Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

388. Memorandum of Conversation¹

I–22598/68

Washington, May 8, 1968, 3:30–5:35 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Visit of Thailand Prime Minister, Thanom Kittikachorn

PARTICIPANTS

• United States Side
  • Secretary of Defense—Clark M. Clifford
  • Deputy Secretary of Defense—Paul H. Nitze
  • Assistant Secretary of Defense—Paul C. Warnke
  • U.S. Ambassador to Thailand—Leonard Unger
  • Assistant for Thailand (ISA)—James B. Devine
• Thailand Side
  • Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn
  • H.E. Thanat Khoman, Minister of Foreign Affairs
  • H.E. Pote Sarasin, Minister of National Development and Minister of Economic Affairs
  • H.E. Bunchana Atthakor, Ambassador to the United States of America
  • LtGen Sawaeng Senanarong, Secretary General of the Prime Ministerʼs Office
  • LtGen Kriangsak Chomanan, Deputy Chief of Staff, Supreme Command Headquarters
  • Renoo Savansit, Director, Bureau of the Budget

Introduction

After welcoming the Prime Minister and his party and reminiscing about their previous meetings in Manila and Bangkok, the Secretary asked if there were any items the Prime Minister wished to raise.

Patrol Frigate

The Secretary said he understood that a patrol frigate was recently approved for the Thai Navy and wondered if the Prime Minister was aware of this. The Prime Minister, who spoke in Thai throughout the meeting and had his remarks summarized in English by one of his party, usually Lieutenant General Kriangsak Chomanom, indicated the President had informed him of the approval that morning but that he was not clear on the details. Ambassador Unger commented that the approved cost-sharing arrangements were the same as those discussed by MACTHAI with the Thai Navy in Bangkok. General Kriangsak then asked if the ongoing O&M costs for the frigate would be borne by the military assistance program. Mr. Nitze agreed that they would, but within the existing MAP ceiling for Thailand.

Vietnam

Secretary Clifford then turned the discussion to Vietnam and, specifically, the results of the Communist Tet offensive. He observed that the initial reaction in this country was that it was a victory for the enemy but this was before all the facts were in. With the facts we now have, it is apparent, he said, that the enemy suffered a severe setback, especially in the losses they suffered in their elite units. The offensive also failed from a psychological viewpoint in that the Vietnamese people did not welcome the NVA/VC as liberators in the cities.

The Secretary moved on to a review of the Khe Sanh situation and observed that Communist efforts to turn it into another Dien Bien Phu had failed. He said the enemy withdrew as a result of the punishment they received from the B–52 strikes and the highly accurate artillery fire. He stressed that the Communist withdrawal was not a de-escalation gesture; the enemy simply could not stand the losses they were receiving, i.e., an estimated 12,000 were killed.

Bringing his review of Vietnam up to the present, Secretary Clifford noted that approximately 100,000 North Vietnamese had moved through the Panhandle of North Vietnam since the first of the year and the great majority of these had infiltrated into South Vietnam. But recent Communist attacks on some 129 cities, towns, hamlets, and airfields have had virtually no lasting effect.

Peace Talks

The Secretary concluded his discussion of Vietnam by reviewing the U.S. position on the Paris peace talks. He acknowledged that we were unclear as to North Vietnamʼs true intentions and indicated that we would just have to wait and see how the negotiations proceeded. He suggested three possibilities, however. North Vietnam may see the talks as a way to augment its military capabilities or, along the same line, it may view them as a means of lulling the American public into a false sense of euphoria. Alternatively, it may see the talks as an avenue for arriving at a peaceful settlement of the war.

The Secretary then reviewed the reasons for the Presidentʼs decision not to seek another term, noting that had he stayed a candidate it would have exacerbated the existing political divisions in this country. As it now stands, the Presidentʼs decision has resulted in much greater unity and understanding here.

As concerns our future intentions in Southeast Asia, Secretary Clifford stressed that it was the Presidentʼs firm intention to protect the investment we had made in that area. In short, we would not pull out and write off the investment of 21,000 military personnel killed in action and the billions we have spent in our efforts to insure self-determination for the Vietnamese people. He stated further that the Paris talks would not affect our goals in other areas of Southeast Asia, particularly in Thailand. We were willing to try for peace at Paris but if these diplomatic efforts failed, we would have to go the military route.

