441. Telegram From the Station in the Congo to the Central Intelligence Agency1

1820 (In 79567). Ref Dir 48684.2

1. General comment: KUBARK should not be overly optimistic as to what it alone can accomplish in reducing insurgency and achieving pacification in the countryside. To achieve such an objective KUBARK would have to approach it on a scale similar to that employed in Vietnam. As recognize this not realistic, recommend KUBARK funds and assets be limited to developing ops intel (there is no place in Congo Govt where detailed information on this problem is pulled together); developing access to tribal leaders for purpose of convincing them to lay groundwork for large program of pacification; funding spot requirements (such as provision of small number of arms, key foodstuffs, etc); trying influence key GDRC leaders to launch and implement overall program of pacification (economic and military) and providing technical guidance to responsible GDRC officials in implementing any such program. However, implementation of any large program should be covered by [cryptonym not declassified]. In short, covert KUBARK role would be limited to obtaining basic information on which program would be built, influencing GDRC and tribal leaders to take necessary steps to implement program, to providing limited support during early stages, to filling in any gaps not covered by [cryptonym not declassified] or GDRC and providing covert assets to guide and assist GDRC in carrying out program. In this respect it should be noted that GDRC lacks qualified personnel and any program left entirely to GDRC direction is destined to failure from start.

2. Recommend marops3 program, which funded under [cryptonym not declassified] be funded as separate project as are [cryptonym not declassified]4 and [cryptonym not declassified].5 Marops, [cryptonym not declassified] and [cryptonym not declassified] are direct paramilitary ops [Page 641] conducted under KUBARK auspices and, while they contribute to pacification, believe they should be handled separately.

[Omitted here is further discussion of the pacification program.]

  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 78–02502R, [cryptonym not declassi-fied]/Dev. & Plans, [text not declassified], Aug. ’64 thru Jan. 1967. Secret; [cryptonym not declassified]. No time of receipt appears on the message.
  2. [cryptonym not declassified] and [cryptonym not declassified] were extended until 31 Oct to allow [COS] time get clear picture of ops needs. Now require Leop views and recommendations for renewal these projects. [Footnote in the original.] This CIA telegram has not been found.
  3. Maritime operations.
  4. Operation supporting the Congolese air force.
  5. Program set up to service aircraft in the Congo.