Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

295. Information Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Kohler) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach)¹

Washington, July 5, 1967.

SUBJECT

• Prairie Fire—Phase III

REF

• CM 2453–67, dated 17 June 1967²

Problem: 1. In the memorandum to Secretary Vance at reference, Gen. Wheeler requests approval to prepare for and initiate a guerrilla warfare program in the Prairie Fire zone of Laos, using tribesmen indigenous to the Laos-Vietnam border area under command and with participation of US Special Forces personnel. In a reply dated 30 June, Secretary Vance asks Gen. Wheeler to handle the matter with you.³ (Memos attached).

Recommendation: 2. If Gen. Wheeler raises the subject with you before or during the forthcoming trip, we recommend that authorization be withheld pending thorough study of the problems and uncertainties identified below. Alternatively, if you determine that some action is required at this time, I recommend that approval be limited to that aspect of the proposal discussed in paragraph 4d.

Summary of proposal: 3. The concept underlying Gen. Wheeler’s current request is outlined in JCS Memorandum 215–67 (also attached).⁴ The military authorities propose to supplement present anti-infiltration efforts in the area of Laos south and east of Tchepone and running along the Se Kong River line by seeking to identify, exfiltrate, train, and re-insert indigenous guerrilla forces. The target is a force of 3000 Kha or similar tribal people of the hills, operating in 100-man units under control of US Special Forces A Detachments (total US personnel 135).

Initially, Lao approval would be sought through RVNAF/FA liaison, and both recruiting activities and operations would be confined to the presently approved Prairie Fire area.

Discussion and Conclusions: 4. Our initial reaction⁵ is that the proposal is not susceptible of early realization, that attempting it would divert personnel from other positive programs underway or approved, and that if it were fully implemented it would come into conflict with other projects in Laos and raise to an unacceptable level the risk of exposing US ground operations there.

a. Manpower: We understand that US Special Forces personnel available for the Pacific Theater remain in seriously short supply. We do not understand, particularly in the light of other drawbacks, a recommendation to allocate up to a total of 10 USSF A Detachments and support personnel to this program when authorized Prairie Fire operations are already inhibited by shortage of personnel and when prospective requirements in connection with Illinois City remain unfilled.

Similarly, indigenous personnel are lacking to meet approved Prairie Fire quotas and operational needs. The shortage looms so acutely, as planning for Illinois City progresses, that COMUSMACV is still pressing for use of Thai units, despite the judgment of both Ambassador Martin and Ambassador Sullivan, which we share, that use of US-Thai teams will not be acceptable under the conditions contemplated.

It would not seem prudent to dilute programs already approved for the sake of a new variation unless there were exciting prospects of success. We do not believe this is the case. CIA has had several years experience with Kha tribal groups analogous to those envisaged for the guerrilla force. Prolonged and careful training has resulted in creation of the passive road-watch teams which are increasingly effective in monitoring the flow of supplies through the Laos Panhandle. [6 lines of source text not declassified]

b. Anti-Infiltration Tactics: The plan to raise guerrilla forces is in harmony with past military proposals for Prairie Fire—that is, of seeking approval for progressively larger units as well as more numerous operations to greater depths. It is one step further in the direction of commitment of both US and Vietnamese combat ground forces, which we know informally Gen. Westmoreland has at least been contemplating. Given the extent and difficulty of terrain and the political problems of Laos, we cling to the belief that the optimal way to cope with infiltration through the Panhandle is to detect and monitor movement of men and supplies by quiet surveillance and to seek to deter it through controlled use of air power rather than with battalions. We recently suggested that Defense consider breaking up the already constituted larger Prairie Fire units to form more of the small reconnaissance teams, thus far without receiving comment. This is an alternative we consider worth pursuing.

c. Extent of Operations: Gen. Wheeler’s memorandum of 17 June says that operations can be initiated within the presently authorized Prairie Fire area and that “the problem of coordinating an expanded area will be reopened if and when it arises”. We believe this issue should be faced now. The approved JCS study (JCSM–215–67) says that although initial steps (recruitment, training, etc.) can be undertaken within the Prairie Fire area and without additional US commitment inside Laos, “this initial activity should not be undertaken without conceptual approval of the over-all program”. The over-all program envisages more than doubling the present depth of the Prairie Fire zone. The greater the depth, the greater the dependence on vulnerable (US) helicopter lift and escort and, in general, the greater the risk of exposure of operations which Lao Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma has not approved and has declared in advance he could not approve. Such an extension would also create difficult problems of coordination with the successful CAS road-watch operation and would probably revive earlier CIA objections to the proposal (which Mr. Helms has withdrawn “so long as the guerrilla force is deployed within the current Prairie Fire area”).

Ambassador Sullivan has recorded the judgment that the Prairie Fire area cannot be further extended nor larger units introduced without crossing the threshold from covert to overt operations to which Souvanna would be obliged to react. He has recently reaffirmed these views and the belief that it is unrealistic even to consider extension of the zone—with attendant risks—when our resources do not permit more than nibbling at opportunities for application of the SLAM concept of concentrated ground-air interdiction within the established Prairie Fire zone. He would specifically oppose use of Special Forces A Detachments—without which the Kha guerrilla units would be unlikely to function effectively—in Laos.

d. Lao Involvement: The concept envisages preliminary discussions between South Vietnamese and Lao military authorities (RVNAF and FA) to obtain Lao agreement to the program and the services of selected Lao personnel to make initial contacts, with US involvement and control kept in the background at this stage. An apparently similar proposal has in fact already been discussed during the recent visit of Lao General Kouprasith and others to Saigon, on which we unfortunately lack detailed reporting. The Lao interest, however, is known to be limited to obtaining Vietnamese logistic, training and probably financial support for the development of guerrilla units that would operate under Lao, not Vietnamese or US, control. To the extent this can be done without direct US financing or other involvement, we would have no objection. We may, in fact, derive from Lao and Vietnamese pursuit of the idea some further insights into the possibilities of developing guerrilla formations in this remote area.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret. Drafted by Hamilton.
2. Document 292.
3. Not found.
4. Document 282.
5. There has not been time for proper staff review of the military proposal since receiving it on July 3. [Footnote in the source text.]