332. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs (McNaughton) to Secretary of Defense McNamara1
I–36200/66
Washington, October 17, 1966.
SUBJECT
- Military Aspects of US Policy for Thailand
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have asked that you review the military aspects
of US policy for Thailand (JCSM 632–66, attached).
After review of US commitments to Thailand the Joint Chiefs have
concluded that in support of the military aspects of these commitments
the US should undertake to:
- 1.
- Assist Thailand in developing and maintaining armed forces
capable of conducting effective military operations against
major external aggression as well as against internal
subversion.
- 2.
- Be prepared to assist Thailand to defeat communist
aggression.
- 3.
- Develop in Thailand forward bases to include requisite
logistic and communications-electronics base to support
operations against internal subversion and external
aggression.
The Joint Chiefs have asked that you endorse these military aspects of
the US policy towards Thailand.
I believe the Joint Chiefs have forwarded this paper in order to obtain
from you a clear definition of the military aspects of US policy for
Thailand including your views on the make-up of Thai forces, the level
of US support for such forces and the degree of planning and base
construction which the US should undertake in preparation to meet
possible contingencies covered by our broad commitments to Thailand.
I recommend you sign the attached memorandum to the Chiefs2
telling them that you will be prepared in the near future to discuss
with them the military aspects of US policy for Thailand. For your
possible use in these discussions, I will prepare a brief statement of
my views on this subject if you want it.
[Page 734]
Attachment
Washington, September 29,
1966.
Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
Secretary of Defense McNamara4
JCSM–632–66
SUBJECT
- Military Aspects of US Policy for Thailand (U)
- 1.
- (S) In view of the dynamic situation that exists throughout
Southeast Asia, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed US
military policies and objectives in Thailand. They consider that
an updated statement of military policy for Thailand would help
to ensure a mutual understanding by all US agencies concerning
the importance of Thailand to US strategy in Southeast Asia. At
issue are.
- a.
- The seriousness of the subversion/insurgency threat
and how far the United States should go to assist
Thailand to cope with the problem.
- b.
- The extent of preparations necessary for carrying out
commitments and strategic requirements for the defense
of Thailand.
- 2.
- (S) Importance of the Area. Thailand represents a special
situation in terms of US interests in Asia. That countryʼs
central location and the cooperation of the Thais have afforded
the United States a complex of bases, the value of which is
exemplified by their support of the current military effort in
Vietnam and Laos. Thailand possesses the political, economic,
and social stability, as well as the military potential, to be a
focus of indigenous anticommunist strength in Southeast Asia.
Thailand has demonstrated that it is determined to deal
effectively with its own domestic insurgency. It has taken the
lead in organizing free Asian states in several regional
groupings, as early steps toward a security organization of free
Asian states, able to bear an increasing share of Asian defense
responsibilities—backed ultimately by US strength. Thailand has
demonstrated, in the case of Vietnam and Laos, that it takes its
regional responsibilities seriously and will act militarily
against aggression outside its frontiers. The loss of Thailand
to the Free World would facilitate further communist expansion,
regardless of the outcome in South Vietnam. For these reasons,
the United States has repeatedly pledged assistance to Thailand
to resist communist aggression in any form, notably through.
- a.
- US membership in SEATO and the resultant multilateral
contingency planning.
- b.
- The Rusk-Thanat Communications of 1962.
- c.
- The “Project-22” Agreement5 and resultant bilateral contingency
planning.
- d.
- The assurances of Vice President Humphrey during his
visit to Asia.
- 3.
- (TS) The Internal Threat. The
existence of subversion and insurgency, though regional in
scope, is real and present; unless timely and effective measures
are taken, they can be expected to continue to expand. At this
juncture, a relatively small effort could make unnecessary a
much larger effort later. Thailand offers excellent potential
for successfully countering insurgency and is mounting an
impressive program to deal with its own problems. However,
fomentation and support of this insurgent threat by Hanoi and
Peking have created a clear need for US support of the Thai
effort without affronting the known Thai desire to minimize the
US presence in counterinsurgency operations. Also, there is a
need for our concurrence6 in the soundness of this principle. A
program of early and adequate assistance should permit the Thais
to deal with the insurgency problem on their own, and such
indigenous action is the least expensive and most effective way
to deter extensive insurgency and overt aggression.
- 4.
- (TS) The External Threat. While
the primary current threat is a covert one, there remains the
threat of overt aggression. Though the possibility of such
aggression is slight at this time, it is a contingency of such
importance that the United States and Thailand must make
adequate preparations for this eventuality. For details relating
to such preparations, see Appendix A, hereto.7
- 5.
- (TS) Meeting the Threat.
Countries within Southeast Asia could selectively require
continuing US political, economic, and military support at a
substantial level, even after overt fighting, such as in the
case of South Vietnam, were reduced or stopped. Thailand is a
keystone of US security efforts in this area. Thailandʼs
principal role should be to provide secure base facilities for
projected use by US and SEATO
forces and to conduct necessary operations to permit the
deployment of allied forces.
- 6.
- (S) Objective, Tasks, and Policy. Based upon study of current
US policy documents, commitments, and international agreements
affect
[Page 736]
ing Thailand,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that the objective, military
tasks, and policy are essentially as stated below.
- a.
-
National Objective. To ensure
that Thailand remains an independent, economically
viable, noncommunist nation which is allied to the
United States.
- b.
-
Military Tasks in Support of the
Objective.
- (1)
- To assist Thailand in developing and
maintaining effective internal security
capabilities.
- (2)
- To assist Thailand in developing and
maintaining armed forces able to conduct effective
military operations in the event of major external
aggression.
- (3)
- To be prepared, in accordance with our
commitments, to assist Thailand to defeat
communist aggression.
- (4)
- To develop, in Thailand, forward bases for the
projection of Free World power in Southeast Asia,
to include the requisite logistic and
communications-electronics base to support
operations as required in subparagraphs 6b(1),
(2), and (3), above.
- c.
-
Policy. Adequate and timely
military assistance is essential to the retention of
Thailand as a cooperative and effective member of the
Free World community. As the threat to this key area is
currently that of subversion and insurgency, emphasis
should be placed on coordinated assistance calculated to
strengthen the internal security of Thailand, including
the security of air bases used by US forces against
Vietnam and Laos. Because of US strategic requirements
and arrangements to defend Thailand, it is also
necessary to proceed with those preparations essential
to the logistic support of forces—US, allied, and
indigenous—which would be employed in the defense of
Thailand against aggression. Additionally, the
assistance given the Thai forces, apart from maximizing
their capability to deal with insurgency, should be
sufficient to afford them the capability to conduct
effective military operations against external
aggression until the requisite US/allied combat and
supporting forces can be provided.
- 7.
- (U) Recommendations. In view of the
foregoing and as a means of carrying out the tasks in support of
the national objective set forth above, the Joint Chiefs of
staff recommend that.
- a.
- The statement of policy as set forth above be
approved.
- b.
- A memorandum substantially the same as that contained
in Appendix B, hereto,8 be forwarded to
the Secretary of State. Since military policy is only
one aspect of national policy for Thailand, it is
necessary that it be integrated with other aspects of
policy by the appropriate agency.
- 8.
- (U) Subsequent Action. Early approval
of this statement of policy for Thailand will facilitate
preparation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the necessary
follow-on actions.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
