Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

304. Memorandum From the Central Intelligence Agency to President Johnson¹

Washington, July 31, 1967.

SUBJECT

• [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]

1. Once again a visit to Laos impresses me with the substantial gains being made toward [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] overall U.S. objectives.

2. South Laos is a particularly striking example of forward motion on these objectives. During the past year roadwatch team effort [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] has been expanded from an intermittent coverage of a few spots to an almost continuous coverage of all major trafficable routes running from North Vietnam through Laos to South Vietnam. A trained and experienced pool of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] teams now rotates so that there are at almost all times [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] teams on the roads. Aside from information provided, this program is causing very substantial damage to the North Vietnamese as they transit Laos. As an example, on the night of 7 July when a roadwatch team reported the passage of 37 trucks, the information was flashed within two minutes through our communications channels to an Air Force command plane in the area, which diverted jets to arrive at the target seven minutes after original sighting to produce a total of 50-odd secondary explosions. On the ground, a force of action teams has been developed to produce minings, ambushes, and other attrition against enemy traffic in the panhandle. This marriage of the guerrilla with jet aircraft has caused the enemy in the corridor to suffer the loss of some 40 trucks to ground action, and 1,565 to air action, during the period November 1966 to June 1967. To these truck losses can be added the early trickle of what should increase to a steady flow of defectors from the transitting enemy.

3. In 1963–64, the Pathet Lao were probing into the Sedone Valley near Pakse and were establishing a foothold on the strategic Bolovens Plateau. The pacification program for this area was conceived by our station and implemented with Country Team help. It was a microcosm of technique now being wrestled with by the CORDS structure in Vietnam. Regular screening forces were organized, self-defense units were trained and armed, economic and social programs were implemented, and a political program of improving local leadership and popular commitment was carried out. The effort followed a careful plan of oilspot expansion. The result this year is that the enemy’s threat has been purged from an area up to 90 kilometers east of the Mekong, self-defense forces are now being demobilized, their arms recovered and screening forces are being made available for employment further east against the Ho Chi Minh Trail. There are small “islands” in Vietnam proving the feasibility of this technique of pacification, but in Laos the program indicates how much more can be done if the process is started before the enemy grows to be a major military threat. The example is compelling for application in Thailand and other areas where our enemies might seek to emulate the Viet Cong experience.

4. The North Laos “quiet war” goes remarkably well. Some idea of our contribution can be gained by such facts as:

A. We completely fund, support, and direct a force of local defense units, area security units and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] special guerrilla battalions, plus heavy weapons units, intelligence teams and a spider-web of communications [3 lines of source text not declassified].

B. CIA-supported forces in North Laos directly cause the enemy average monthly casualties of 300 KIA, 115 WIA and an average of 40 defectors and captives processed monthly; they also contribute enormously to casualties from air strikes of some 800 KIA per month. In contrast, the Royal Lao Army has caused an average of 70 enemy KIA monthly.

C. From its positions dominating all of North Laos some years ago, the Viet Minh/Pathet Lao enemy has been pushed back to holding a thin edge of North Laos, with a single substantial salient into the Plaine des Jarres, and there is even debate among knowledgeable observers whether this should be taken; there is reason to believe that it could be if it were deemed politically and militarily desirable.

D. Behind these military successes, the process of consolidating political cohesion and strength of North Laos continues apace. The most successful action has been the integration of the Meo tribe into the Lao Kingdom, instead of allowing our support to become a centrifugal force to fragment rather than coalesce the variety of peoples called Laos. This has involved the development of the Union of Lao Races Radio Station, an enterprise to handle through commercial channels the supplies formerly dropped from the sky (and incidentally, help develop a Meo managerial middle class), and police administrative services [3 lines of source text not declassified]. In the process, Meo school registration has risen from 3,000 in 1962 to 12,000 in 1967, settled agriculture is replacing mountain village slash and burn farming, an elected Meo sits in the National Assembly and there is a Meo among the generals of the Army. Seventy Meo attend the top lycee of Laos where only 10 were present in 1962. Of course, where CIA conceived plans are non-covert, they are supported for the most part by other agencies.

5. There are a number of substantial policy problems which will have to be faced relating to the corridor. MACV has made a series of recommendations for vigorous prosecution of cross border operations into Laos from South Vietnam. What began as activities by irregular Vietnamese forces (which the U.S. Special Force believes they must accompany) would be increased in terms of regular Vietnamese battalions with U.S. advisory teams and accompanying air and helicopter support. There is always the danger that we may be faced with a general extension of a Vietnam-style war into the corridor. Policy makers will have to consider whether this kind of effort will actually have more real effect than our current ones, as certainly the enemy has shown the capability of utilizing the DMZ itself, maritime infiltration and Cambodian channels. A more serious effect could well be the upsetting of the Souvanna Phouma Government of Laos, which has provided for collaboration of right and neutral wings of Laotian politics with the result that Laos is left as a clearly secondary theater. Polarization of Laotian situation could provoke more forceful probes by the North Vietnamese toward the Mekong with substantial increase in requirements for U.S. defensive support of Thailand and Laos. The most serious policy question, however, would seem to be the degree to which the U.S. wishes to contemplate increased commitment of U.S. forces in active operations in Southeast Asia. The contest in Laos has been by proxy, engaging minimal U.S. prestige, tying down no U.S. forces and involving few casualties.

6. There is still much unfinished business for CIA in Laos. We must have better penetrations of the Pathet Lao and Viet Minh enemy so we know his activities, capabilities, vulnerabilities and intentions in advance, not just by observing him as he passes or as we exchange shots. We must increase our toll on his use of the Lao corridor to Vietnam, by placing more action teams and special guerrilla battalions on the job. We must further exploit the several opportunities Laos offers for intelligence operations into North Vietnam, the Soviet Union and China. We must also assess and assist the process of succession when 67-year old Souvanna Phouma steps down. Our station is fully aware of these areas of challenge and is already attacking them.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVII, Memos, 2/67–12/67. Secret. An attached covering note from Walt Rostow to President Johnson, August 1, reads: “Herewith Dick Helms’ man, Bill Colby, reports quiet but substantial progress in Laos. The pressure of the road-watch teams, married to jet aircraft, is one reason infiltration has shifted to the DMZ.” There is an indication on the note that the President saw the memorandum.