Office of the Historian

147. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea1

Washington, January 25, 1968, 0325Z.

104293. Eyes Only for the Ambassador from the Secretary. In addition to UN matter for you to discuss with President Pak described in separate telegram,2 you should tell President Pak that President Johnson feels complete solidarity with the Republic of Korea in this tense situation and wishes to be sure that we both are prepared for all contingencies. You should also inform Pak that his agreement to exercise restraint while we are sorting things out is greatly appreciated here.

The President is considering an immediate decision to send promptly a large number of US land-based and carrier-based aircraft (perhaps 250–300) to Korea and immediately adjacent areas. Please ask President Pak under condition of the greatest secrecy whether this deployment would create any problems for him. Naturally, the accommodation of additional aircraft in the Republic of Korea would be [Page 316] worked out through established channels. The immediate question is whether President Pak sees any major political problems in such a deployment. You may also tell him that this augmentation would represent no diversion whatever from Viet-Nam and would be promptly replenished in the US itself. You must underscore with him the secrecy of this possibility and treat it with the utmost discretion in your own Mission.

Request reply Nodis ASAP.3

Rusk
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27–14 KOR/UN. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Rusk; cleared by Berger, Rostow, and McNamara; and approved by Rusk.↩
  2. In telegram 104283, January 25, Porter received instructions to discuss with Pak the U.S. view “that it desirable and advantageous for US to call for early meeting of UNSC to consider North Korean seizure of USS Pueblo and its crew and recent North Korean terrorist attacks in Seoul.” Porter was also to give Pak the draft text of the letter Goldberg would submit when requesting the meeting. (Ibid., POL 33–6 KOR N–US) In reply Porter reported that Pak agreed with the potential advantages of bringing the matter before the Security Council and expressed satisfaction that not only the Pueblo incident, but also the Blue House raid would be brought before the United Nations. (Telegram 3626 from Seoul, January 25; ibid.) The text of Goldberg’s January 26 letter is in Department of State Bulletin, February 12, 1968, p. 199.↩
  3. In telegram 3623 from Seoul, January 25, Porter relayed Park’s appreciation for the President’s support and his willingness to accept the additional aircraft. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27–14 KOR/UN) Rostow forwarded the telegram to President Johnson, noting that sending the planes to Korea “could have a calming effect there—at least.” Rostow’s memorandum indicates the President saw the telegram. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea—Pueblo Incident, Vol. I, Part A [through January])↩