176. Telegram From the Station in the Congo to the Central Intelligence Agency1

1413 (In 05830). Ref: [less than 1 line not declassified].2

1. Ref plus related lesser developments lead us believe it time consider operational tactics to insure ODYOKE against possible loss of influence in Congo if [Identity 1] falls and his equipe eclipsed by influx [Identity 2] or other entourage. Though we far from certain how present muddle will resolve itself, we reasonably optimistic that with fast footwork and pertinent decisions ODYOKE can maintain its position vis-à-vis any of the more probable successor regimes to that of [Identity 1].

2. Must bear in mind however that ODYOKE has for so long been associated in so many minds with unequivocal [cryptonym not declassified] support that if we were to adopt traditional policy of “watchful waiting” toward any new regime such posture would almost certainly be misinterpreted by that regime. We have gone for broke for so long that our reservoir of trust among [cryptonym not declassified] is disturbingly low.

3. While we might be able count on Congolese venality and lust for power to enable us to buy our way through any immediate crises, such tactics would seem to return us to mid-62 morass rather than moving us ahead toward goal of united and stable Congo. However difficult a nettle it may be to grasp, it our conviction that there are all sorts of political figures in Congo who while strongly anti-Communist simply do not like [Identity 1] or his associates. Given basically conservative character [Identity 3], it seems highly likely these figures will play key role in new regime.

4. Thus believe it incumbent on us to begin deciding which of these figures we (KUBARK) can work with, can influence, and therefore should support.

[Omitted here is further discussion of the political situation.]

5. While we cannot argue with conviction that CDA has yet become impressive political organization, mass forces it claims to represent may be more formidable than those which [cryptonym not declassified] and/or RADECO have rallied up to now. RADECO currently [Page 252] negotiating with Conakat and MNC/Kiwewa, but outcome these negotiations remains very much an open question. And this seems to us to be crux of problem. However desirable national party and “apolitical” government may be, neither seem to be in cards for Congo at present time. Strong leader might make these goals feasible, but even [Identity 4] had his problems. Thus inclined believe we should recognize political appeal of regional groupings and alliances, and try to influence and focus them on one objective—unified Congo. [cryptonym not declassified] have obviously tried political alliance system, but in terms of mass support they have always dealt from weakness. Popular dissatisfaction with [cryptonym not declassified] inability solve overwhelming problems overnight has only underscored this weakness. Ineffectiveness [cryptonym not declassified] security forces—ANC and Sûreté—has further undercut their national hegemony.

[Omitted here is further discussion of the political situation.]

  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 78–00435R, DDO/ISS Files, Box 2, Folder 10, [cryptonym not declassified] Operations. Secret; Rybat; [cryptonym not declassified]. No time of receipt appears on the message.
  2. Not found.