Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL BURMA–US. Secret;Nodis.
98. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson
Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. I, 5/1–27/64. No classification marking.
Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 BURMA–US. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Bangkok and CINCPAC for POLAD.
100. Action Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Berger) to Secretary of State Rusk
Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 BURMA. Secret. Drafted by Ewing and cleared by Trueheart. Sent through Ball and U. Alexis Johnson who both initialed it.
Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Burma, Ne Win Visit, 9/8–10/66. Secret.
103. Draft Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Berger) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Bundy)
Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) BURMA. Secret. Drafted by Berger.
Source: Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 165. Secret; Controlled Dissem. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the NSA prepared this estimate. All members of the USIB concurred with it except the representatives of the AEC and FBI who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction. A table of contents and a map indicating the major areas of insurgent activity are not printed.
Fred Green, Director of the Office of Research and Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific, recommended that Hughes approve this estimate. Green noted that DIA and Berger had initially requested its production because of concern about increasing Chinese Communist involvement and cooperation among insurgent groups. DIA was the most concerned about the threat of insurgency, while the State and Office of National Estimates representatives did not view Chinese activities as a real danger. The other area of difference was the Burmese Army as a counter-insurgency force. CIA gave it high marks; DIA considered it totally inept. The estimateʼs conclusion is a compromise of these extremes, which Green considered the best judgment possible given inadequate sources of information. (Memorandum from Green to Hughes, March 12; ibid.)