Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

400. Memorandum for the Files¹

Washington, August 5, 1968.

SUBJECT

• Discussion of Attached Letter from Ambassador Unger,² August 1, 1968

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. Bundy, Ambassador Brown, Ambassador Martin, Mr. Hannah, Mr. Spear, Mr. Stuart

Mr. Bundy asked me for the background of the 303 approval of the proposal to fund the creation of a government party in Thailand. After a brief exposition of the terms of the proposal, its approval by the 303, and its further authorization by the Secretary and Higher Authority, I pointed out that Ambassador Unger had on several occasions received assurances from [2 lines of source text not declassified].

Mr. Bundy commented that it was quite clear that we had a commitment to fulfill, but that it was important to find out if the situation had changed sufficiently so that we ought to reconsider. At this point Ambassador Martin, supported by Mr. Hannah, argued at length that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] would eventually be taken into the group, that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] was front man for [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], and the proper person to head up the operation. True, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] was, through [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], collecting election funds already, but only because [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] were doing nothing to prepare for the election. Mr. Hannah argued that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] could not help but know of our help, that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] would tell him. But what, Mr. Spear wanted to know, would keep [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] from supporting candidates who were opposing candidates supported by [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]? Mr. Hannah conceded that this could happen, but went on to say that so far we didnʼt know what the election law would provide, that is, whether candidates would run on party tickets or as individuals. So far, Thai candidates had always run as individuals.

It was clear that to Ambassador Martin and Mr. Hannah, there had been no change in the situation which had first prompted Ambassador Martin to propose the operation. Mr. Spear appeared less certain, but nevertheless convinced that we had a commitment which had to be fulfilled. Mr. Bundy leaned to the belief that what appeared to be a possible split in the government was more apparent than real, and said that Ambassador Unger had presented the matter evenhandedly in his letter (Mr. Bundy in Bangkok last week) but that Ambassador Unger was convinced that we had to follow through. Nevertheless we needed to know whether [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] would be taken into the party, whether [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] would tell [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] what would happen if we insisted that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] tell [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and what the results would be if we went ahead with the action and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] was not told. What did Ambassador Unger think we ought to do? [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] What did Bill Hamilton think? He tasked Mr. Hannah, who was leaving for Bangkok the next day, with getting these views back to him. If there were dissents, he wanted them clearly stated.

Ambassador Brown was given the assignment of finding out whether [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] still had the money to carry out the action. He said that he would do so in the afternoonʼs meeting with [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].³ I was instructed to advise [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] ahead of time of the problem and ask him to be prepared to answer the question.

RKS

1. Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Thailand 1968. Secret.
2. Apparent reference to Document 397.
3. Brown met with [text not declassified] on the afternoon of August 1. [text not declassified] stated that the money would have to come “from [text not declassified] and presumably there would have to be some sort of huddle with BOB, [text not declassified] possibly State.” (Memorandum from Trueheart to Hughes, Denny, and Evans, August 6; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Thailand 1968)