117. Telegram From the Station in the Congo to the Central Intelligence Agency1
1. [Identity 1] called [COS] his home [less than 1 line not declassified]. Said [Identity 2] had advised him of his 7 May conversation with [COS] and had asked him [Identity 1] for his advice whether to accept ODYOKE offer of aid in formation new party. [Identity 1] explained that he and other [cryptonym not declassified] believe ODYOKE has accomplished more in the Congo than could have been expected in that it succeeded in torpedoing [Identity 3] preventing [Identity 4] or [Identity [Page 162] 5] from obtaining control GOC and assisted in establishing [Identity 2] regime. He said [cryptonym not declassified] understand reasons behind ODYOKE actions, i.e., that ODYOKE did not wish an unfriendly and pro bloc regime in the Congo. However he added that [cryptonym not declassified] concerned by possibility ODYOKE might now or later switch its support to Tshombe (T).
2. [Identity 1] said T popularity is on upswing within Congo and T may go for brass ring and try become premier or president. In such case [Identity 1] said he could understand ODYOKE might prefer T to [Identity 2] view fact both T and [Identity 2] anti Communists. Added support of T might facilitate things for Chief ODYOKE in that T appears be fair haired boy more conservative members Congress. [Identity 1] concluded by saying he and most [cryptonym not declassified] strongly favor effort work with ODYOKE but before advising [Identity 2] he needed some assurance from [COS] that ODYOKE would not turn against [Identity 2] and favor T.
3. When [COS] expressed surprise that [cryptonym not declassified] could suspect such change in ODYOKE policy, [Identity 1] outlined following points as apparently substantiating such possibility:
A. [Ambassador Timberlake] recalled and replaced by [Gullion] despite fact ODYOKE fully aware [cryptonym not declassified] preferred [Timberlake].
B. Conservative congressional leaders have expressed approval of Tshombe and have been critical of [Identity 2] and some of his supporters. [Identity 1] opined Chief ODYOKE might find it convenient for internal political reasons sacrifice [Identity 2].
C. Station has recently cracked down on financial support at time [Identity 2] in trouble.
4. [COS] endeavored reassure [Identity 1]. Held long meeting with him night 10 May and again on morning 12 May. Explained need for tightened financial strings. Pointed out that Station had accepted unorthodox funding methods during continued Congo crisis but explained that neither Station nor HQS believes vote buying to be more than interim step. Assured [Identity 1] that continued KUBARK support would be forthcoming, probably even including use of some bribe money, if the [cryptonym not declassified] were concurrently endeavoring establish a more permanent organizational solution (a national political party).
5. [Identity 6] raised similar problem with [COS] 11 and 12 May. [COS] used same arguments in replying.
6. At 12 May meeting [Identity 1] told [COS] he had recommended [Identity 2] make every effort comply with Station recommendations and begin organizational efforts ASAP.[Page 163]
7. Following are Station comments on Reference A:
A. While concur [Identity 2] should provide his own plan, it Station and [Embassy] experience that to get things done in Congo it advisable do as much as possible oneself. Certainly any final program must be worked out by [cryptonym not declassified] but to be realistic believe Station must make some contribution.
B. Leop not sanguine re possibility removing Congolese venality by means school or seminar for leaders. As in most backward areas which do not have civic traditions, suspect venal motivation will remain for many generations.
C. Fully concur para 1C Ref A.
8. Leop looking forward receipt materials re civic action. Per [less than 1 line not declassified]4 would appreciate any written material or guidance which HQS can provide. Specifically would appreciate any studies re political organizational work conducted by KUBARK in other retarded areas. Wish take advantage KUBARK experience elsewhere in order avoid as many mistakes as possible.
9. [Identity 2] not under [cryptonym not declassified] care. Have tried achieve this through [Mobutu] and [Identity 2] but no luck to date.
10. Leop trying obtain list Releve members [cryptonym not declassified].5 Basis talks leaders believe Releve has wide geographical basis and includes members from all provinces but cannot yet categorically confirm this. Will advise.
End of message.
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 78–00435R, DDO/ISS Files, Box 1, Folder 10, [cryptonym not declassified] Operations. Secret; Rybat; [cryptonym not declassified]; Routine. Received at 1243Z.↩
- Gave guidance to Station for future talks with [cryptonym not declassified]. [Footnote in the original.] This CIA telegram 09888 to Leopoldville, May 11, stated that CIA support should be contingent on [Identity 2] producing a specific plan. The Chief of Station’s advisory role was desirable, but the plan had to be [Identity 2] own product to be meaningful and have hope of implementation. Also [Identity 2] should not wait for civic spirit to grow among Congolese leaders to supplant venal motivation; his plan should include a school or seminar for leader indoctrination. (Ibid.)↩
- In telegram 3855 from Leopoldville to CIA, May 9, the Chief of Station reported that when he met with [Identity 2] on May 7, the latter had not yet prepared an action plan. The Chief of Station told him he thought the current regime was doomed unless it achieved results on the economic level and instituted a program of political solidarity. [Identity 2] said that a public works program had long been his goal, but he could not launch such a program until the budget was voted. When queried regarding the possibility of attempting to create a political party based on key political leaders from each province, [Identity 2] said that was already his plan. He asked the Chief of Station if he could count on U.S. support, to which the former replied that he thought the United States would support such an effort if it offered the possibility of obtaining a stable government and guaranteed financial control of expenditures. The meeting terminated with [Identity 2] promise to come up with his own organizational planning. (Ibid.)↩
- Not found.↩
- In telegram 3822 to CIA, May 5, Leopoldville reported that the [cryptonym not declassified] team members had decided to try to take over the Releve group as a nucleus for a parliamentary majority. The objective would be to convert Releve, which was composed of representatives of many political parties, into a national party in support of Adoula. (Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 78–00435R, DDO/ISS Files, Box 1, Folder 10, [cryptonym not declassified] Operations)↩