Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

480. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 11, 1965, 10 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Southern Rhodesia

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.
  • Secretary Rusk
  • Secretary McNamara
  • Under Secretary Ball
  • Ambassador Thompson
  • Assistant Secretary Leddy
  • Ambassador Bruce
  • J. Harold Shullaw, Director, BNA
  • Assistant Secretary Sisco
  • Deputy Assistant Secretary Fredericks
• U.K.
  • Michael Stewart, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
  • Sir Patrick Dean, British Ambassador
  • Sir Paul Gore-Booth, Permanent Under-Secretary of State
  • The Viscount Hood, Deputy Under-Secretary of State
  • Denis A. Greenhill, Assistant Under-Secretary of State
  • Michael N.F. Stewart, Minister, British Embassy
  • Lord Chalfont, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs

The Foreign Secretary outlined the political and economic measures which the UK proposed to take in the event of a Southern Rhodesian unilateral declaration of independence. He prefaced his summary with the statement that the UK would employ military force only in the unlikely circumstance that the situation in Southern Rhodesia deteriorated to the point where the Southern Rhodesian authorities themselves requested it.

If UDI is announced the UK will: 1) dismiss all Southern Rhodesian ministers; 2) end Commonwealth preferences; 3) exclude Rhodesian tobacco exports to the UK; and, 4) call immediately for a meeting of the Security Council. In the UN the UK will seek a resolution welcoming the measures which it has taken and calling on all members to assist the UK in making these measures effective. The object, Mr. Stewart said, would be to head off wilder action which might otherwise be taken in the UN.

The Foreign Secretary said that unfortunately some of the economic measures and possible Rhodesian retaliatory action against Zambia might undo some of the good work which has been done, with U.S. help, to strengthen sterling. He said that the UK hoped if financial difficulties for sterling arise from the economic measures taken, that the U.S. will give further help. He estimated the potential strain on sterling resulting from possible UK measures and SR retaliation at as much as #200 million. He said he was making this point at the request of the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

If Smith does not make an early declaration of independence, the UK will wait two or three weeks and then try to get a constitutional conference organized to draw up a new constitution. The Foreign Secretary said that it is not clear to what degree Smith has been moved by world-wide opposition to UDI.

Secretary Rusk asked whether economic sanctions would require legislative action in the UK. Mr. Stewart replied that legislation would not be necessary since action could be taken on the grounds of rebellion against the Crown.

The Under Secretary said that the practical economic measures we can take without Congressional action are limited. We can apply export controls against SR but are doubtful that it would be very effective since there are alternative sources of supply for the commodities involved. So far as imports are concerned, we cannot apply the Trading with the Enemy Act in the absence of a state of war or the declaration of a national emergency. The only possibility we can see at this time would be action pursuant to a resolution by the Security Council under Article 41 of the Charter. The US could help the UK on tobacco through medium-term commodity credits. It was our understanding, however, that in view of the level of tobacco stocks in the UK, there would be no immediate problem. We could not help with respect to the sugar quota which would require legislative action and this would be controversial in Congress.

Mr. Leddy asked if the UK believed that economic sanctions would force Southern Rhodesia to change its political stance, and observing that economic sanctions had not been historically effective for this purpose. The Foreign Secretary replied that he would hope so but it would take time. Meanwhile, white-black relations would be exacerbated throughout Africa.

The Secretary and Under Secretary, referring to the estimate of 200 million pounds sterling loss in the first year, if Zambian copper exports were cut off, gave the UK representatives no encouragement regarding the willingness of the US to give additional support to sterling in these circumstances.

Sir Paul Gore-Booth pointed out that Southern Rhodesia can easily cut off power to Zambia. Furthermore, Zambia itself may make it inevitable that Southern Rhodesia will take action against it. The Under Secretary asked if Zambia could be kept under control so that it did not provoke Southern Rhodesian retaliation. The Foreign Secretary said he hoped so. A further difficulty would arise if Southern Rhodesia expelled laborers from Zambia and Malawi.

In discussing the Portuguese attitude both the Secretary and the Foreign Secretary expressed doubts that Portugal would recognize Southern Rhodesia immediately. Also it was doubtful that South Africa would give early recognition.

The Secretary expressed concern that a two-thirds majority might be found in the General Assembly for a peacekeeping force. Mr. Stewart agreed and said it would be difficult for the UK to oppose such a proposal without encouraging the colored races of the world to turn against the Western powers.

In discussing possible airlift requirements for assuring the continuation of Zambian copper exports, Mr. Fredericks said a survey indicated that as much as 100,000 tons of copper would have to be brought out and coal brought in. The Secretary said he was skeptical of the estimates of the carrying capacity of the railroads and thought they were probably low. He said the US would be reluctant to call on military air transport to transport coal and copper when commercial transport was available. Secretary McNamara endorsed this view.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Kingdom, Vol. VII, Memos and Miscellaneous. Confidential. Drafted by the Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, J. Harold Shullaw, and approved in S, U, and G on October 19. The source text is marked “Part 4 of 6.” The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office.