Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

240. Action Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Brown) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, July 29, 1968.

SUBJECT

• Problem of Release of LCU 1577 and Personnel Detained in Cambodia

While press reaction has been notably scarce in quantity and mild in tone so far on the LCU detention, we are aware that this could change at almost any moment and that continued detention of the men may rouse Congressional and public sentiment, particularly because of the apparent similarity to the Pueblo case. We are therefore proceeding as quickly and quietly as possible to obtain the release of the 11 detained Americans.

Actions Taken

Immediately following the receipt of information through COMUSMACV that the LCU 1577 had been seen by the RVN outpost to have entered Cambodian territory, we dispatched via the Australians an urgent message to the RKG regretting this inadvertent intrusion into Cambodian territory and saying that we would be grateful to the RKG for the return of the vessel and the personnel on board. We also said that we were making every effort to prevent the recurrence of such an intrusion.² Our message has so far had no positive result. On July 22 the Cambodians rejected our explanation and indicated an intention to try the men and confiscate the vessel.³ (In a message of July 20 through the French Embassy they had officially informed us of the entry.)⁴ Although their propaganda has been offensive in language, it has been low keyed (delivered for the most part in the Cambodian language by Sihanouk) and the RKGʼs formal communication rejecting our explanation was correct in tone. While the Cambodians have now (July 26) granted access by the Australians to visit the detained personnel (who have been found in satisfactory condition and are being provided by the Australians with sundry supplies), we doubt that further representations in a standard framework would be effective.

We have prepared a further note to the RKG confirming the innocent mission of the LCU and, by citing operational and loading data, stressing the inadvertent nature of the intrusion and the navigational error which caused it. We have cabled an advance text to the Australian Ambassador in Phnom Penh and as soon as we have confirmation from Saigon that the GVN concurs, at least informally, we shall add a paragraph inviting FARK officers to visit Viet-Nam and inspect operational and loading data we have cited. We shall then authorize Deschamps to pass this note to the RKG.4

We have considered a number of courses of action which we might take in view of the apparent unwillingness so far of the Cambodians to release the men. The rationale of these recommendations is that we should move fast and hard diplomatically at first and that the tone of our representations should combine “politesse” and firmness. If and when Sihanouk wishes to release them he will be able to find an acceptable channel in one or the other of our recommendations, although he may of course come up with one of his own which we can accept. It is our intention to have him understand the seriousness with which we view this matter. We would hope to come out of this affair not only with the men (and the LCU) but also with Sihanouk reappraising his involvement with the VC/NVA and their flagrant (in contrast to our mistaken) violations of his neutrality.

On July 25, you sent a message to Canberra asking Mr. Hasluck to go to Phnom Penh to make clear to the RKG our concern over this incident in the light of increasing VC/NVA activities in Cambodia and our hope for a prompt and amicable solution. Hasluck replied with a counter suggestion that his Ambassador sound out “elder statesman” Penn Nouth in Phnom Penh.

We explored the possibility of the Under Secretary approaching Ambassador Nong Kimny in New Delhi on the matter, but the absence of the latter from his post has closed this channel.

We considered asking the French to think about how they might influence Sihanouk to release the men but suspended consideration for the time being. We felt that if we involved the French and subsequently found ourselves obliged to take some action they would not approve, the reaction would be adverse to our interests. We feel the possibility of French intervention should continue to be held in abeyance.

We have considered the wisdom of intercession by a prominent American public figure acceptable to Sihanouk. Mr. Macomber has discussed this matter with Senator Mansfield. Senator Brooke might be another possible candidate.

We might also consider requesting informal intervention with RKG by former Secretary Acheson who has a special position of favor in Phnom Penh due to his successful representation of Cambodian interests in the Preah Vihear temple case at the ICJ. An approach by him could be informal, as private as possible, and along the line that releasing the men immediately would be in the best interest of Cambodia, and that this could be done without prejudice to negotiations for the release of the LCU which could be pursued subsequently in a less tense atmosphere.

We might also consider allowing Sihanouk to save face by agreeing to a controlled submission of the matter to a Cambodian court.

