Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

399. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State¹

Bangkok, July 31, 1968, 1126Z.

18214. For Bundy and Norman Hannah.

1. As you would expect, the July 26 raid on the airbase at Udorn² has stirred up a great deal of activity both on the US and Thai side, some of it essential and to the point and some of it ranging from the pointless to the dangerous. Probably there will be a delayed reaction in Washington but some of the same ideas and proposals may surface there. In anticipation of this I wanted to get my thoughts to you immediately to be sure we were thinking along parallel lines and also to confirm that the line I am taking here will be supported in Washington if it is challenged.

2. To rehearse the obvious briefly, we are of course distressed that the Communists have now turned to a type of action we have known for a long time they were perfectly capable of mounting. We know the heavy responsibility that rests on us to do everything reasonable to provide our men and equipment with protection from raids. We also know, however, that it is illusory to suppose that any complete protection can be provided; if we had any doubts our regular experiences at Danang, Bien Hoa and elsewhere surely prove the point.

3. Nevertheless, US commanders particularly those who, together with their men, face the threat directly are going to be pressing to take whatever measures seem to offer them better protection. There have already been proposals made about bringing mortars and recoilless rifles into the bases to be operated by US personnel against sources of hostile fire from outside. A proposal has been made that US helicopters be used to take Thai military personnel to the scene of action in the vicinity of the base. The flying in of a standby reaction force from out of country upon call in an emergency has also been mentioned. Proposals are being revived that we request the RTG to permit US military to carry weapons off base.

4. There is a feeling also, even if not articulated, that if a serious attack should occur US forces should move into combat action outside base areas along with whatever Thai forces were also committed.

5. I wish I could dismiss all of these proposals with the assurance that the Thais are in a position to take on and effectively carry out all of those tasks. They are not, nor do I anticipate they will be at any foreseeable time. We are already in frequent close consultation with the RTG at all levels and will be seeking constantly to move the RTG toward a base security program which in our opinion offers the best protection. We will also be bombarding Washington with requests for funds and equipment to support our own and Thai efforts in this regard. In due course I hope that we will have a mixed Thai-US arrangement “within the fence” and an effective Thai arrangement outside, (including the indispensable intelligence component and at least minimum provision for reaction forces), so that we can certify to a reasonable level of protection having in mind all of the competing demands on Thai and US forces and resources. Such protection would of course also be premised on the cardinal principle that in Thailand it is the Thai armed forces and police who are responsible for security, including the security of US installations outside their boundary perimeter.

6. I could easily and I believe effectively argue on military grounds for letting US personnel take a larger role in protecting bases outside the fence. I know, however, that each limited and seemingly logical action outside the perimeter will lead to further actions not quite so limited so that before too long we would find ourselves widely and deeply engaged on the sound premise that defense of the bases knows no precise geographic limits. American forces would be firing their weapons into Thai villages; American aircraft would be bombing and strafing presumed hostile sites where innocent Thais would surely be counted among the casualties; American ground forces would be involved in actions, bedevilled by the friend or foe dilemma so familiar in Vietnam. Ironically all of this effort on our part and its unhappy consequences for the Thais would carry with it no assurance whatsoever that the bases would be secure; again I offer our experience in Vietnam to illustrate.

7. There is latent and now increasingly articulated concern in Thailand about the American presence, but it has been almost entirely a benign presence in which identification with Thai interests and objectives is not hard to demonstrate. This would rapidly change in circumstances where American men and planes and guns are killing Thais. The Communists in the country and outside would of course be able to make great capital of this and they could count on an increasingly wider and more sympathetic audience as the military action proceeded. (Indeed their report of the Udorn incident referred to it as a “popular reaction to the US occupation”.) The eventual result would be, even if not a request for withdrawal of US forces from airbases in Thailand, at least seriously damaging to the Thai Government and posing the gravest jeopardy to the kind of cooperative relations we and Thailand have enjoyed so long and to so much mutual benefit. In this way the Communists would have accomplished much: to frighten US into actions which would achieve their prime aim—division between the US and the Thai Government and people.

8. In conclusion, I believe we can and should, of course, remain on the bases in Thailand in order to maintain our capability for strikes against Vietnam that play an indispensable role militarily as well as support our firm posture in Paris, and accept that the external protection of these bases is a Thai responsibility and that the protection will inevitably leave something to be desired. There is no need to postulate a choice between “fight” and “withdraw” at this time, and therefore we should not permit discussion to be couched in those terms. I will report regularly on progress we are making toward a mixed Thai-US system that will reduce risks while preserving our ability to use Thai bases, in order to assist those in Washington arguing both for patience and for the kind of support mentioned in paragraph five.

9. Specifically, I have explained the foregoing considerations to General Seith (Deputy Commander, 7/13th) and instructed him that no weapons or systems or personnel of a nature relevant to them will be deployed in Thailand without my permission, and that he is to concert all actions respecting base defense with the Embassy and the Consul. He has demonstrated comprehension of my views and full willingness to cooperate with them.

Unger

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–1 THAI. Secret.
2. On July 26, at about 10:30 p.m. local time, the airbase at Udorn was attacked by enemy forces. They destroyed an aircraft and a truck, damaged another aircraft and another truck, and wounded four U.S. personnel. One attacker was killed. The attackers, whose identity was not known but was assumed to be “Communist terrorists,” were estimated to number about ten. (Memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, July 26; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Thailand, Vol. VIII, Memos, 7/68–12/68)