Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

387. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow)¹

Washington, May 8, 1968.

SUBJECT

• Notes of Presidentʼs Conversation with Thanom, May 8, 12:00–1:00 p.m.

I am sending you in this single copy my notes of the Presidentʼs conversation with Thanom at this first meeting. For working purposes, I gave a quick summary of the highlights to Secretary Rusk and to Secretary Clifford for their use in their follow-up conversations. I also informed Ambassador Unger in a general sense.

As the conversation went, Thanom and Thanat met privately with the President for about 10–15 minutes, after which the President invited Ambassador Duke and myself to join.

1. Presidentʼs Decision/Selection of Paris. When I entered, the President stated that he had already briefly discussed the reasons for his personal decision with Thanom, and that he had particularly wished to do this privately. He also reported that he had briefly discussed the reasons for the selection of Paris for the talks, and that he had already got Than-omʼs assurance that the Thai would continue with their troop commitment this year. The dates the President mentioned—without contradiction from the Thai—were not later than July for the first contingent, and November (sic) for the second contingent. (I believe in later conversations the second contingentʼs time of arrival was more generalized and in any case to be before the end of the year.)

2. Possible TCC Summit. Thanom raised this issue, asking simply whether the President thought a summit meeting might be useful in the next few weeks. The President responded that he would be in a better position to judge by July 1st. He was expecting to see Thieu and all the other TCC heads by then; he mentioned that it was Mrs. Marcos he expected to see, but made a remark to the effect that Marcos did not have much of a stake anyway. (He did not spell out any plan for seeing Holyoake.)

The President went on that he could most conveniently go to Honolulu, and would hold his schedule flexible to make this possible on fairly short notice. He was prepared in principle to meet with any two or more of the TCC if this were useful. At the same time, we all had to be on our guard lest the press interpret such a meeting as having a crisis flavor.

Thanom responded that he himself was ready to come to Honolulu whenever the President judged it useful and wise to do so, and would hold himself flexible.

The President then said that we might have a better judgment in 2–4 weeks, and asked whether Thanom had any special date in mind.

Thanom responded that he did not, and that “we will follow your convenience.”

Comment: My feeling was that the President had expressed just the right blend of sympathy and reserve, and it seemed to be quite clear that Thanom was not pressing very hard. There was no mention of the idea later proposed by Thanat, of a Foreign Ministers meeting in Bangkok.

3. Prospects for the Paris Talks. Thanom asked how the President saw the Paris talks unfolding, and the President said that of course stopping the bombing might be the immediate issue. We would press quite hard for clear indications of what Hanoi would do, and take a very firm position. If Hanoi did not give us such indications, we might at some point face the question of stopping the bombing on a trial basis to see what happened. However, the President made clear that this was a most tentative forecast, and that all that he could say definitely was that we were going into the talks in a firm position. As I recall, the President made some mention of our recent military successes, political improvements in Saigon, and the gentle feeling that we were in a fairly strong position.

4. Balance of Payments. The President then brought up the question of the Thai assisting us on our balance of payments problem by transferring some of their reserves into longer-term US securities. At the Presidentʼs request, I described the proposal in general terms—as involving a transfer from present short-term holdings to longer-term holdings bearing a higher rate of interest. I noted that of course such an arrangement would require technical discussions.

Thanom reacted sympathetically to the Presidentʼs suggestion, and said that his government would be entirely willing to discuss this further in a forthcoming spirit. He indicated that there were other monetary questions that needed discussion, without specifying what these were.

Comment: The matter was further pursued by Secretary Rusk with Thanat (with Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Petty present), and more informally by Mr. Barnett with Pote. The Thai subsequently agreed to the visit now being carried out by Barnett and Treasury representatives.

5. MAP Program. The President brought this matter up, saying that he had just received a recommendation from Defense that we go ahead to furnish a half of the cost of a frigate for the Thai Navy, along the lines the Thai had suggested. He said that he was giving a firm go-ahead on this, and that Thanom could now understand that this request was approved. Thanom reacted with obvious pleasure to this disclosure. (The matter was further discussed by Secretary Clifford at the afternoon meeting that day.)

6. Satellite Conversation. The President then alluded briefly to the plan that he and Thanom should inaugurate the Satellite circuit with a conversation after the dinner to be held that night. Again Thanom reacted with obvious pleasure.

7. Thai Counter-Insurgency Program. The President then asked Thanom how the insurgency situation was going. Thanom responded that the Laos Government was being more cooperative in the northern areas, and that things were generally going better. He particularly referred to the capture of key Communist leaders, and said that this had provided a wealth of information on the way the apparatus worked. He did note that they were still unable to find out what the source of funds was.

Thanom also noted that the situation in the northeast had cooled down, and said that the real cure there and elsewhere lay in economic and social measures. In response to the Presidentʼs question whether there were any gaps in our own assistance, Thanom said that things were in satisfactory shape, although he also mentioned that they were concerned that our programs remain adequate in respect to the hill tribes effort, the volunteer defense corps, and the village security force. The President said we would have a look at these, to be sure they were adequate. He made no commitments, and this discussion was in general terms.

WPB

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, President-Thanom meeting, May, 8, 1968. Secret; Eyes Only. According to the Presidentʼs Daily Diary, the meeting lasted from 12:14 to 1 p.m. (Ibid.) Transmitted to the White House on May 20.