Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

394. Summary of Discussion and Decisions at the 36th Meeting of the Senior Interdepartmental Group¹

Washington, May 13, 1968.

PRESENT

• Under Secretary of State, Chairman
• Deputy Secretary of Defense
• General Brown for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
• The Director of Central Intelligence
• Mr. Poats for the Administrator, Agency for International Development
• The Director, United States Information Agency
• SIG Staff Director
• Ambassador Unger, Bangkok
• JCS—General Orwat
• ISA—Mr. Earle
• State—Mr. Bundy
• State—Mr. Spear
• State—Mr. Ruser

I. Future Business

The SIG agreed to meet on Friday, May 10, noon, to consider contingency plans for Czechoslovakia.

II. Review of Thailand

The following are highlights of Ambassador Ungerʼs presentation and the ensuing discussion.

A. Thai Response to International Situation

Ambassador Unger said that there had been considerable uneasiness in Thailand about international developments earlier in the year—notably about the Presidentʼs announcement that he would not stand for re-election, and Hanoiʼs decision to negotiate. Both developments had made a deep impression on Thai thinking. The President, in Thai eyes, was the guarantor of United States foreign policy in Southeast Asia. There had been considerable nervousness, similar to that during the 1962 crisis, that the United States was anxious to cut its commitments in South Viet-Nam and that the terms of a settlement would leave South Viet-Nam open to Communist take-over.

The Thaiʼs present attitude was more realistic. The Wellington discussions² had been useful in reassuring the Thai leadership with regard to United States intentions. The Thai had also been impressed by the firmness with which we had handled the site question. They considered Paris a reasonable compromise.

The Thais were realistic on negotiations. They would like to be kept informed but did not wish to become active participants in the talks. However, they would expect to be thoroughly consulted before the United States commits itself on the terms of a settlement. As they see their role as that of protector of South Viet-Namʼs interests, they would strongly object to a role of passive on-looker for either South Viet-Nam or themselves.

As regards the current visit, the Presidentʼs public and private comments had been very helpful in further reassuring the Thai leadership as was the language of the communiqué, which harks back to the Manila declaration.

B. Attitudes on Thai Security Interests

There was not in Thailand today a great deal of open political discussion. In fact, the majority of the politically articulate population probably did not at this time have clearly defined political views. There was a vaguely defined cleavage of loyalties that in general followed the division between the military and the civilian sectors of the Thai elite. However, there was a good deal of intermingling of these groups, and all the evidence supports the conclusion that the two groups work pretty well together.

On the other hand, there was probably below the surface some split of opinion with regard to Thai national security interests and the question of how closely Thailand should cooperate with the United States. Were we to create the impression that the United States was veering away from its SEATO commitments and the arrangements for joint military planning (such as Project 22), or if we were to lodge a disclaimer with respect to our commitments, this potential cleavage would come to the surface. The advocates of close cooperation with the United States, principally Thanom, Thanat and their associates, would come under fire. Praphat and his associates would push for a more independent, nationalist line. While the Thais would not break away from the Alliance, we would find them much less cooperative on issues on which we must deal with them.

The Ambassador said that he would not wish to overemphasize these nuances in the ruling eliteʼs attitudes. For the present, these shadings in views on Thailandʼs security interests were quiescent: they were potential rather than actual. We had an excellent chance of keeping them this way. But it was essential that we kept them in mind in all our decisions affecting Thai security interests.

C. Other Domestic Political Developments

Ambassador Unger foresaw a more difficult period in United States-Thai bilateral relations. Elections were scheduled under the new constitution for next February or March. This process—adoption of the constitution and preparations for the elections—would result in some ferment. For example, newspapers were already increasingly outspoken with respect to such issues as corruption, the size of the United States presence, the Thai commitment to the United States, and the costs of this commitment in terms of Thai national interests. The military was going along with the elections, albeit with some misgivings. There was some concern, particularly on the part of Praphat and his group, that the militaryʼs economic interests might be assailed publicly in the Assembly. Our people were making considerable effort to persuade Praphat and his group to adopt a more relaxed attitude toward public criticism and to take steps to improve their image.