Thai SVN Division

The Secretary at this point asked the Prime Minister about the status of the Thai light division and, specifically, if there were any equipment problems that were affecting its training. After a discussion in Thai with the Prime Minister, General Kriangsak said that training was proceeding smoothly and that the necessary equipment was arriving, but that there was a shortage of 1.6 million baht ($80,000) for latrines at the Kachinaburi training site. Kriangsak also said that, in response to a query from the President that morning regarding the feasibility of accelerating the deployment of the Thai force to SVN, the Prime Minister had replied that an acceleration of the training schedule would adversely affect the operational readiness of the unit. Prime Minister Thanom felt that the currently planned training cycle was required for the first increment but that they would try to move up the deployment date of the second increment from January to November if it could be done without degrading the readiness of the unit. At this juncture, Foreign Minister Thanat commented that it was his understanding that there were some deficiencies in arms that had been due in March for the unit. No one at the table was familiar with any such shortage. Secretary Clifford directed that the problem be investigated and indicated that if deficiencies did exist he would put a man on it and correct the problem. (Note: A subsequent discussion with General Kriangsak and investigations by DA indicate that Thanat was referring to typewriters and one or two radios and tool sets, none of which affect the readiness of the unit.)

Insurgency Situation

The Secretary inquired about the status of the insurgency in Thailand. After receiving the Prime Ministerʼs thoughts in Thai, General Kriangsak responded that insurgent strength in the Northeast had diminished, that the number of CI defectors had risen, primarily due to effective use of radio station 909 for psychological purposes, and that the Civilian-Police-Military CI approach had proven very effective. Kriangsak briefly alluded to the situation in North Thailand, observing that the hilltribes presented a special problem. He noted that a force of 15 police was ambushed shortly after they left on their trip.

RTA Logistics and Personnel

Secretary Clifford remarked that he had been informed that the Thai Army logistical system was in need of substantial improvement. He said that much of the equipment already provided by the U.S. appeared not to be properly utilized due to a shortage of such commodities as tires and batteries which could be provided from Thai sources. He stressed the need to retain skilled personnel in the Thai Armed Forces, especially in the junior officer and NCO categories. He also noted that additional RTA units might be required in insurgency threatened areas. The Secretary concluded by noting that there was need for closer U.S.-Thai cooperation in the entire field of logistics and that we must work together to remedy the problems.

The Prime Minister through General Kriangsak admitted that the Secretaryʼs remarks were indeed true. For example, he noted that Army, Navy and Air Force helicopters had separate maintenance systems and that recruitment procedures required improvement. (Note: Efforts are currently underway to establish a single helicopter maintenance facility for all RTA, RTAF and Police helicopters.) He said that the Thai would do the best they could to solve existing problems. He did observe, however, that the shortage of skilled personnel was due in part to the need to fill out the forces to be deployed to SVN.

Helicopters Deliveries

General Kriangsak then asked if the helicopter delivery schedule previously approved by Secretary McNamara would be met. Ambassador Bunchana interjected that he hoped we would be able to waive the proviso that U.S.-Vietnam helo requirements might conceivably necessitate diversion of the helicopters to Vietnam. Mr. Warnke observed that we must reserve that right but it was not expected that diversion to Vietnam would be required. Secretary Clifford reiterated Mr. Warnkeʼs comments, noting that he had recently approved an increase in helicopter engine production which had heretofore been the major bottleneck in helo production.

Korat to Ubon Road

General Kriangsak, at the Prime Ministerʼs behest, then raised the subject of a Korat to Ubon road. He outlined the justification for it in terms of its requirement under SEATO Oplans and Project 22, as an aid to CI efforts, as important for the flow of USAF commodities to the Ubon airbase, and as having value to Thailandʼs economic development. Kriangsak went on to express the hope that U.S. engineers could help with the project. (See below for further discussion of road.)

Budget Priorities

The Secretary thereupon raised the subject of budget priorities, observing that DOD must absorb one half of the FY69 overall budget cut agreed to by the President. He emphasized the gold flow problem confronting us and stressed that the U.S. and RTG would have to work together in determining what is needed right now and what can be postponed. He went on to say that each program in Thailand needs to be examined from this standpoint given the limited available resources.

Status of Forces Negotiations

Secretary Clifford then raised the subject of the status of forces agreement negotiations and stressed the need for reaching prompt agreement. He observed that the matter of criminal jurisdiction was a particularly delicate issue, but stated that servicemen charged with offenses arising from the course of their official duties or offenses involving only U.S. interests should be tried by U.S. courts. He recognized that both Governments have public opinion problems and noted that there was concern here regarding Thai handling of a recent case involving a U.S. sergeant. Ambassador Unger outlined the current status of SOFA negotiations, indicating that he and the Foreign Minister had reviewed the subject and that many of the problems were on their way to resolution.

