Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

331. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson¹

Washington, October 15, 1966.

SUBJECT

• Military Assistance for Thailand

Secretaries Rusk and McNamara have been unable to reach agreement on the level of our MAP assistance to Thailand for FY 1967. In the accompanying joint memorandum² they present their positions and ask for your decision. Both consider it important that the Thai be advised of the decision during your forthcoming trip. I agree.

The Issue

The MAP level for FY 1967 is currently programmed at $35 million. The Embassy, Secretary Rusk and Joint Chiefs urge a minimum level of $60 million. Secretary McNamara sees possible military justification for no more than $44 million. The disagreement reflects differing assessments of the proper military structure for Thailand, of their performance in using equipment provided, and of political factors.

Stateʼs Position

We face a crisis of confidence in our relations with the Thai Government. The Thais have aligned their policies with ours in containing Communist aggression and have been highly cooperative in permitting our use of their bases and facilities. They want to strengthen their own defenses by bringing their conventional forces up to authorized strength. This would mean a FY 1967 program $16 million larger than in FY 1966, and $25 million more than currently programmed.

Congressional criticism of our commitment and presence in Thailand have soured our relations to the point where Thai leaders are beginning to question our resolve. Our failure to help strengthen their defenses by approving a MAP level of $60 million would further erode the stability of our alliance. They would likely press for a bilateral defense treaty and impede our Vietnamese operations from Thailand by establishing greater controls over each air mission as well as any future utilization of their facilities that we contemplate.

While MAP assistance should stress combatting insurgency, the Thai do not accept the view that their military forces should be limited to a constabulary while they rely on outside powers to provide conventional defense capabilities as needed.

Defense Position

The proper MAP level from a military standpoint is the currently programmed $35 million. There could be some justification for a level of $44 million. Thai forces should be directed primarily to counterinsurgency missions and internal security, with provision for only limited conventional capabilities. We should provide support only as the Thais demonstrate they can meet minimum maintenance and usage standards. The $35 million level is adequate for these purposes. There are, as well, serious inadequacies in past Thai performance.

Substantial Congressional cuts in the Military Assistance Program would make it difficult to increase the Thai program above $35 million. If the Thai program is held to this level, the Congressional cuts will still force reductions of nearly $85 million in programs of other countries already at austere levels.

Additional funds for Thailand would constitute a political pay-off taken from MAP funds badly needed elsewhere.

Funding Options

If the level is raised to $60 million, these would be the funding options:

New Legislation

• —A supplemental appropriations request to include economic and military aid to Viet-Nam and other Asian countries.
• —Request Congressional authority to transfer the Laos MAP of $109 million for FY 1967 to military services budgets, freeing that amount for MAP elsewhere.

Current Authority

• —The law permits transfer of some funds from economic to military assistance in the Supporting Assistance and Contingency Funds. Given Congressional cuts and economic aid requirements, transfers would have to be compensated by supplemental appropriations for economic aid.
• —Up to $300 million of U.S. military stocks can be used and repaid from future MAP appropriations.
• —Transfers from other MAP programs (e.g. India/Pakistan pipeline, Greece, Turkey, Republic of China, Korea or Latin America).

Credit Sales

• —Instead of MAP grants, we could enter into credit sales on maximum concessionary terms of 14 years repayment without interest.

The positions of both Secretaries have merit.

In my judgement, critical political factors and important questions of our use of Thai facilities, argue persuasively for agreeing to a $60 million level for FY 1967.

The Thai have repeatedly noted that you, in your 1961 visit, were the only senior American visitor who ever took time to explore Thai problems deeply and to follow through by securing an increase in military assistance. The suggested action would underline your continuing concern with Thai security.

I am impressed also by the following:

(1) Indications of improving Thai maintenance and usage capabilities.

(2) the fact that the Thai want to increase their conventional force to prevent any future heavy dependence on us or others.

(3) the clear determination by the Thai to achieve the desired military capacity, even if it means cutting back on their “nation building” program which has shown so much promise. Ambassador Martin feels certain that if we push them down that track, history will regard it as a monumental error. I think he is right.

(4) failure to help them meet the gap between their plans and their capacities will almost certainly mean an end to the virtually free hand we have had to date in use of Thai facilities.

The positions of Secretaries Rusk and McNamara are elaborated in the attached joint memorandum and a separate memorandum from Secretary Rusk with supporting documents.

Walt

Approve $60 million³

Approve $44 million

Approve $35 million

See Me

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Thailand, Vol. V, 10/66–2/67. Secret.
2. See the attachment to Document 329.
3. In Joint Defense-State telegram 68658 to Bangkok, October 19, the Department informed the Embassy that the President had agreed to provide a fiscal year Military Assistance Program of $60 million to Thailand and that the Thai Government should be informed that despite a cut of $378 million in global MAP availabilities for fiscal year 1967 from 1966, their program would be “significantly greater than last year.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 US–THAI)