Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIII, Congo, 1960–1968

442. Telegram From the Station in the Congo to the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Leopoldville, October 25, 1965.

1834 (In 79991). Ref Leop 1833 (In 79998).²

1. Although recognize contingency fund approval by [303 Committee] per Dir 49147³ may no longer be applicable, strongly recommend HQS approve ref request.

2. As result ODYOKE decision not to engage in political action, ODYOKE influence within GDRC councils has never been lower since departure of Lumumba. Leop now preparing detailed cable this subject but suffice it say for purposes this message [Mobutu] remains almost our only anchor to the windward. Thus, do not believe we can afford risk possibility of his losing his current job or his being discredited by possible revelations of fact he expended [Congolese army] “psychological action” funds to support [cryptonym not declassified] efforts to build balancing force in parliament. Failure provide these funds would probably confirm idea which now prevalent among [cryptonym not declassified] group that ODYOKE is opposed to them and hopes to bring about their political demise. While [Godley] stipulation that [cryptonym not declassified] must agree not to tell other [cryptonym not declassified] of this gift will partially limit its value, [Mobutu] would know of it and would continue to work with [cryptonym not declassified] group to try ensure group’s continued cooperation with ODYOKE. Wish stress importance of obtaining cooperation of [cryptonym not declassified] for whether or not ODACID approves of them, they continue to play key role, probably a predominant role, on Congolese political scene. For example, in nineteen-man Kimba govt, [cryptonym not declassified] group controls six ministers and one secretary of state and should be able exert considerable influence over six other ministers and one other secretary of state.

3. Please advise if additional supporting info necessary.

4. Hope HQS will obtain approval ref request as soon as possible.⁴

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, [text not declassified], Vol. III, Mobutu. Secret; Rybat; [cryptonym not declassified]. No time of receipt appears on the message.
2. Telegram 1833 from Leopoldville to CIA, October 25, transmitted a message from Godley to Fredericks recommending that the Station be authorized to provide Mobutu with funds that would permit him to replace what he took from the army’s “psychological action” account to fund Nendaka and Bomboko. The Ambassador regretted that Mobutu had done this, but agreed that he continued to be the key to the Congolese situation. Although his efforts to maintain the Kasavubu–Tshombe team failed, the United States had to depend upon him to keep any future government in line and to avoid a drift to the left. (Ibid.)
3. Not found.
4. In CIA telegram 53496 to Leopoldville, October 26, the Agency transmitted a message from Fredericks to Godley approving his recommendation for assistance to Mobutu. (Ibid.)