D. The Insurgency

Ambassador Unger gave the view that, of the various insurgencies, that in the North was potentially the most serious.

The insurgency in the Northeast had gotten nowhere for about a year. The hard core of the insurgent groups was intact and capable of causing trouble. But these bands had been unable to increase the scope of their operations and had not succeeded in developing an effective propaganda line. The combination of Thai military, police, and civic action programs had been effective in containing these groups.

In the North, the potential for insurgency had existed for some time. Last year, the problem had been surfaced by sweeps of government forces into remote areas never fully under government control. A chain of events had led to a situation where control of the insurgency had become an issue of national prestige. Efforts by the Thai third army to suppress the insurgent groups had met with little success. Indeed, the nature of the armyʼs operations had further alienated the hill tribes inhabiting these areas.

The government was now trying to formulate a long-range policy for getting the insurgency under control. Some elements of this new security policy were encouraging. The third army now acknowledged the need to use tribesmen in intelligence and scouting missions. It was beginning to institute new development programs to complement security operations. The border police were being given greater responsibilities. An effort was made to profit from Lao successes in dealing with the Meo tribes. Clearly, however, the Thai had not yet found an effective security program for these remote regions.

The insurgency had now quieted down, and as the rains came, would quiet down further. Because of its ethnic basis, the insurgency was, to a considerable extent, self-limiting. On the other hand, because of the wide open Lao border, it was almost impossible for the Thai to establish and maintain control over these areas. In fact, it was uncertain how many of the insurgents were regular Thai residents and how many came across the Lao border from Sayaboury province.

In other parts of Thailand, the Ambassador said, the insurgency situation remained roughly the same, more potential than actual. There was some insurgent activity on the peninsula, particularly along the border with Burma (i.e. the West Central area). Police work was, generally speaking, effective, and the insurgency seemed fairly well under control.

As regards border areas with Malaysia, small insurgent groups of Malay-Chinese stock had been maintaining themselves there for quite a number of years. Their operations had been directed mostly towards Malaysia. They had not made great efforts in the direction of Thailand. However, there was a potential threat to these areas from the fairly substantial, relatively well-off Chinese minority, whose loyalties to the Thai Government were suspect. This minority—as well as the Malay living in these southern provinces—were now politically inactive. But it was possible that the insurgents could stir up the Chinese minority through propaganda-insurgency efforts aimed at this group.

Cooperation between the Thai and Malaysian Governments was good. Border police units were numerous and fairly well equipped. A further useful step would be a Thai Government effort to improve relations with the Malay population. In this connection, Thai plans for the University of the South, as a focus for Malayan population and culture, had considerable importance.

Ambassador Unger stressed his conviction that this project should receive encouragement and support from the United States.

E. The United States Presence

Incidents involving American servicemen, the Ambassador observed, had the potential of causing considerable trouble. The Thais had tended to disregard these incidents in the past. With the reawakening of political activity, they were now receiving much greater newspaper publicity.

The point was made that according to Washington figures some 20 per cent of American servicemen continue to live off-base, and that this pattern tended to increase the number of incidents involving United States personnel. There was also a question of whether on-base recreation facilities for servicemen were adequate. The Ambassador said that considerable effort was being made to expand on-base housing as rapidly as possible. The problem of substantial numbers of servicemen living off-base was now largely confined to Udorn. He agreed that efforts must continue to improve recreational on-base facilities.

The Ambassador said he expected negotiations on the SOFA to be completed rapidly, following the Thanom visit and the opportunities it afforded for further discussions. The Thais were unwilling to accept an automatic waiver-of-jurisdiction provision, but would in practice agree to waive jurisdiction in the greatest number of cases possible. Meanwhile, a new problem has arisen: the national government had terminated the procedures in effect for several years, and the police now required a special order from Bangkok to be able to turn over detained servicemen to American authorities.

