Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

329. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson¹

Washington, October 13, 1966.

SUBJECT

• Attached Joint Memorandum from Secretary McNamara and myself on FY 1967 MAP Level for Thailand

The attached memorandum was signed by Secretary McNamara before he left for Vietnam last Saturday. The purpose of this Supplemental Memorandum is (1) to report in context on several developments since his departure, and (2) to indicate the feasibility of funding my recommendation of a $60 million MAP program in Thailand, despite the cut of $125 million in the MAP appropriation.

(1) Recent developments and their background. The original planning figures submitted to Congress for MAP included an item of $35 million for MAP in Thailand. Last yearʼs total was $44 million, a figure disclosed to the Thai. There have been a number of changes from the original planning figures in both directions, including an increase in ammunition requirements of $39 million for Laos. After the Thai item was prepared, a thorough review of the Thai situation was made by General Stilwell. His recommendations, approved by Ambassador Martin and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would support a MAP effort of some $60 million, both for conventional and for counterinsurgency forces.

The Thai have become concerned about the firmness of our commitment to their defense, in the light of adverse comments by Senator Fulbright and others, and have expressed a desire to embody our present relationship in a bilateral treaty. The visits of the Thai in Washington this week have underscored the reality and urgency of their concern. It is reflected also in Mr. Moyersʼ telegram (111536Z) of October 11.²

I believe it vital on political grounds, and an important step in preparing for the Manila Conference, to assure the Thai before the Conference that we shall enlarge last yearʼs program, carrying out the Rusk-Thanat communiqué of 1962,³ and your letter to Prime Minister Thanom of June 1964,⁴ in which we agreed to engage in joint planning with the Thai against the possibility of a conventional threat. I enclose copies of both documents. I conclude that the Thai have earned this reiteration of our SEATO commitment. Such action is required to prevent them from pressing for a formal public bilateral agreement of support. It is justified by the real progress the Thai have made in their military effort and by their cooperation with us. And I believe that such a step taken now is the best possible insurance against the risk of Thailand degenerating into another Vietnam, if various adverse contingencies occur.

(2) Ways to pay for the revised MAP programs. The source of funds for the increase of $25 million for Thailand must be considered in connection with other increases in requirements for military and economic aid for Southeast Asia and other areas. There is already a requirement for an additional $39 million MAP for ammunition for Laos, and new economic aid requirements have arisen for the Dominican Republic, Indonesia and Panama as well as Southeast Asia.

The high priority MAP increases for Thailand and Laos should be funded in a way that will not undercut the effectiveness of other MAP and AID programs.

The options are:

A. New Legislation

1. Following the Manila Conference, seek a supplemental appropriation package including elements of economic and military aid for South Vietnam, Thailand, Laos, Korea, Indonesia, and the Philippines, in the light of the situation in Asia as it develops.

2. Seek Congressional authority to transfer the Laos MAP program of $109 million for FY 1967 to the Military Services budgets, just as military assistance to South Vietnam and war-related costs for South Korea are now authorized to be funded.

B. Current Authority

1. The law permits the transfer of some funds from economic to military assistance. However, the Foreign Assistance Contingency Fund was cut by Congress to a total of $70 million. At the same time, Congress cut Supporting Assistance requests by $57 million. Economic aid requirements for Southeast Asia and other politically sensitive countries, such as the Dominican Republic, Indonesia and Panama, require that the entire Supporting Assistance and Contingency Fund Appropriations be used for economic assistance. Alternatively, to transfer Contingency Fund or Supporting Assistance monies to MAP would mean that we should have to seek a supplemental appropriation for economic assistance. Other economic aid funds cannot legally be transferred to MAP.

2. The law also permits you to authorize the use of up to $300 million of U.S. military service stocks to be repaid from future MAP appropriations, an authority the Secretary of Defense has told the Congress would be exercised only in cases vital to the security of the U.S. It has been used twice for South Vietnam.

3. Political and programming developments in the ensuing two or three months might let us find the funds for Thailand ($25 million) and perhaps Laos as well ($39 million) by transfer from such current MAP programs as the $48 million India/Pakistan pipeline, currently being held in suspense, combined with some marginal contributions from the planned programs for Korea, China and Latin America. Cuts in these MAP programs would, of course, raise problems in each of the cases mentioned.

In view of the availability of these alternatives, I believe you can safely make the decision called for by the attached memorandum, and delay a final choice of means until sometime after your return.

Dean Rusk

Attachment

Washington, October 13, 1966.

Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson

SUBJECT

• FY 1967 MAP Level for Thailand

The Departments of State and Defense have been unable to agree on this matter, and have thus been forced to seek your decision.

Recommendations

A. Secretary Rusk recommends that you authorize informing the Thai Government at once that we will furnish from FY 1967 funds designated MAP items totaling approximately $60 million. The precise dollar amount would not be used, except in the general sense of informing the Thai that the program was significantly greater than last yearʼs total (which they know to have been $44 million). Ambassador Martin would be instructed in the strongest terms that we expect him to use this commitment to persuade the Thai to undertake substantial further improvement in their counterinsurgency performance.

