484. Telegram From the Station in the Congo to the Central Intelligence Agency1

8296. Ref Kinshasa Limdis 2426.2

1. Ref reports essence of [COS] conversations with [Identity 1] and [Mobutu] in which [Mobutu] demanded that [Godley] leave the Congo.

2. Station currently reassessing its relationship with [Identity 2] and [Mobutu], [Identity 1] and assessing current GDRC foreign policy developments in light of certain of [Mobutu’s] recent actions. Cable on this subject will follow shortly.3

3. [Mobutu’s] insistence that [Godley] must go represents complete reversal of his 8 Sept statements to [COS] that his ([Mobutu’s]) disagreements with [Godley] had been completely resolved. While there are no doubt numerous factors which motivated [Mobutu] in reaching this decision, believe [Mobutu] was sincere when he patched up relations with [Godley]. However, [cryptonym not declassified] decision to withold air support during the late Sept Kisangani crisis was interpreted by [Mobutu] as “proof” that [Godley] did not support the govt. Despite the Station’s many assertions to the contrary, [Mobutu] continues blame [Godley] for the decision to withold an air strike and the resulting danger in which the regime was placed by this decision.

4. In addition to the Kisangani problem, Station suspects [Mobutu] endeavoring establish himself as a leader of the African states. In order achieve this objective, he probably believes he must prove that he is not a “[U.S.] puppet”. Thus by demanding recall [Godley] suspect he thinks he will be able demonstrate that he not under [U.S.] influence. This move may well be followed by other actions designed to support the thesis that [Mobutu] is truly an independent African nationalist, and some of his moves will almost certainly appear [anti-U.S.] in nature.4

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5. [name not declassified] told [COS] that [Godley] now believes it would be advisable for [COS] to be recalled to mark [USG] displeasure with [Mobutu]. While Station disappointed by turn of events, it does not concur with this view. Believe logic which motivated HQS decision to maintain [COS] in Kinshasa for completion his tour continues be applicable in current situation. Should developments convince Station otherwise, Kinshasa would immediately so advise HQS.

6. Paras 1–4 above shown to [name not declassified] in draft but not yet coordinated with [Godley] who will be tied up with deputy chief CINCSTRIKE until late afternoon. Will advise if he disagrees with points outlined paras 1–4. Thus request that contents this message not be mentioned to [Department of State] pending Kinshasa’s follow-up cable indicating [Godley’s] approval or disapproval.5

7. No index.

  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, [text not declassified], Vol. IV, Mobutu. Secret; Rybat; Priority, Director. Received at 1345Z.
  2. Not found.
  3. Not found.
  4. A Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Information Cable from Kinshasa, TDCS DB–315/02971–66, October 14, reported that Mobutu told a close associate that he was tired of what he believed to be excessive U.S. Government pressure on him on various questions concerning the Congo. He said American aid was designed for the benefit of the United States rather than the recipient country. He also complained of the problems he had with the U.S. Embassy over the use of aircraft in the Kisangani affair. (Central Intelligence Agency Files, [text not declassified], Vol. IV, Mobutu)
  5. Ambassador Godley left the Congo on October 15.