Foreign Minister Thanat interjected the observations that the SOFA issue had been on the books for some seven years and that the U.S. had never responded to an earlier Thai SOFA proposal. He emphasized the importance of the need to consider Thai public opinion and stated emphatically that certain offenses had to be dealt with under Thai law, especially in peace time. He said that the Thai Government was not opposed to a status of forces agreement and that it was prepared to proceed on a reasonable basis. He alluded to the case of the U.S. sergeant and commented that there were apparently conflicting reports on what actually occurred, but indicated that we should not engage in controversy but rather work together.

Base Security

The Prime Minister through General Kriangsak discussed the base security problem in Thailand and the need for increased manning, more weapons and communications equipment. Kriangsak asked if the U.S. would be of assistance. Mr. Warnke confirmed the urgency we attach to base security and expressed our willingness to examine jointly measures that might be taken to improve the current program. The Secretary stated his agreement with this approach. Kriangsak went on to note that there was a requirement for equipment for an additional regiment of Thai guards to permit rotation of the current force for training purposes. Ambassador Unger suggested incorporating this proposal in the aforementioned review of the base security program and the Secretary agreed to this.

U.S. Use of Foreign Nationals, Services, and Commodities

Pote Sarasin then raised the problem of U.S. contractor use of foreign nationals, particularly Filipinos, for services that could be performed just as well by Thai. Secretary Clifford asked how many foreign personnel were involved. General Kriangsak said he did not have specified figures but cited tug boat services for which a contract could have been let to a Thai company but instead went to a Philippine company. Ambassador Unger said that, as a matter of policy, first preference did go to Thai if they possessed the necessary skills. Secretary Clifford agreed that this should be the test and again asked for illustrations of where this policy was not followed so that we could trace back to see what went wrong. He asked Ambassador Unger to maintain liaison with the RTG on this subject.

General Kriangsak suggested that the U.S. provide the RTG a list of its requirements so that efforts could be made to build the necessary capability in Thailand. Kriangsak also mentioned that cement had been imported when it could have been procured locally and that a local airline could provide administrative airlift services that were currently being performed by an outside line. He said that MACTHAI was cooperating in this regard, but was hopeful that more could be done.

(Secretary Clifford and Mr. Warnke left the room on urgent business for a few minutes at this point.)

C–123ʼs for RTAF Tachikawa Detachment

After a lengthy discussion in Thai with the Prime Minister, General Kriangsak discussed the Thai Air Force detachment at Tachikawa, Japan, and the requirement that exists back in Thailand for the unitʼs two C–47ʼs. He asked if the U.S. could replace these with two C–123ʼs. Mr. Nitze confirmed that we are prepared to do this. The Prime Minister expressed his appreciation.

Delivery of Engineer Equipment

Kriangsak then asked that the delivery of engineer equipment we now have programmed under MAP for a Thai engineer construction battalion be expedited. He said the equipment was badly needed and that they could not wait three, four or five years for it. Mr. Nitze observed that this subject, along with others that had been raised, would be better considered first in the field. Kriangsak said the Prime Minister agreed, and that he mentioned them for Washingtonʼs information.

HAWK Battery

General Kriangsak at this point brought up the HAWK battery and indicated that the RTG had learned a great deal about the HAWK system through the visits of Thai officers to Vietnam and Taiwan. Mr. Nitze commented that the HAWK battery was a good example of what Secretary Clifford had meant earlier regarding the need to look at priorities.

Korat to Ubon Road

The subject of the road from Korat to Ubon was brought up again by General Kriangsak. Mr. Nitze reiterated the need for both the U.S. and RTG to undertake high priority projects first and postpone others. In this connection, he said we had similar problems initially with the patrol frigate proposal in light of the more pressing counterinsurgency requirements.

(At this juncture, Secretary Clifford and Mr. Warnke returned.)

Appointment of Thai to U.S. Service Academies

The discussion turned to Thai desires to have additional Thai admitted to the three U.S. Service Academies. Ambassador Bunchana indicated he had discussed a Naval Academy appointment with Secretary of the Navy Paul Ignatius. General Kriangsak quoted the Prime Minister as saying he asked for appointments for Thai during his 1959 visit to the U.S. but had never received a response from the Navy. Secretary Clifford promised to look into the matter.

Status of Forces Negotiations

The meeting ended with Foreign Minister Thanat observing that there was more to the SOFA negotiations than the criminal jurisdiction issue. He said RTG willingness to cooperate was illustrated by the tax exemptions that had been granted just as if a SOFA existed. He asserted that these amount to 200,000,000 baht annually.

Conclusion

After an exchange of amenities, the meeting ended.

1. Source: Johnson Library, Clifford Papers, Memorandum of Conversation. Secret. Drafted by Devine and approved by Warnke on May 13. The meeting was held in Cliffordʼs office at the Pentagon.