B. Secretary McNamara believes that the proper MAP level from a military standpoint is the currently programmed $35 million, (although he is prepared to recognize some military justification for a program totaling approximately $44 million) and that because the Congress cut the Military Assistance Program so substantially, we simply donʼt have the funds to finance higher levels—if the Thai program is held to $35 million, the Congressional cuts will still force reductions of approximately $85 million in the programs of other countries which were already at austere levels. It is Secretary McNamaraʼs view that any additional funds for Thailand would be pure political pay-off taken from military assistance funds badly needed for military purposes elsewhere.

• Approve $60 million
• Approve $35 million
• Approve $44 million⁵

Discussion

1. There is no disagreement on the significance of Thailand to our Asian policy. Its role in relation to the war in Laos and Vietnam, its longer term strategic importance, and its active support of Asian regional cooperation are all matters of the first importance. Our Asian policy requires a continuing strong relationship with Thailand.

2. It is also agreed that the immediate although currently limited threat to Thailandʼs continued ability to play its important role in Southeast Asia is Communist subversion and insurgency.

3. Further, it is agreed that the Thai have been very forthcoming in response to numerous U.S. requests made on them, giving us invaluable support in both the military and political fields. It is also agreed that the resulting U.S. construction program in Thailand will provide the Thais a new deep water port, a country-wide communications system, new and improved roads, POL pipelines and new and improved airfields, all costing more than $250 million over the last four years. Although U.S. operations out of Thailand are as much in Thai as in U.S. interest, it is an agreed fact that the Thai role beside us in the war leads them to expect us to be forthcoming in response to their needs and requests.

4. Disagreement emerges in connection with the role of our Military Assistance Program in dealing with the Thais and with the threat. The disagreement about the level of the program reflects differing assessments of the proper military structure for Thailand and of Thai performance in making proper use of equipment provided. Finally, there are important political factors which Secretary Rusk believes must be given great weight in making the decision on the level.

5. Basic Facts

a. The MAP program in Thailand was $51.9 million in FY 1961, $81 million in FY 1962, and $73.5 million in FY 1963. The figures were considerably lower for FY 1964–66, $42 million, $38 million, and $44 million, respectively.

b. In August of 1965, Major General Richard Stilwell was assigned as COMUSMACTHAI and instructed to review the MAP program fully. In February, he recommended, with the full support of Ambassador Martin, that the program be set at a level of $70 million for FY 1967, and that similar figures be envisaged for further years. Secretary McNamara points out that this program, with which the Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred, is based upon the premise that there should be a major improvement in the capability of the Thai to deal with a conventional threat from land, sea and air; this to be accomplished by increasing the size and equipment of Thai forces. Secretary McNamara does not agree with this premise. He believes the size and capabilities of the Thai forces should be directed toward internal security, with only limited emphasis placed on Thai ability to stand alone against external aggression. Ambassador Martin has for a long time recommended a $70.7 million program for FY 1967, together with a firm commitment that a program of this magnitude would be maintained for three years.

6. Summary of Positions

It is Secretary Ruskʼs judgment that there is substantial over-all military justification for a program at the $60 million level, and that overriding political factors dictate a commitment of at least this magnitude. Although Secretary Rusk would see much political advantage in committing ourselves to a similar figure for three years, he believes that the uncertain prospects of the MAP account make such a commitment undesirable. He would thus limit the commitment to items totaling $60 million, covering FY 1967 funding only. Secretary McNamara, as indicated above, believes $35 million would, from a purely military standpoint, provide adequate resources to meet likely threats and would provide the Thais with as much as their record shows they can properly use. He believes that Ambassador Martin, especially in view of the recent drastic cut in MAP funds, can handle the political problem.

7. Proper Military Structure for Thailand

a. Secretary McNamara believes that, from a purely military standpoint, the Thai forces should be directed primarily to counterinsurgency missions with provisions made for only limited conventional capabilities. And, in connection with conventional capabilities, he believes we should provide equipment only as the Thais demonstrate that they will meet minimum maintenance and usage standards. In his judgment, the $35 million is adequate for these purposes.

b. Secretary Rusk, while concurring that the principal current mission of the Thai forces is to combat insurgency, believes that emphasis must be placed upon our SEATO commitment to Thailand to assist in its defense against conventional attack, with the related undertaking to assist in developing Thai conventional capabilities. Secretary Rusk stresses that great weight must be given to the Rusk-Thanat communique of 1962, reaffirming our commitment in effect on a bilateral basis, and to the letter from President Johnson to Prime Minister Thanom of June 1964, in which we specifically agreed to engage in joint planning with the Thai against the possibility of a conventional threat. This essentially bilateral relationship with Thailand is at the heart of our whole position there today. Because of these commitments, and solid evidence of Thai reliance upon them, Secretary Rusk believes that our MAP program must provide Thai forces the support for the level of conventional capability believed necessary by the Thai and by Ambassador Martin. He believes this requirement points to the $60 million figure.