The RKG has told us that it intends to submit the vessel and crew to “treatment provided by Cambodian law.” (RKG note, July 22, 1968.) During the Tugboat Bream episode the French lawyer for the Australian Embassy in Phnom Penh provided some information on relevant Cambodian law. He posited three conceivable charges: 1) illegal entry—maximum sentence 12 months imprisonment and/or fine of 4000 riels ($114); 2) carrying of arms—maximum punishment, one monthʼs imprisonment and/or fine of 1200 riels ($34); 3) espionage—maximum sentence, death (lesser sentences in extenuating circumstances at judgeʼs discretion). While the gamut of punishments is wide, the Cambodian prosecutor, of course, can charge or decline to charge crimes as he thinks appropriate. If the RKG wishes, as is possible that it does, to dispose of the problem of captured Americans expeditiously, yet without compromising on its own sovereignty, it might be amenable to trial of the officer-in-charge of the vessel on (say) illegal entry and to persuade the judge to set the punishment at a fine which the United States could pay on behalf of the officer. Although we would prefer that only the officer-in-charge be made to stand trial, we might consent to trial of the full complement of men if the trial were expeditious. We might also accept a prison sentence for the officer or men which would be suspended or completely off-set by a short period of detention while awaiting trial. Under the circumstances, we should consider accepting as a practical matter, RKG retention of the LCU, although this might be the subject of a later USG claim against the RKG.

In practice, the USG has paid fines on behalf of captains of American fishing boats seized on the high seas by Ecuador, which claims a territorial sea of 200 miles; and we have accepted fines paid by the GUSSR on behalf of captains of Soviet intelligence collecting trawlers which have been seized in Alaskan waters.

Contingency Actions

If we determine that we need to move into a stiffer position, it would be essential for us to have a full and frank discussion on the matter with the Australians before any action is taken. The Australians as our representatives in Cambodia are deeply involved in the whole affair, and we must guard against any move on our part which might take them unawares and put them in an impossible position.

We should avoid any public threats of stiff action against Cambodians. If we find it necessary to take such actions, we should do so without verbal threats and let the actions speak for themselves. Such actions might include:

1. Tourists. We might discourage Americans against tourist travel to Cambodia on the grounds that it is dangerous and we could neither protect them against detention nor intervene for them. We estimate if this warning were effective, it would cost the Cambodians, initially, about one-fourth their tourist trade or about $1 million annually. And other tourists might be deterred by our action. (Cambodiaʼs budget is equivalent to about $200 million per year.)

2. Mekong Traffic. Tighten supervision of river traffic by GVN agencies, with American advice and discreet supervision ostensibly to enforce GVN customs, sanitation and navigation rules and regulations but incidentally to slow down traffic to Phnom Penh. This could be done progressively or abruptly, concentrating on POL and other key cargoes in ways that would virtually suspend river traffic.

3. Naval Reciprocity. Exploit Market Time operations in the Gulf of Siam to apprehend any Cambodian naval craft suspected of violating Vietnamese territorial waters with a view of negotiating an exchange for LCU 1577.

4. Reconnaissance. Increase Dorsal Fin, Daniel Boone, and related air and ground operations.

5. Attacks on VC/NVA facilities in Cambodia.

All of these means except the first (warning to tourists) would be likely to inspire Sihanouk to characterize them as examples of a great powerʼs attempt to crush a small power, and as proof that the US is indeed Cambodiaʼs enemy as he has alleged, and is cooperating with Cambodiaʼs enemy, SVN, to strangle Cambodiaʼs economy. They are at least as likely to lead Sihanouk to punish the crew as to release them.

We therefore do not recommend serious consideration of any of these measures as yet, but see merit in some contingency planning so that we can be sure as to exactly what pressure measures could be employed, should we later decide to use them.

Recommendations:⁵

1. That we ask Mr. Acheson whether, if requested, he would be willing to make an informal approach to the RKG.

2. That we sound out Deschamps on the feasibility of application of the “Russian Fishing Boat” approach.

3. That we prepare a draft instruction discouraging tourist travel to Cambodia for eventual release at an appropriate time.

4. That we request DOD to draft contingency plans for:

A. Tightened supervision of Mekong traffic.

B. Exploitation of Market Time to apprehend Cambodian Naval craft with a view to negotiating an exchange for LCU 1577.

C. Increased air and ground reconnaissance operations.

D. Attacks on VC/NVA facilities in Cambodia.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 33–4 CAMB–US. Secret. Drafted by Trent, Corcoran, and Charles A. Schmitz of L/EA.
2. Text in telegram 204114 to Saigon, July 17. (Ibid.)
3. As reported in telegram 208274 to Saigon, July 24. (Ibid.) Regarding the Cambodian reply, see footnote 2, Document 239.
4. Text in telegram 208274 to Saigon; see footnote 3 above.
5. There is no indication on the source text whether Rusk approved or disapproved these recommendations.