135. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State1
Seoul, November 29, 1967,
0400Z.
2621. Subj: ROK Internal Security.
- 1.
- In recent weeks there have been a number of developments relating
to ROK preparations in internal
security field for next spring’s anticipated intensified NK infiltration effort.
- A.
- President Pak has disapproved Korean National Police plans to double size of combat police forces from 23 companies to 46 companies and to improve coastal watch organization. Police plan submitted to Pak would have required a won 1.1 Billion supplemental budget as well as about $5 million in equipment (commo, transport, patrol boats, helicopters etc.) to be furnished by U.S.
- B.
- President Pak has approved for planning purposes strengthening of ROK Army for counter-infiltration activities by 8 new counter-infiltration battalions in each of 8 reserve divisions under second ROK Army. MND plan presented to Pak points out that this would require by contrast with police plan a supplemental budget of won 317 million and that equipment for battalions is on hand in reserve divisional stocks.
- C.
- MND Kim on Nov 22 sent letter to COMUS/K advising him of plan to organize 8 battalions, stated that personnel strength of these battalions will be temporary augmentation of present authorized strength of ROK Army.MND has not requested COMUS/K concurrence of this augmentation but requested concurrence for use of equipment from ROK Army stocks for new battalions.
- D.
- At briefing given to senior U.S. personnel by ROK MND on military counter-infiltration plans, as tentatively approved by President Pak, MND said ROK military would assume control of CI operations in those areas and situations where experience shows that police lack capability to cope with infiltration situation.
- 2.
- Understand President Pak disapproved increase in police and approved additional ROK Army battalions because use of military was budgetarily much cheaper. On basis information available to him Pak believes North Korean infiltration threat south of the DMZ will be of magnitude that will require the use of military forces and even augmented police will be unable cope with this level NK activity. Pak [Page 295] concerned by NK sabotage efforts aimed at ROK industrial base and at govt organization, including use of NK military “suicide squads” for this purpose.
- 3.
- ROK military now submitting requests to COMUS/K for assistance on variety of projects to improve capability. To assure coordinated U.S. efforts in dealing with requests from the ROK military and civilian agencies and to assure that the ROKG develops the soundest possible plan for dealing with the intensified infiltration next spring, Country Team has established a special committee chaired by DCM to include USFK Chief of Staff, Chief, PROVMAAG/K, Deputy USOM Director [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].
- 4.
- Comment: We see problem of dealing with internal security matters to be responsibilities of ROKG with USG providing such assistance as it can. We also continue believe that ROK civilian agencies, primarily augmented KNP, are best instrument for dealing initially with various aspects of NK activity in ROK outside of forward areas under ROK military control and that ROK military effort should be focused along DMZ, coast and offshore as collateral activity to their regular military missions and providing spot assistance to civilian authorities when requested. We believe present concept reportedly accepted by Pak that military forces be applied if dimension of threat such that civil agencies cannot handle is sound. Pak of course will decide when and if to bring military power to bear on problem, but for reasons connected with population, training problems, and eventual expense arising from military participation, we hope his judgment will be measured in this matter.
Porter
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–7 KOR S. Secret. Repeated to the Department of Defense and CINCPAC for POLAD.↩