398. Memorandum From the Secretary of Stateʼs Special Assistant for Refugee and Migration Affairs (Martin) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Brown)1
I have read Len Ungerʼs letter of July 24 to Mac Godley and the attached memcon of Ungerʼs conversation of July 18 with [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].2 I do not know whether any additional conversations took place between them which added any light before Bill Bundyʼs arrival in Bangkok, or whether [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] has sent in any appraisal of Praphatʼs intentions [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. No where in Lenʼs letter to Mac am I able to find his appraisal of where American interests lie in view of the evolving relationships between Thai personalities since last September. Since he assumes, as I do, that the commitment is firm, my comments must be based, therefore, on my knowledge of the interplay between the personalities involved.
I believe the party organization described by [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in the second paragraph of the memcon is about the maximum of “unity” one could logically expect. The convolutions within that framework will be intricate, competitive, complex, and in all of Asia, would be exceeded in deviousness only by the Javanese. Despite this, there is also a remarkable consistency and cohesion, which we have seen demonstrated over the past decade. There is really nothing in Asia to match it.
The present combination is viable and its success in the forthcoming elections is almost essential if American policy still includes among its goals a post-Viet-Nam Southeast Asia not under Chinese hegemony, either truly neutral or aligned with us in some way yet to be defined. Without a stable government in Thailand, I do not think realization of such a goal likely.
The reason the combination is viable is that it includes all the power elements necessary for stability. However, the vying for ascendancy, or the struggle to maintain present parity, will reach an acute stage during the period before the election.
For some time, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] has been the “bag man” if that is an appropriate description, for the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] faction. They have obviously accumulated [Page 888] considerable funds and are prepared to spend them to elect their candidates. (Thai candidates have traditionally run as individuals not as party members. Although it had been proposed to require party affiliation this time, I do not know how the electoral law will come out.)
I would suspect [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] are now feeling the pinch. It is quite true that contributions will be available to them. It is also quite true that contributors will expect to exercise an influence commensurate with their contributions. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] believes strongly that the only way to break out of this vicious cycle is to finance this campaign without such contributions. He has put forth rather eloquently the view that the normal Asian “conventional wisdom”, that venality is inevitable, was dealt a shattering blow when the Government allowed the Sarit scandal to be fully exposed with enormous recovery to the Treasury. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] believes that if a group can be elected without selling itself in advance, time will have been provided to eradicate such venality.
While I believe he overstates the case, he does have a case, and I believe a good one.
I might add that, despite [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] inspired rumors involving [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], I believe him to be essentially honest.
I am also certain that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] is completely honest, so much so that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] hates his guts—a feeling [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] fully reciprocates, believing [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] too closely tied to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], which he is not. And while [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] permits his family to use the influence of his position in the best Asian tradition, no scandal attaches to him personally.
It is obvious that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] has arranged matters to make it appear to the candidates that he, personally, is putting up the money. This will, of course, greatly enhance his influence. Since we can be completely sure that this influence will be used to advance all U.S. interests that are not in conflict with Thai interest, I believe we should welcome this prospect.
One overriding concern from the beginning was that the provision of this assistance never be known. This is the reason why [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] are so insistent on limiting knowledge of it so severely. A leak would destroy them. Since our own interest in secrecy fully matches theirs, I suggest we leave decisions on who on the Thai side needs to know, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].
I have previously stated that, long-range, our interests are best served by being very slow to make commitments but meticulous in keeping commitments once we do make them. I am quite sure in my own [Page 889] mind that, without the absolute conviction that we would honor this commitment, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] would not have pushed through to final action the promulgation of the new Constitution, with the elections this makes mandatory. [1 line of source text not declassified] has always opposed this, [1 line of source text not declassified].
But we now have the Constitution. The elections will have to be held. It would seem very much in our interests not to have [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] emerge as the dominant force in the new regime or force [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to avoid this only by mortgaging their faction to campaign contributors whose influence would seriously erode the emerging new “conventional wisdom” that the Governmentʼs business cannot be carried on without a return to the widespread venality that marked previous parliamentary regimes in Thailand.
The full amount would have been a small investment for the dividends we have every right to expect from it. Now that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] has indicated a smaller amount may be required, I think there is really no excuse for not fully carrying out this commitment.
I strongly recommend this be done.
- Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Thailand, Lotus File, 1968–1969. Secret; Eyes Only.↩
- Documents 397 and 396.↩