297. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand1
2208. For Ambassador from Bundy. Embtel 2041.2
We are impressed by recent indications of an atmosphere in which major constructive change can be achieved in Thailand, most notably your remarkable success in negotiating in a very brief span an agreement laying the basis for critically important reforms in the police. We share your belief that an achievement of similar proportions now seems possible vis-à-vis the armed forces. As you know we also share your estimate of the consequences of failure to seize this opportunity.
We are prepared to make a maximum effort to obtain the negotiating authority requested reftel, despite great difficulties noted Deptel 2114.3 Next step will be our reply to McNaughton letter of June 4 to this end. In addition we will if necessary ask Secretaryʼs direct intervention (as we did in support of your request for FY 1965 add-ons—Deptel 2167).4 We will have to be prepared to be quite specific about what the Thai must do—and when they must do it—in order to live up to their side of the bargain. In my judgment we will need as a minimum: 1) some concrete evidence that the Thai are starting to move toward fulfillment of the Dawee commitment and that it will be fulfilled within a reasonable time frame; 2) further RTG commitments to undertake promptly a) to provide for intensive field training, with adequate stress on CI missions of all Project 22 units and other units having a CI mission; b) to bring all Project 22 units (including reserves) up to levels adequate to assure ability to utilize and maintain equipment to be provided in FY 66 plus equipment previously provided and to execute missions assigned by joint plans; and c) to assure proper utilization and maintenance by RTAF of all [Page 637] aircraft provided in FY 66 program and add-ons as well as aircraft previously provided under MAP.
Request your comments on likelihood of Thai being willing and able to deliver on above in return for our proposed FY 1966 package. Would also greatly appreciate any suggestions of alternative or additional RTG commitments which we could reasonably seek.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US–THAI. Secret; Priority; No Distribution Outside Department. Drafted by Pickering, cleared by Dexter, and approved by Bundy.↩
- In telegram 2041 from Bangkok, June 15, Martin made a strong appeal that the “add-ons” to the Thai military assistance program were in complete conformity with McNamaraʼs criteria. Martin concluded his long cable with the observation that he had just secured “Thai commitment to massive reorganization of one pillar of power establishment—the Thai police system.” Martin thought that the Thai were now receptive to reform and modernization and he believed “we now have a similar opportunity to achieve same massive reorganization of the military power establishment” at “infinitesimal” cost. Martin was confident he could achieve results and would stake his career on it. (Ibid.)↩
- As explained in telegram 2114 to Bangkok, June 15, the appropriation was not yet voted upon or the program allocated, so Martinʼs request for immediate authority to pre-sent to the Thais the total Military Assistance requested for FY 66 created great difficulty. (Ibid.)↩
- Dated June 23. (Ibid.)↩