-by-unit justification of increases.⁶ Enclosed are alternative memoranda for you to send to the JCS and the Army.

You asked about the possibility of earmarking a specific group of forces in CONUS for quick deployment to Korea, but holding them here until the need was clear to send them. I believe this solution would not meet General Bonesteel’s request head on. He characterizes his need (or at least the part that deals with sabotage and infiltration) as a gradually increasing one, rather than one which would develop suddenly. Nevertheless, such a force certainly could be organized and quick-deployment plans developed.

Alain Enthoven

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/OASD/ISA Files: FRC 73 A 1250, Korea 370. Secret.
2. Not further identified but summarized below.
3. Reference is to JCSM-53–68 to McNamara. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/OASD/ISA Files: FRC 73 A 1250, Korea 370)
4. Not further identified.
5. None of the attachments is printed.
6. McNamara supported the second option and notified the appropriate military officials of his decision in a February 1 memorandum. The JCS submitted their analysis of the requested increases to McNamara on February 21. The request was repeated in November, but on November 30 Nitze informed the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the decision would be deferred because of on-going studies of the issue. (All in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSA/OASD/ISA Files: FRC 73 A 1250, Korea 370)