390. National Intelligence Estimate1

NIE 52–68

COMMUNIST INSURGENCY IN THAILAND

The Problem

To assess the probable development of Communist insurgency in Thailand over the next two years or so.

Conclusions

A.
The Communist insurgent threat to the stability of the Thai Government has not grown appreciably over the past year despite the appearance of insurgent activity in additional areas of the country. At the heart of the insurgentsʼ failure to make significant progress is the lack of a charismatic leader or a compelling issue with which to stir popular emotions. The insurgent movement is further handicapped by its foreign flavor; its policies are strongly influenced by Peking and its leaders are predominantly Thai-born Chinese.
B.
The Thai Government has generally shown increasing competence in dealing with the insurgency. But many problems remain, including bureaucratic rivalries and the failure of the government and the army to make the most effective use of the resources already at their disposal.
C.
Despite its many serious handicaps, it is probable that the insurgency in Thailand, with the continued support of Peking and Hanoi, will persist and even increase in intensity over the next two years or so. Even though government suppression activities may become more effective, it is unlikely that major guerrilla units will be eliminated; the guerrillas will probably gain in skill and continue to find sufficient numbers of adventurous youth and disaffected peasants to maintain something like their current personnel strength. The Northeast will continue to be the key area, but the local threat in the North may become more serious.
D.
The insurgent movement would almost certainly benefit from a settlement in Vietnam favorable to the Communists; the benefits would be even greater if all Laos fell to Communist control. But the Thai Government would not be disposed to accommodate with the domestic insurgents in either case, and there would not be an automatic and rapid growth in the insurgent movement. The effectiveness of the counterinsurgency program, however, could be diminished by political instability at the center resulting from the combined impact of Communist successes in Indochina, uncertainty as to the future role of the US on the Southeast Asian mainland, and divisions over the international political adjustments thought necessary to ensure Thailandʼs survival in a new environment.

[Here follows the Discussion portion of the paper, and two maps, “Communist Activity and Major U.S. Military Bases,” and “Major Ethnic Groups.”]

  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, 52, Thailand. Secret. The CIA, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the USIB concurred with its release except the representatives of the AEC and FBI who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction. A table of contents and a map entitled “Thailand Communist Insurgency Regions” are not printed.