140. Editorial Note

Telegram 6570 from the Station in Leopoldville to the Central Intelligence Agency, April 10, 1963, reported that the political situation there was so murky that it was difficult to determine whether Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula would survive. On April 9, the Chief of Station met with the Prime Minister and told him that he thought that the great mass of the Congolese population was disgusted with the lack of government action and the ostentatious living and corruption of its political leaders. He urged Adoula to take decisive action to terminate the [Page 198] incompetent parliament immediately, suggesting that he select a small government of the most qualified individuals and announce a program with limited objectives such as severe austerity, an anti-corruption campaign, and immediate implementation of a public works program. (Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 78–00435R, DDO/ISS Files, Box 2, Folder 1, [cryptonym not declassified] Operations)

The Agency responded in telegram 31679, April 10, that the disturbing aspect of telegram 6570 was that even though Leopoldville agreed that Adoula had shown himself thoroughly incapable of taking any action—decisive or otherwise—during the crisis, Leopoldville still believed that urging him to take such action would have the desired results. Experience regretfully just did not permit such a hopeful conclusion to be drawn. (Ibid.)

In telegram 6687 to Headquarters, April 20, Leopoldville reported that the [text not declassified] were again in trouble and facing a no confidence vote. On the urging of the Ambassador, funds had been passed [text not declassified] for use in this vote. The Station requested authorization to expend additional funds to keep the [text not declassified] afloat. (Ibid.) The Agency responded in telegram 34111, April 20, that its impression was that Adoula’s inept handling of cabinet reorganization, his failure to take other [text not declassified] into his confidence, and the fact that he could rely on only 48 chamber votes appeared to make it unlikely he could survive until the end of June. Hence Headquarters, while authorizing additional funds, was reluctant to pour in money with scant hope of success. Due to the past failures of either CIA or the Department of State to influence Adoula’s tactics, the Agency was pessimistic that any new radical approach could change the situation and get Adoula out of his self made box. (Ibid.)

Telegram 6708 from Leopoldville to CIA, April 23, expressed the hope that Adoula would close parliament before the end of April, and said that in view of his success in the April 20 no confidence vote, he might make it through. The Station was keeping its fingers crossed. (Ibid.)