Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

306. Telegram From the Ambassador to Laos (Sullivan) to the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland)¹

Vientiane, August 10, 1967, 1210Z.

101210Z. Ref: MAC 7473.²

1. Your message on Prairie Fire touches on the question of the collaborative effort required to deal with the problem of enemy operations on Lao territory. I fully endorse this principle of collaboration and assure you that I also subscribe to the principle of flexibility, within the limits fixed by the imperatives of our larger national objectives here in Southeast Asia.

2. However I would like to stress three points which I will wish to discuss with you in further detail tomorrow at Udorn.

A. The Prairie Fire zone is not a piece of territory which has been detached from my responsibilities in Laos and given over to your command. It is instead an area in Laos where MACSOG is permitted to conduct certain types of operations which have been agreed to by higher authority in Washington, subject to my concurrence. Therefore, question does not arise of you “allowing” CAS Road Watch teams to land in Prairie Fire zone. I will send Road Watch teams anywhere in Laos I feel they are needed, including Prairie Fire zone, if that seems the best method of handling the problem. Naturally, if I undertake any operations in the Prairie Fire zone, I will effect the closest coordination with MACSOG to avoid conflict. In practice, I feel it is best to avoid CAS operations in the Prairie Fire zone because of possible conflicts and confusions. However, the principle exists and is valid.

B. On the other hand, there is not a reciprocation in principle for Prairie Fire operations in Laos elsewhere than the Prairie Fire zone. In practice, there has been one instance of Prairie Fire authorization west of the zone, although this has required clearance with Washington.

C. The case at issue is not quite so black and white as you have described it. It was not a question of employing Prairie Fire forces against a known enemy force astride the boundary of the Prairie Fire zone. The circumstances are as follows:

A CAS special guerrilla unit is in the area of an enemy force which is well west of the Prairie Fire zone. For Prairie Fire teams to attack in this area would have required their introduction into the vicinity of our CAS unit, from which they would then have mounted their action. This would have brought the Prairie Fire team into potential conflict with the CAS unit. For this reason it was decided that the CAS unit would undertake the mission and it is currently moving to engage the enemy. While it is true that there are other elements of the enemy (probably associated with the same organization), which are located east of the Prairie Fire zone, the circumstances of their total disposition are such that it does not seem to me to give rise to the considerations reflected in last sentence para 2 reftel.

3. This business of coordination requires the closest and most trusting mutual efforts. It will not be otherwise unless the JCS turns Singlaub and his MACSOG unit over to me or else the President names you Ambassador to Laos. The larger national interests would suggest that we avoid both these extremes. Warm regards.³

1. Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, Message Files, COMUSMACV, 1 July–30 Sept. 1967. Top Secret. This message had no number and was not sent via Department of State communications channels. Also sent to Admiral Sharp.
2. In telegram MAC 7473, August 9, Westmoreland informed Sullivan that “the Prairie Fire boundary should not be considered a limitation on the conduct of military operations against the enemy.” Westmoreland suggested that it should be a “line of coordination” rather than an “iron curtain” to allow tactical flexibility and to deny the enemy “safe havens.” He asked Sullivan to accept this concept. (Ibid.)
3. Printed from an unsigned copy.