Office of the Historian

389. Memorandum From Marshall Wright of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow)1

Washington, May 8, 1968.

SUBJECT

  • SIG Meeting on Thailand2—May 9, 3:30 p.m.

There are no decisions to be taken at the meeting. The purpose of the meeting is to examine in depth with Len Unger the situation in Thailand and United States programs there. I understand that Katzenbach is being provided with some rather sharp questions about the relationship between programs, whether they are consistent with each other, and whether they should be changed in the light of our experience in Vietnam. Katzenbach may also question whether the Thai take the insurgency as seriously as we do and whether they are putting enough resources into the counter-insurgent effort.

Another likely topic is the political situation in Thailand and how the Ambassador views the likelihood and significance of elections. (The present guess is the constitution will be promulgated in June with elections to follow in January or February of 1969.)

In my mind the three most interesting things to pursue with Len are:

1.
How do we handle the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Thailand post-Vietnam without causing the Thai to panic? How serious will the economic effect be of our withdrawal? How should we cushion it? (Our troop presence in Thailand is by no means an unmixed blessing for the Thai and will become even less so if they move into open politics. I suspect that if we will avoid giving the Thai the impression that we are in hot haste to get the troops out, they will probably themselves suggest fairly rapid schedules of withdrawals for most of our forces. If, however, we seem anxious about it, it will arouse all their latent fears about the firmness of our commitment to them.)
2.
What kind of arrangements on Laos are necessary as part of the Vietnam settlement from the Thai point of view? What is the relationship between the post-Vietnam situation in Laos and the Thai attitude toward a U.S. military presence in Thailand.
3.
What effect will the coming of open politics have on U.S.-Thai cooperation? What can we do to minimize the bad things and maximize the good.

Attached is a paper circulated by Art Hartman which outlines the major issues to which Len Unger has been asked to speak.3

  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, SIG, Vol. 4, 36th meeting. No classification marking.↩
  2. In March 1966 the Johnson administration created the Senior Interdepartmental Group chaired by the Under Secretary of State and supported by Interdepartmental Review Groups (IRGs) headed by the Assistant Secretary of State for the appropriate area. The action was an attempt to return to the Department of State primary responsibility for foreign policy formulation and supervision of interdepartmental activities abroad.↩
  3. Attached, but not printed.↩