83. Memorandum for the Record1


  • Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 8 June 1961


  • Messrs. Bowles, Gilpatric, Bundy, Ralph Dungan, Dulles

Mr. Dungan, Special Assistant to the President, participated in the Special Group meeting for the first time.

[Page 112]

1. Congo

Messrs. Bowles and Gilpatric agreed with the plan for the Congo.2 Mr. Bowles conditioned his approval on the acceptance of the three provisions set forth in the State Department internal memorandum dated 6 June 1961 (copy attached).3 Mr. Dulles indicated that these conditions were accepted by the Agency but he pointed out that the condition which prescribed the inclusion of Gizenga or his representative in the Leopoldville Government involved the danger of bringing in a representative of Moscow who would attempt to subvert and control the government. Mr. Bundy felt that he could not approve this program without reference to higher authority.4

Note was made of the possibility that if Gizenga decided to participate in a new Leopoldville Government or Parliament, he had ample resources and a chance eventually to win control of the government.5

[Omitted here is discussion of other subjects.]

  1. Source: National Security Council, Intelligence Files, Special Group, Minutes and Approvals, 1961. Secret; Eyes Only.
  2. Document 82.
  3. Footnote 2 to Document 82.
  4. On June 10, Tweedy advised the Deputy Director for Coordination in the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Joseph W. Scott, that in view of the fact that the Leopoldville Station was already reporting requests for support, the Agency had decided to see whether Bundy would agree to partial clearance of the proposed CA program for the Congo, even though the whole program might not be reviewed until June 15. Scott gave his approval. (Memorandum for the record, June 12, 1961; Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 78–01450R, DDP Subject Files, Box 1, Folder 7, Area Activity—Africa) In a memorandum to Kennedy dated June 10, McGeorge Bundy reported that a meeting was being arranged with the President to discuss all U.S. clandestine activities in support of political leaders and parties, including in particular a proposal for action in the Congo. One small aspect of the Congo proposal, however, had been presented with an urgency that had led him to approve it in the President’s absence on the basis of clear State Department concurrence—an expenditure of [dollar amount not declassified] in support of particular activities designed to strengthen the moderate camp in the Congo. Bundy stated that there was danger of losing an important moderate group if U.S. action were delayed and noted that “very much larger sums have been spent in the past in the same direction, through the same channels and without embarrassment.” (See Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume XX, Congo Crisis, Document 71)
  5. In CIA telegram 44709 to Leopoldville, June 10, the Agency reported that while authority for the whole [cryptonym not declassified] program had not yet been received, it had requested and received specific approval for the Station’s recommendations that [amount not declassified] francs be paid to [text not declassified] and [text not declassified] francs to [text not declassified] through [text not declassified]. The cable warned that maximum security had to be observed and that, unless no alternatives were possible, Embassy officers should not handle direct payments. (Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 78–00435R, DDO/ISS Files, Box 1, Folder 7, [cryptonym not declassified] Ops)