481. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson1

Developments in Africa. The number one problem continues to be the crisis over the imminent Rhodesian unilateral declaration of independ-ence (UDI). Another crisis may develop in the Congo if President Kasavubu forces Tshombe’s resignation—perhaps this week. [Items in brackets are those too sensitive for use.]2

Rhodesia. As predicted, Rhodesian negotiations with the UK over independence broke down last week. Pursuant to your exchange with Harold Wilson, our Charge in London presented a US message to Smith advising against UDI and warning of the consequences. [Similar warnings [Page 825] were sent to Smith by Australia, New Zealand, Canada, West Germany and Japan.] Zambia’s President Kaunda immediately cabled you his personal appreciation for the US stand.3

So far our efforts to seize the initiative in the UN on this issue have met with success. Ambassador Anderson’s speech on UDI met with an encouraging response and an anti-Rhodesian resolution was overwhelmingly adopted by the General Assembly: 107 for, 2 against (Portugal and South Africa) and 1 abstention (France).4 The UK did not vote, although it confidentially concurred in the language of the resolution.

Wilson has asked us to publicly release an official statement along the lines of our message to Smith; we are preparing one. UK strategy is to appeal to the more moderate elements of the Rhodesian population. The UK is considering a top-level Commonwealth “Peace Mission” to Rhodesia, to be led by Australian PM Menzies. Wilson appears today on BBC in connection with this crisis.

Smith has returned to Rhodesia. His first moves will probably be to (a) meet with his Rhodesian Front party leaders; (b) call a cabinet meeting; and (c) recall parliament. It’s anyone’s guess how long thereafter UDI will follow. Smith himself is now speaking in terms of “before Christmas.” In any case, this is still primarily a UK problem. We will continue to march no faster than they.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated topics.]

R.W. Komer 5
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 15. Secret.
  2. Brackets in this and the following paragraph are in the source text.
  3. Telegram 501 from Lusaka, October 9, transmitted Kaunda’s message to the President. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD)
  4. For text of Resolution 2012 (XX), adopted October 12, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, p. 680.
  5. Bundy initialed below Komer’s signature.