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  4. Document 482

482. Special National Intelligence Estimate1

SNIE 72–65
Washington, October 13, 1965.

REPERCUSSIONS OF A UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE BY SOUTHERN RHODESIA

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Note

This estimate is primarily directed to the few months following a unilateral declaration of independence by Southern Rhodesia, though some longer range estimates are made.

Conclusions

A.
We believe that for the next several years at least, political and economic sanctions would not dislodge white rule in Southern Rhodesia and that effective military intervention from any quarter is highly unlikely. Rhodesia’s white minority government would probably be able to maintain internal security following independence; it would be unlikely to undertake serious economic measures against neighboring African states unless severely provoked. (Paras. 22, 20, 16, 6–7)
B.
African frustrations over Rhodesia’s ability to sustain itself would cause recurrent difficulties for the West in the UN and African forums, and bring down new pressures on African moderates, particularly Kaunda in neighboring Zambia, and on the UK and the US, to take stronger measures against Rhodesia. (Paras. 9–10, 15–19, 21, 24)
C.
The situation might lead to severe strains between Britain and the African states in the Commonwealth and a few of the latter might withdraw. (Para. 18)
D.
The probability that the West will be unable to resolve the Rhodesia issue to the satisfaction of the Africans will provide opportunities for Communist propaganda. While Western influence will suffer a considerable setback, the West will, however, retain an important presence in Africa, and Africans will continue to look to the West for the bulk of their economic, technical, and other assistance. (Paras. 20, 22)

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  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on October 13.↩