296. Letter From the Assistance Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)1
Dear Bill:
I very much appreciate the thorough review you have made of the MAP and the proposed add-ons for Thailand. I have the following comments, keeping in mind the Secretaryʼs memorandum of 18 May.2
As you recall, the Secretary made clear the requirement that the Thai orient their efforts towards effective counterinsurgency measures and also develop a “balanced” military force. In his memorandum of 18 May, he made assurances to this effect a condition of proceeding with the funding of the FY 66 MAP program for Thailand. I think we can all agree that Marshal Dawee has given us a commitment to bring his units for Project 22 up to 80% manning strength. This Dawee commitment, along with Ambassador Martinʼs assurances, is sufficient to permit us to begin the funding of essential items in the FY 66 program, with the continuation of funding being contingent on support by the Thai of Daweeʼs commitment and of visible efforts to orient to counterinsurgency.
I feel that we should reach a formal determination, agreed to with the Thais, of the particular Thai units we are talking about for Project 22. I understand that the necessary details regarding the Thai units that will be committed to Project 22 are now being developed by the Joint US-Thai Planning Group in Bangkok. In this regard, we have some reservations as to the accuracy of the strengths of the committed units described in the attachments to your letter. We understand that the Ambassador is aware of the need for accurate data on the present strengths of these units to provide a basis for a more informed judgment on the Project 22 force structure. I believe that in due course we should also have assurances for Ambassador Martin and COMUSMACTHAI as to the exact Thai plans for raising their manning levels (raising total strength or reducing units), so that there will be effective field training and acceptable equipment maintenance, with follow up reports from the Country Team as to Thai progress.
Although we continue to be of the opinion that the existing programs, $33 million in FY 65 and $27 million in FY 66, are ample for the development of Thai forces in the manner outlined by Secretary McNamara and consistent with the ability of the Thai to assimilate assistance, [Page 635] we recognize the desirability of certain of the proposed add-ons. Accordingly, we have raised the MAP level for FY 65 by $2.7 million to $35.7 million to provide Thai funds to pay for [(a)] per diem support in the field (with reimbursement from AID), (b) the two battalion posts at Muang Nan and Sakon Nakhon ($1.6 million), and (c) increased costs for packing, crating and other supply operations (which otherwise would have been absorbed within the current-level program). The Ambassador may notify the Thai of these items at any time. To go beyond these items in FY 65 MAP funding gives us difficulty in view of the tight MAP situation worldwide and the desire not to reduce the FY 65 MAP levels of such forward defense countries as Korea and China. Moreover, in our discussions with Ambassador Martin, he made it clear that he did not view funding of the add-ons in FY 65 as essential, particularly since we were so near the end of the year.
Further with regard to FY 65, Ambassador Martin has been informed in detail by a separate message of a significantly large package of U.S. construction for Thailand recently approved as part of the FY 65 supplemental budget request. Major items of this program have joint use aspects and will have a direct impact on the question of influencing the Thai as to the seriousness of the U.S. commitment in Southeast Asia. This Thailand construction package of about $22 million (out of a total of $107 million for all of Westpac and Southeast Asia) does not at this time include items proposed as MAP add-ons. In any event, Ambassador Martin may wish, in his dealings with the Thai, to emphasize the Thai-oriented nature of the U.S. construction projects wherever possible. This includes, for example, the Kabinburi-Korat road ($6 million), the Korat tank farm ($.54 million), and the Ban Sattahip port development ($.8 million). I think Ambassador Martin should hold up discussing any of these construction items with the Thais until we have had a final cable from CINCPAC on these items, which should be in our hands shortly.
Once there have been adequate assurances that the Thai are in fact moving rapidly in the direction indicated by Secretary McNamara, we can then give further consideration to funding in FY 66 of the various add-ons proposed by the Ambassador which may be thought necessary either in addition to or in place of those initially programmed. In addition, we will have in hand fairly soon a study by Tim Hoopes on the Thai MAP program, which will be supplemented about the end of July by a RAND study which, among other things, will address itself to Thai MAP.
Sincerely,
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–8 US–THAI. Secret.↩
- Document 294.↩