Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

382. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy)¹

Washington, March 25, 1968.

SUBJECT

• United States Policy and Programs in Thailand

You may have seen my recent memorandum to John Bullitt raising certain questions about United States-supported programs in Northeast Thailand (copy attached). The memorandum was occasioned by a briefing I had recently on the situation in Thailand and our programs there.

The following are some of my thoughts on the broader context in which, under your leadership (and complementing the efforts of Ambassador Unger in Bangkok), I believe this inquiry should proceed.

The Political-Military Group is about to put before the SIG its report on United States counterinsurgency policies around the world. I understand that one of its principal recommendations is that regional bureaus should set up working groups under the aegis of their IRGs (but more restricted and selective in membership) to review and appraise the insurgency situation in selected problem countries.

This is a recommendation with which I personally agree. Leadership in this area must, of course, rest, in the first instance, with the Chief of Mission and the Assistant Secretary (and, under his direction, the country director). But there is a place, as well, for an inter-agency working group—operating under the IRG and manned by specialists with experience across country lines—to assist the bureaus in appraising insurgency situations and the effectiveness of programs. In my view, these working groups should include, besides OSD/ISA, JCS, CIA and AID, knowledgeable representatives from other offices with a global functional interest such as G/PM and Systems Analysis (OSD). In the Latin American area such a working group has been operating with good results for several years.

I do believe that such a group should be formed in EA and that Thailand should be high on the list of countries to be examined.

My central concerns, as they relate to the Thai situation, are:

• —the effectiveness of United States-supported counterinsurgency efforts (see Bullitt memo), and the proper mix of security and development efforts;
• —the dilemma of how to avoid both trying to do too much too quickly and not doing enough;
• —the possibility of a clandestine organizing effort that is more widespread than our intelligence data now indicate exists.

As regards the longer term, I am interested in an examination of the relationship between the developing situation in Viet-Nam and Laos and our policies, programs and interests in Thailand (one of the reasons I have endorsed the proposed RAND study); and in an examination of alternative United States strategies in the light of these interests and developments. Finally, I think it is important not to limit the insurgency review to security programs. It should include, as well, consideration of the complementary development programs.

There are some general thoughts on how we might proceed. I know there have been several reviews and studies on Thailand and our programs and policies in that country (such as Ambassador Ungerʼs current study of Thai-United States resources). I also know of the Missionʼs own very detailed review procedures of the insurgency situation, Ambassador Ungerʼs continuing personal interest and concern, and the monthly reviews by the Thai working group (under the chairmanship of the country director) here in Washington. All of this gives us a good base from which to move ahead.

Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

Attachment

Washington, March 18, 1968.

Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to the Assistant Administrator for East Asia, Agency for International Development (Bullitt)

SUBJECT

• Scope and Effectiveness of Thai-AID-Supported Programs in Northeast Thailand

I fully agree with your, Mr. Bundyʼs and Ambassador Ungerʼs plans for a thorough evaluation of U.S. programs in Thailand. I will be discussing with Mr. Bundy how to carry forward this evaluation at the Washington end in the IRG/EA framework.

In this connection, I endorse the proposed RAND study of future problems in the United States-Thai assistance relationship. I hope that after Ambassador Unger has reviewed and commented upon the prospectus, work on the study can get promptly underway.

I also endorse the re-appraisal of the Thai insurgency situation through the special NIE now in progress and the study of Thai-United States resources which is being carried forward under Ambassador Ungerʼs leadership. I would like to review personally the results of both.

As regards AID activities and programs, even while this work goes forward, I believe we should also re-examine and re-assess more directly U.S.-supported programs and activities, their adequacy in terms of geographic coverage, effectiveness in raising living standards, and ultimate effect on the loyalty of the local population. A number of questions can legitimately be raised in this connection.

1. Coordination: How good is coordination between security operations (Army, police, border patrol), measures to improve the security structure (organization of village security forces, establishment of police tambol stations, police and border patrol deployments, installations of radio links to villages, etc.), and deployment of the rural development effort (accelerated rural development projects, deployment of mobile development units, community development efforts, agriculture extension programs, mobile medical teams).

2. Geographic scope of Thai-U.S. operations: In geographic terms, how adequate is the coverage of Northeast Thailand by Thai security and development efforts relative to the geographic incidence of the insurgency. How quickly will coverage increase.

3. Effectiveness of AID civil police administration programs: How do we judge the effectiveness of these programs, particularly as they relate to the security situation in the 25 most sensitive changwads. More generally, what do we know about relations between the police and the local population.

4. Effectiveness of accelerated rural development program: This program which had been intended as a broad effort to meet village development needs has concentrated heavily on road construction. In your judgement, are other village needs (water supply and control, irrigation, school construction, medical needs, agriculture extension) adequately being met by this or other programs.

5. Balance between security and development programs: More generally, what is your judgement on the proper balance between security and development programs. Are the Thais doing enough in the development area. Should the emphasis be shifted either way.

6. Effect on village social structure and political loyalties: What concrete evidence do we have as regards the effects of these programs on village social structure, (e.g. the role of the traditional village leadership, the aspirations of younger people, increased participation in voluntary associations and the political processes) and political loyalties.

7. Effect on local and provincial government structure: In what ways do these programs utilize, strengthen and develop local and provincial government administrative capability and authority.

I recognize that some of these questions will also be covered in Ambassador Ungerʼs study. I would appreciate it if you and your staff would examine these and other related questions that may occur to you in your review.

Nicholas deB Katzenbach ²

1. Source: Johnson Library National Security File, Country File, Thailand, Vol. VII, Memos, 8/67–7/68. Confidential. The Department of State copy of this memorandum indicates that it and the attachment were drafted by Claus Ruser of Katzenbachʼs staff on March 16. (Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) THAI)
2. Printed from a copy that indicates Katzenbach signed the original. A note on the source text indicates that Katzenbach handed the original memorandum to Bullitt on March 18.