419. Telegram From the Station in the Congo to the Central Intelligence Agency1

0133 (In 15351). Ref: Leop 0111 (In 14484).2

1. [COS] dined with [Godley] and [name not declassified] night 19 July. Per previous arrangement with [Godley], [COS] carried most of conversational ball and followed plan outlined para five ref.

2. [name not declassified] welcomed [COS] back to Congo and immediately asked how he liked the climate. As [name not declassified] obviously referring to the political climate, [COS] took following line:

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A. ODYOKE policy is to avoid split between Tshombe on one hand and Kasavubu and [less than 1 line not declassified] on other. Such split which now appears possible, could only redound to the advantage of the rebels.

B. Main problem seems to be one of personalities and mutual distrust between the two groups.

C. [COS] pointed out that while Tshombe may in all good faith have tried to work with Kasavubu and the [less than 1 line not declassified], some of his entourage had erred in their actions. [COS] cited fact that Mobutu aware of efforts bribe senior army officers and promises that these officers would gain promotion if Mobutu were removed from control of the army; fact that creation of competing security services, and specifically the general incident, had upset Kasavubu and the [less than 1 line not declassified] who feared that Tshombe entourage wished to liquidate them physically.

3. All above was said after many protestations on part both [COS] and [name not declassified] that frank speech was desirable and useful. In this vein [COS] said (with prior permission [less than 1 line not declassified] he had carefully checked all members of [less than 1 line not declassified] and that he was convinced that an entente between the Kasavubu and [less than 1 line not declassified] and Tshombe was both feasible and desirable. [COS] cited statements by all members of the [less than 1 line not declassified] to the effect they wished work with Tshombe and maintain him as prime minister, provided he does not seek the presidency. [COS] added that he fully convinced that the [less than 1 line not declassified] as such would be willing to cooperate and he recommended that Tshombe enter into negotiations with General Mobutu, the latter to speak on behalf of the [less than 1 line not declassified]. Tshombe had already stated that he found it easier to deal with Mobutu than with Kasavubu in that Mobutu never failed to be frank in his dealings with Tshombe. [less than 1 line not declassified] it would be possible to reach an agreement with the [less than 1 line not declassified], [COS] was careful to note that he not in contact with Kasavubu.)

4. In making the above statements [COS] stressed ODYOKE policy favored such an entente and underlined that he was in the Congo to help achieve this objective, not to support the [less than 1 line not declassified]. [COS] referred to stories that had circulated that he was in the Congo to support the [less than 1 line not declassified] and denied them.

5. During the conversation [Godley] and [COS] repeatedly stressed that ODYOKE believes Tshombe must remain as prime minister. In this context [COS] referred to his most recent conversations with Governor Harriman and repeated the latter’s hope that Tshombe would remain in the govt. (The governor had authorized this.)

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6. [7 lines not declassified] and [COS] hit hard on the consequences which would result were Tshombe to resign. He acknowledged seriousness of such a step but indicated that he was not far from resigning. [5½ lines not declassified] the fact that he has just brought all of his family back to Leo, convinced both [Godley] and [COS] that Tshombe does not now intend to resign.

7. [name not declassified] stated he was delighted with the more than frank conversation, said he hoped [COS] would continue to advise him, and said he would look forward to seeing [COS] again. While recognize this probably polite talk from an accomplished politician, [COS] will make every effort to renew contacts with [name not declassified] as often as is feasible and/or as often as [Godley] will permit.

8. See Leo Embtel 137 to Dept (66 to Brus and 52 to Eliz)3 for [Godley’s] report on the conversation.

9. After the talks [Godley] expressed the view that the frank approach had been the proper one, and he noted that [name not declassified] interest had never once lagged. Apparently this is not always the case.

  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, [text not declassified], Fiche 47, Row 1, Frames 6–10, [text not declassified]. Secret; Rybat; [2 cryptonyms not declassified]; Priority. Received at 1750Z.
  2. Telegram 0111 from Leopoldville to CIA, July 19, reported that Mobutu told the Chief of Station that afternoon that he strongly supported the U.S. Government position that Kasavubu and Tshombe must both remain in the government. After reviewing the mutual suspicions separating Tshombe from the [cryptonym not declassified], Mobutu said he would do everything within his power to get Kasavubu to agree to retain Tshombe as Prime Minister. The Chief of Station informed Headquarters that when he met with [text not declassified] that evening he planned to tell him that he had talked with all members of the [text not declassified] and that they were all willing to support him. He would also point out to [text not declassified] that the present political conflict was based to a large extent upon the mistrust and fear on the part of the [text not declassified], based partly on some of the actions of Tshombe’s entourage. (Ibid., Job 78–00435R, DDO/ISS Files, Box 2, Folder 11, [cryptonym not declassified] Operations)
  3. Not printed.