Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

239. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India¹

Washington, July 26, 1968, 0005Z.

209406/UNSEC 19. For Under Secretary Katzenbach from the Secretary. Subject: Cambodian Detention of US LCU.

1. Background. On July 17 a US Army utility landing craft (LCU 1577) with 11 Americans and one RVN policeman on board inadvertently strayed into Cambodian waters on Mekong River and was seized by Cambodian Navy. We immediately expressed regrets and asked for return of vessel and personnel on board. Meanwhile Sihanouk, speaking for domestic consumption, threatened to try the men under Cambodian law and hold them for ransom of tractors.

2. We have now received Cambodian reply rejecting our request. RKG characterizes penetration as deliberate act of provocation, connects it to other border incidents, and states men on board will be dealt with in accordance with Cambodian law. (Text repeated you septel.)² On July 25, Sihanouk, speaking in Cambodian to National Congress, dropped mention of trying men or demanding ransom, and instead indicated they would be interned till end of hostilities and LCU confiscated. Text in FBIS 32 of July 25. Australian Emb Phnom Penh has not yet been accorded consular access to crew.

3. Further Action To Be Taken. We are preparing further evidence showing inadvertent nature of intrusion, to be conveyed to RKG through Australian Embassy in Phnom Penh. FYI. The Secretary is personally asking Hasluck to undertake mission to Phnom Penh to intercede with Sihanouk. (See septel.)³ We will keep you informed of Australian plans in this regard, but wish you to go ahead with your approach to Nong Kimny in any event. End FYI. We are also studying other means of communication with or pressure on RKG with a view to bringing about release.

4. Action: Please arrange meeting with Cambodian Ambassador Nong Kimny and express to him our urgent interest in release of crew. You should present following facts and US views.

A. Incident was entirely inadvertent, with no hostile intent.

B. LCU 1577 is utility landing craft designed for handling heavy and bulky cargoes. With length 120 feet, beam 32 feet, max speed 8 knots, craft is obviously not one which we would contemplate employing for deliberate or provocative penetration of Cambodian territory. Royal Cambodian Navy possesses several LCUʼs and can confirm details of performance. Craft was armed with two .50-caliber machine guns and one M–60 7.62 mm. light machine gun, plus individual weapons of crew members and passengers (M–16ʼs, carbines, pistols, and one M–79 grenade launcher). This armament exclusively for defense against hostile fire along waterways within RVN. Cargo included 200 drums of solvent, two commercial forklift trucks, 34 drums JP–4 fuel (kerosene), and 6 containers miscellaneous supplies. As make-up of cargo suggests, craft was on routine resupply run to US installations in Mekong Delta. Route was from base at Vung Tau via Mekong River and cut-off to Bassac River, then down Bassac to Can Tho. Apparently craft missed first turning, about seven miles from border, and proceeded up river into Cambodian territory. Navigational error was same as that of Philippine tugboat Bream, which RKG has now returned, following release of Filipino crew and two US military policemen who were on board.

C. We are conducting further investigation to determine how error was made and whether any individual responsibility can be assigned. In addition, we are taking measures to avoid such incidents in future. These include but are not limited to more thorough crew indoctrination and briefing, embarcation of personnel familiar with area near border, establishment of prominent aids to navigation and control points, and provision of positive method to warn shipping of approach to Cambodian border.

D. From his service in US, Nong Kimny must understand sensitivity of US public to prolonged detention of US soldiers whose only transgression was that one of them was apparently inexperienced or inadequately trained as a navigator. As RKG doubtless aware, our regret expressed over inadvertent violation above Kurile Islands was quickly followed by Soviet release of our plane with its crew and passengers. Similarly, when Soviet vessel violated US regulations in Alaska, ship and crew were released after Soviet captain paid a modest fine.

E. The American people will be especially puzzled if severe treatment is meted out to US servicemen guilty only of inadvertence, when the public is becoming increasingly aware of the use made by VC/NVA forces of Cambodian border areas for attacks against US forces in SVN. Cambodian publications have recently referred to at least three such violations with no record of RKG detention or punishment of any VC/NVA. Our own intelligence shows rapidly expanding use of Cambodia by VC/NVA. We expect to present evidence to RKG soon, in line with our policy of providing such information as it becomes available. VC/NVA use of Cambodia is a large-scale, planned and deliberate violation of RKG neutrality, as contrasted with small-scale, inadvertent LCU intrusion. Contrast in RKG policies toward two situations is hard to understand and will raise question of what we are doing wrong that the VC/NVA are doing right.

F. We urge Nong Kimny to impress on his government nature of our position, our desire to settle matter satisfactorily with utmost urgency, and seriousness with which US would respond to continued detention of personnel on board LCU. We would welcome any suggestion he or his government may have as to how best we can achieve release of personnel in shortest possible time. We want the boat back too but return of personnel is urgent and should be addressed immediately.

G. In event Nong Kimny refers to other border incidents in which Cambodian lives were lost, you may wish to draw on following: We understand Cambodian sensitivity in such matters and are doing what we can to avert all such incidents. However, it is difficult when VC/NVA increasingly use Cambodian territory from which to attack our forces. In some cases, for instance, VC have dug in on Cambodian territory and then opened fire across frontier. This was case in incident May 4 at Bavet, which ICC has investigated, and on which our offer to make witnesses available to testify before ICC is still standing. We have presented full details this incident to RKG, and we continue use our best efforts to investigate and respond to RKG complaints on border violations. On most serious recent incident (Svey A Ngong, June 29) we have presented to RKG and ICC all facts we have been able to elicit, and again offered witnesses. On later incident (Prasat, July 10) we are urgently investigating. We wish to continue these efforts to avoid border incidents, and would welcome any constructive suggestions RKG might have in this connection, or any suggestions for improvement in investigation procedures.

5. Should Nong Kimny decline to see you, you should discuss with Ambassador Bowles his seeing Nong Kimny in your place.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 33–4 CAMB–US. Secret; Priority; Exdis; No Distribution Outside Department. Drafted by Bennett, cleared by Leonhart, Corcoran, Richard H. Moorsteen of U, and Murray J. Bellman, the Deputy Legal Adviser, and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Canberra and Saigon.
2. Telegram 209405/UNSEC 18, July 26, 0004Z. (Ibid.)
3. Telegram 209404/UNSEC 17, July 26, 0001Z. (Ibid.)