Ambassador Unger emphasized that we would, through a written exchange with the Thais, assure adequate protection of servicemenʼs rights in cases where the Thais were unwilling to waive jurisdiction.

It was noted that arrangements with Thailand were considerably more favorable than those with the Philippines, which were modeled after our SOFA with the Netherlands. Out of some 323 cases, the Philippines Government had waived jurisdiction only in 9. Nationalists in other East Asian countries, fortunately, had not so far focussed on the Philippine SOFA as a model for similar arrangements in their countries.

Another aspect of the United States presence, the Ambassador said, involved such intangibles as Thai attitudes, feelings, and perceptions.

The Thai, generally, remained friendly towards Americans. But there clearly was some uneasiness simply about the number of Americans, their effect on Thai culture, etc. However, although somewhat troubled, the Thai, generally, would like to see some United States presence after a Viet-Nam settlement.

The Thai Government had raised this matter before the present visit. It would like to see some United States forces stationed in Thailand indefinitely as an earnest of our commitment to their security. The Ambassador proposed we assure the Thai Government that we would not move precipitously and agree to consult before removing United States units.

F. The Thai Economy

The economic situation, Ambassador Unger said, was no longer quite as favorable as in past year. A drought and lower export prices for corn, jute and tapioca had slowed down economic growth in 1967. But, unless the drought should continue this year, there was no reason to think growth at a rate of 7–8 percent would not be restored. Economic expansion in the Bangkok area, in particular, was impressive. Some of it was superficial—the boom in real-estate values, etc.—but a good deal of it involved basic improvement of the economyʼs productivity.

Some of this prosperity was reaching the countryside but not as much as we considered desirable.

G. Thai Civilian-Military Relations

The Ambassador referred to concerns about a military coup, occasionally still encountered among observers of the Thai scene.

He gave the view that the political situation in Bangkok had changed very markedly from that prevailing during his earlier tour of duty in the late fifties. The process of government had become in large measure institutionalized. Control of the first army was no longer the key to political power. Rather, the stability and continuity of the government now depended upon the relationship between Thanom and Praphat, each of whom had his own large group of military and civilian followers throughout Thai public life. The elections would have no effect on this relationship. Furthermore, the ruling elites should have no difficulty in organizing some kind of party structure, which would provide additional support for the regime.

H. Follow-up Action

The Chairman said he wished to express to Ambassador Unger the SIGʼs appreciation for this comprehensive and candid presentation. He gave the view that we would want to keep the Thai situation under continuing close review, both in Bangkok and in Washington. He would like to endorse the various efforts now under way to assess and appraise aspects of our relationship with Thailand, including:

• —Assessment of the reliability of intelligence data on the insurgency now being undertaken by CIA.
• —The Country Teamʼs resources study now under review by the IRG/EA.
• —The assessment of AID programs requested in the memoranda to Messrs. Bundy and Bullitt,³ the latter to take into account the findings of the new NIE⁴ on Thailand and their implications for AIDʼs strategy.

The Chairman also referred to his earlier suggestion, in line with the Political-Military Groupʼs internal defense policy paper, that the IRG/EA form a working group-subcommittee to keep insurgency situations and internal defense programs under review for the East Asia region. He noted that in the Latin American area, such a group manned by experts on insurgency, had worked with excellent results. He saw such a working group as a way for EA to mobilize experience available in Washington to assist the bureau and the country teams in formulating its policies in this difficult area.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, SIG, Vol. 4, 36th meeting. Secret; Limdis. There was no drafting information on the source text, which indicates that this was the “Chairmanʼs Summary of Discussion and Decisions.” It was probably drafted by Arthur A. Hartman, Staff Director of the SIG.
2. The combined SEATO, ANZUS, and Seven Troop Contributing Countries meeting at Wellington, New Zealand, April 1–6.
3. Apparent reference to Document 382 and the attachment thereto.
4. Document 390.