5. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1


I Objectives

A. The role of KUBARK in the Belgian Congo during the period prior to 30 June 1960, should be to ensure that U.S. aims for the area, both the Congo and the other parts of the continent whose relationship with the Congo will affect our aims, can be implemented. These aims are as follows:

1. The election of a government oriented to the West, friendly to the United States, devoted to ideals which may best guarantee stability and order.

2. The identification, isolation and exclusion of bloc-supported, bloc-oriented and Marxist groups.

B. For the accomplishment of these aims, KUBARK must address itself to a number of goals as follows:

1. The tendency in the Congo is for political groupings to develop on the basis of tribal connections. This has led to an extraordinary fractionalization which, should it continue, can be depended upon to hinder the development of a politically unified state which could provide a secure base for the economic development upon which economic stability depends. In this connection it would seem obvious to support a movement which could cut across tribal lines and which would draw its strength from a wide geographic base. [6½ lines not declassified]

2. No one leader has shown himself to be a disinterested statesman. Each of the many party and party-fraction leaders has been utilizing his tribal associations and followers for the purpose of self-aggrandizement. No one seems to have evolved a political platform on the basis of ideology; the only theme with any appeal on a national basis has been that of independence and, since independence is a fore-gone conclusion, there remains only an attempt to identify oneself with its attainment. Although some will have more success than others, it is inevitable that each ethno-political entity will be represented in the government-to-be. Our goal in this connection is to be able to deal with [Page 11] and influence as many as possible of these groups. Our task will be to identify individual leaders whose policies most nearly coincide with ours and offer them some support. We should also attempt to identify other leaders whose views may not coincide with ours who are fairly sure of some success in the forthcoming elections. Although we may not support them to the same degree, we should avoid any action which will make enemies of them and take some insurance for future shifts in political power. We should realize that in most cases the political leaders of the Congo today have not matured ideologically. Most have shown themselves willing to take help from any quarter and many have been amenable to bloc blandishments and aid. In our view this should not be interpreted to mean that the bloc-supported groups have committed themselves ideologically either to the East or to communism. Rather than consider these groups as targets for attack, we should prefer to attack, where possible, the bloc sources which are attempting to subvert them.2

[Omitted here is further discussion on the situation in the Belgian Congo.]

  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 64–00352R, DDO/ISS Files, Box 1, Folder 7, AF Division, 1960. Secret. A stamped note indicates that the paper was a DD/P document.
  2. In CIA telegram 27945 to Leopoldville, May 4, the CIA instructed the Station to develop the widest possible spectrum of contacts and friends and to cultivate people close to the top in all parties who might become important. Given the short time involved, it was unlikely that this could appreciably affect the elections, but it was important to try to create goodwill and means of access during the period of formation of the new government and afterwards. (Ibid., [text not declassified], Volume 2)