8. Thai Performance and Necessary Improvements

a. Secretary Rusk agrees that past performance of the Thai military force has been defective in some respects. He notes that the U.S. support effort has also had its weaknesses, and that there has been substantial improvement by the Thai over the past year. This improvement is attributed by Ambassador Martin and General Stilwell in large part to the fact that the U.S. gave the Thai a general MAP commitment of $39 million for FY 1966 in August of 1965, and this experience of improvement is a major reason for Ambassador Martinʼs recommendation that a firm commitment be made currently. This improvement is not confined to conventional military forces but encompasses such things as basic reorganization of the government efforts against insurgency, and fundamental reforms in the collection, collation, and exploitation of intelligence.

b. Secretary McNamara points out that the 1961–63 MAP programs were excessive and led to a serious deficiency in maintenance by the Thai forces, which was highlighted by a 1965 GAO report covering the 1963 period. He notes some improvement in maintenance and utilization rates, but he points to continuing seriously inadequate utilization rates in current Thai performance.

9. Political Factors

While not able to take issue with the purely military judgment of the Secretary of Defense, Secretary Rusk believes that the following political factors make the $60 million level imperative:

a. Above all, the great importance of nurturing and preserving our valuable relationship with them.

b. The importance of erring on the side of ample resources to enable and to encourage the Thai to deal effectively with the present level of insurgency.

c. Failure to supply the additional items, largely of a conventional nature, represented by the difference between $35 million and $60 million, will result in substantial dissatisfaction in the Thai Armed Forces, who represent the controlling element in the Thai Government. Hence, failure to provide the $60 million level could result in significant general damage to our relations with the Thai.

d. More specifically, our current relations with the Thai have been significantly soured by adverse comment in the United States, particularly statements by Senator Fulbright about the “shaky” foundation of our military commitment and presence there. As a result, the Thai have recently insisted on the early negotiation of a status of forces agreement and—far more significant—Foreign Minister Thanat has formally requested a bilateral treaty with the United States. We have told Thanat frankly that this is out of the question, and for the time being Prime Minister Thanom is letting the matter lie. However, if we were to come forward with a MAP program that appeared to the Thai to short-change their forces, it is Secretary Ruskʼs judgment that we would have a major possibility that the Thai would press seriously for a bilateral, and also take action which would impede our Vietnamese operations from Thailand, for example by requiring specific prior Thai concurrence in the target of every air mission carried out from Thailand. Basically, Secretary Rusk believes that failure to provide the necessary MAP items would give the Thai the impression that we did not really expect Thai forces to participate fully in the event of a conventional threat, and would redouble Thai insistence that the U.S. commitment be made even more specific and precise than it is at present. Needless to say, any deepening of our commitment—by a treaty or otherwise—would set off a most harmful debate in the United States.

e. While agreeing that the primary Thai emphasis should be on combatting insurgency, Secretary Rusk believes that a $60 million level would provide significantly increased leverage for U.S. influence in a number of areas still requiring improvement, as compared to a $35 million level, thus materially improving the prospects for a successful all-out effort against the insurgency while it is still manageable. Moreover, Secretary Rusk notes that, if the Thai should feel that their conventional capabilities were being neglected under our MAP program, there is the clear possibility that they would use resources of their own to purchase military equipment, perhaps outside the United States, and would thus divert the heavy (60%) proportion of their budget that they have been devoting, with our support, to economic and social development measures which, in the long run, will more effectively insure Thailandʼs security against subversion.

10. MAP Fund Program

Both Secretaries agree that there is a serious problem in funding any MAP sum greater than the present planning figure of $35 million. (This figure dates from last fall, prior to General Stilwellʼs review.) The Conference has approved a total MAP appropriation of $792 million. This is a cut of $125 million from the Administration request of $917 million. There have been a large number of changes in both directions from the original planning figures. The India/Pakistan program should be substantially reduced. However, increases for Laos, Korea and NATO (the increases now estimated at $58 million) have produced a net shortfall on the order of $85 million before any addition for Thailand. Thus, it is agreed that the allocation of an additional $25 million for Thailand, bringing the shortage to $110 million, would require significant large reductions in the planned programs, over and above the reductions that already appear to be required.

11. In the light of these factors, Secretary McNamara would include the funding problem as a major reason for not going above $35 million. Secretary Rusk, however, believes that despite the serious over-all funding situation, Thailand must be accepted as having such a high priority that its needs should be met even at the expense of additional reductions in other major programs.

• Dean Rusk
• Robert S. McNamara

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Thailand, Vol. V, 10/66–2/67. Secret; Exdis.
2. This telegram from Moyers to the President and Bundy, which was attached to the Department of State copy of this memorandum, October 11, previewed the Presidentʼs trip to Thailand and stated that the issue to be decided was whether it should be a state visit or just an official visit. Moyers suggested that the “advantage a State visit to us is opportunity to provide tender loving care at time we are unable provide much more.” (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–8 US–THAI)
3. Printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 1091–1093.
4. See Document 277.
5. None of these options is checked.