Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

238. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, July 8, 1968, 2342Z.

198217. For the Ambassador from Bundy. Ref: A. State 128989; B. State 135669; C. Bangkok 16574; D. Saigon 31032; E. Saigon 22864; F. State 135496.² Subj: Cambodia.

1. I think there is some misunderstanding as to what we are proposing to do with respect to Cambodia. Let me review the bidding. In March (ref A) we set forth advantages and disadvantages of moving toward possible resumption of relations with Cambodia, concluding that we need to explore certain aspects in New Delhi to help us in coming to a decision. The matter was put entirely in terms of where the balance of US interest lies. The crux of the matter was, and continues to be, how we can most effectively move Cambodia back toward position of true neutrality.

2. Later in March, after receiving comments from all interested posts, we concluded (ref B) that we should go ahead with exploration in New Delhi. We once more made it very clear at that time that we were in no way proposing to “reward” Cambodia for good behavior and that if any forward movement toward resumption of relations should result, one of its objectives would be to improve relations between Cambodia and its neighbors. We would have gone ahead with exploration then, in view of no objections voiced by Thai and GVN Foreign Ministers, if the P–3 incident of April 1 had not supervened. As you know, this was followed by other major unpleasantness such as Bavet incident and tugboat episode.³

3. Realize of course that many things have happened in the meantime including talks in Paris about which GVN is understandably nervous. At same time, as we approach some kind of settlement in SVN it is becoming more and more clear that this will have to take into consideration the problems along SVN-Cambodian border and that Cambodia at some point will have to be brought into the talks. This will necessitate the possibility also of informal talks with Cambodia and will mean that the desirability of informal contacts, and perhaps later of more formal ones, has if anything increased.

4. We feel that basically our reasoning of March is still applicable in July and that only procedural problems that remain are to secure general understanding by Thanh of what we are about to do and to give Bangkok 24-hour interval to touch base again with Thanat (ref C).

5. While not strictly relevant to discussion of pros and cons of the New Delhi exploration, I would like to set your mind at rest with respect to the point you make in paragraph 3 ref D about Sihanoukʼs unresponsiveness to evidence of VC/NVA use of Cambodia, which you had also made in ref E. As we pointed out paragraph 2 ref B, Sihanouk did respond to a substantial extent. Not all this information is documented in State cables since it is based on reporting of Australian Embassy Phnom Penh and other sources, some of them very sensitive. Most recent evidence of such responsiveness that we disseminated was in ref F. There is much more going on in this respect than one would think on the basis of Cambodian propaganda; and we should be guided more by actual behavior than by propaganda.

6. It is for you of course to determine the most propitious moment when matter should be raised with GVN and level at which this is most appropriate. However, we have found that with respect to moving re Cambodia there never is a “right” moment. The present seems better from some points of view than it has been for some time. If our Vietnamese friends were to think we are planning a “rapprochement” with Cambodia they would totally misunderstand what we have in mind. Indeed, the initial exploration would be private, through Nong Kimny, and, while we cannot ever exclude the Princeʼs making something public, we would suppose he would have considerable reasons not to do so at the present time.

7. If these points still leave you with reservations, let us talk quietly about it when we see each other very shortly. But I did want you to understand what we have in mind.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CAMB–US. Secret;Exdis; No Distribution Outside Department. Drafted by Herz and Bundy, cleared by J.R. Burke of EA/VN, and approved by Bundy.
2. Reference A, March 13; Reference B, March 25; Reference C, June 26; Reference D, June 26; and Reference E, March 23, are ibid.; Reference F, March 23, is ibid., POL 27 VIET S.
3. On April 1 a U.S. Navy P–3 Orion patrol aircraft was shot down by two Cambodian patrol boats in the Gulf of Siam. All crew members of the U.S. aircraft were killed. On May 25 the Cambodian Navy captured a Philippine tugboat 1 mile inside Cambodian territory on the Mekong River and detained eight Filipino and two U.S. Army crew members. The Filipinos were released on June 8; the Americans on June 10. Bavet is apparently a border village attacked mistakenly by U.S. helicopter gunships.