84. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1

Our Leopoldville representative has provided the following comment on the proposed covert action program in the Congo.2

Although Ileo is currently planning to revise his government and present it to Parliament for approval, most Congolese political leaders are convinced he will not be able to obtain a confidence vote. Other individuals who might possibly form a government include Adoula, Bomboko, Bolikango, Gizenga and Kamitatu. Bomboko has eliminated himself from the race and is currently supporting Adoula. These two individuals have agreed to work together closely to obtain a moderate government.

If Ileo withdraws or fails to obtain a confidence vote, Adoula appears the most likely candidate to form a government. In view of Gizenga’s and Kamitatu’s opposition to Kasavubu it is doubtful that he would call upon either of them unless no other person was available. Although Bomboko is working closely with Adoula and does not feel that Ileo can form a government, he does not want to appear to be undercutting Ileo at the present time.

Our Leopoldville representative has referred to Embassy Dispatch No. 468 of May 24, 19613 which contains revised estimates of potential voting lineup in the Congolese party. This dispatch gives Ileo a probable 60 votes out of a total of 136 in the Chamber and 44 probable votes out of a total of 83 in the Senate. These figures are considered overly optimistic and we have been advised that both the Embassy and our representative are working up a new estimate based upon current consultations with local contacts.

Prospects for Government of Katanga participation in Parliament appear increasingly good, but the final outcome will be dependent on the Milan negotiations and continued efforts by the Congolese government and the UNOC. The question of Gizenga’s participation remains uncertain. It is possible that some of his followers will come to Parliament if they are given protection and transportation by the [Page 114] UNOC, even if Gizenga himself refuses to attend. This does not mean, however, that they would necessarily support a moderate government. It is doubted that Gizenga would personally attend Parliament even though he might send his chief followers. Our representative believes that it is wishful thinking to expect Gizenga and his followers to accept minor positions in the new government. It is considered that he would not settle for less than the post of Vice Premier if admitted to the government.

Our representative recommends that we not go all out in support of Ileo if it appears that he has little chance of forming a government. It is, however, considered that Adoula and Bomboko would vote for and support Ileo in the initial instance even though convinced he has little chance of winning a vote of confidence. Our support [less than 1 line not declassified] would therefore not be in opposition to Kasavubu’s designation of Ileo as the individual to attempt to form a government.

Both the Ambassador and our representative disagree with the view that a relatively large program will not be necessary if Gizenga does not attend Parliament. The need to undertake such a program at the earliest possible date is emphasized.

It is agreed that the operation should proceed on a strict need-for basis, under the Ambassador’s control, and with selected Congolese deciding who is to be aided, and how.

Our representative states that the majority of funds used in the program can be handled so that the U.S. Government can plausibly deny involvement. Frequent status reports will be provided. Every effort will be made to avoid prejudicing future effectiveness of the individuals to be aided. They will be discouraged from taking extreme positions.4

  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 82–00450R, Box 6, Folder 7, 40 Committee, Congo (K), 1960–1964. Secret. No drafting information appears on the original but it is attached to a transmittal slip dated June 14 from Glenn Fields to Thomas A. Parrott, Secretary of the Special Group, that reads: “More background re Congo paper. Copy of this being handed to State.”
  2. The following summary is based on telegram 1465 from Leopoldville to CIA, June 12. (Ibid., Job 78–00435R, DDO/ISS Files, Box 1, Folder 7, [cryptonym not declassified] Ops)
  3. Not found.
  4. CIA telegram 45581 to Leopoldville, June 15, reported that the overall [cryptonym not declassified] program had still not been reviewed or approved by higher authority, and would not be prior to June 22. (Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 78–00435R, DDO/ISS Files, Box 1, Folder 7)