Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

305. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Habib) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach)¹

Washington, August 9, 1967.

SUBJECT

• Military Projects in Southeast Asia on which Action is Pending

In accordance with your request, we have prepared a summary of military projects relating to operations in Laos and Cambodia on which some sort of action is still pending. We have sought to highlight problems and areas of disagreement in each case but have not attempted to set forth here the details of the various positions. We would, of course, be glad to provide you with more detailed information should you require it.

Actions Against VC/NVA Forces in Cambodia

At the moment we have not been officially seized with any requests for military actions against VC/NVA forces in Cambodia. However, we anticipate renewed pressure from Defense for more forceful actions to limit the advantage the enemy derives from use of Cambodian territory. Defense has made it known to us that they have had under consideration a wide variety of actions which would begin with expanded cross-border intelligence operations and aerial reconnaissance and might eventually work up to such actions as establishment of guerrilla warfare operations in northeast Cambodia, blockade of the Mekong, the immediate pursuit of the enemy across the border, and air strikes against known enemy installations inside Cambodia.

Any proposals which may emanate from Defense will, however, be carefully considered by the inter-agency committee on Cambodia before they reach you for a decision as will any recommendations of the Cambodia working group established by SEACOORD. We expect to have the next meeting of the committee on August 15. I will keep you informed of any significant developments.

Southpaw

COMUSMACV has been pressing for authority to conduct raids into Laos using regular ARVN forces of one- to three-battalion strength. Ambassador Bunker apparently endorses this proposal. However, at the SEACOORD meeting Ambassadors Sullivan and Martin allied themselves with CINCPAC, who has firmly opposed the concept in view of the political and military complications it raises. Although the Department has never been asked for an official view, it is EA’s opinion that the Southpaw concept should be opposed for several reasons, primarily because it would violate the principle of keeping allied operations in Laos at a deniable level. We do not know to what extent the JCS may press for execution of the Southpaw concept, but we doubt that it will get much of a hearing in the Pentagon in the face of the opposition of CINCPAC and Ambassador Sullivan.

Prairie Fire III

Phase III of the Prairie Fire operation includes the use of indigenous tribal personnel (Kha) to conduct guerrilla type operations in the Laos Panhandle. The Joint Staff supports the concept but believes that unless the area of operation can be extended beyond the present Prairie Fire zone, there is little merit in proceeding with it. You will recall, however, that General Wheeler submitted a proposal to you on July 5² requesting approval of the recruitment and training of Kha and other local tribes in Laos, while deferring the question of extending the Prairie Fire operating zone.

The views of the SEACOORD participants are as follows:

• —Both General Westmoreland and Ambassador Bunker, to the best of our knowledge support the proposal, either in its limited form or expanded beyond the Prairie Fire area, if possible.
• —CINCPAC apparently endorses the proposal to recruit guerrilla personnel in Laos, but we deduce from his general position on cross-border operations that he desires to limit the area of ground conflict as close to Viet-Nam as possible, i.e. within the current Prairie Fire area.
• —Ambassador Sullivan believes that it is unrealistic to initiate Phase III of Prairie Fire on the grounds that there are insufficient personnel to exploit existing opportunities and that it will prove impossible to find 3000 Kha suitable for such operations. He continues to oppose any significant extension of the Prairie Fire zone because of the exposure problem.
• —Ambassador Martin also opposed the Phase III plan.

EA’s view was set forth in a memorandum submitted to you on July 5.³ In brief, we are not persuaded that the added military benefit from moving into a phase of guerrilla combat inside Laos would match the added political costs. Moreover, as noted by Ambassadors Martin and Sullivan in expressing some of their objections to Dye Marker (see following), there is more we can do in this area along current lines of action.

Dye Marker (Formerly Illinois City and Practice Nine)

The SEACOORD meeting brought out clearly the uneasiness of officials in the field regarding the Dye Marker concept and the way the project has proceeded.

We have learned from cables amplifying the SEACOORD summary cable that Ambassadors Martin and Sullivan now have strong reservations about Dye Marker, particularly the anti-vehicular phase which involves operations west of the Prairie Fire area. They argue that by doing more and better what we are doing now, particularly with propeller planes and current and planned Lao indigenous forces under CAS control, we can critically reduce infiltration except via Cambodia. They believe Dye Marker will not work and will cut across efforts now in train which will work.

We are not certain how strongly Ambassador Bunker and General Westmoreland support the project although the plan bears Westmoreland’s signature. We know that the JCS were not originally keen on it but that there was strong pressure in DOD to get it moving.

We have had our own doubts about the efficacy of the program but were willing to let DOD give it a limited trial and, indeed, Ambassadors Martin and Sullivan seemed to share this view as of last spring, when only the anti-infiltration measures close to the Viet-Nam border were being considered in detail. In the light of the concerns about this project both here and in the field, we are planning to have a thorough-going review of the entire project when we have received the report of the Dye Marker working group set up by SEACOORD. We will keep you informed as it progresses.

Commando Lava

The code name identifies a soil destabilization project on which successful experiments have recently been conducted in southern Laos. The process involves application to the soil in target areas of a harmless dry powder which breaks down soil stability. Both MACV and Ambassador Sullivan have expressed interest in operational use of this technique to create untrafficable mud fields along road and infiltration trail routes and, possibly, to supplement mine fields in strengthening defensive perimeters in hostile areas. Ambassador Sullivan is most anxious that the technique be applied in northern Laos as well as in the Panhandle and anticipates no difficulty in obtaining Souvanna Phouma’s concurrence in the program.

Mr. Kohler, Mr. Bundy and other Department officials have been briefed by the technical experts on the first experimental effort. We believe that the political problems which might result from the Commando Lava project would be manageable and we expect to forward a favorable recommendation to you when DOD is ready to recommend a specific operational plan.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 ASIA SE. Top Secret. Copies were sent to William Bundy, Kohler, and John C. Ausland of G/PM.
2. Not found.
3. For Kohler’s view, see Document 295.